Kadancha

இல்லை என்பதே எனது புரிதல். நியாயமான கேள்விகள். முதல் வீடியோ இல் இருக்கும் Chinese American, சினிமா துறையில் உள்ளவர். சில வேறு விடீயோக்களில், தான் இந்த தமிழ் சினிமாவை பார்ப்பது தனது புது ideas இற்காக என்று மற்றவர்களுடனான சர்வசாதாரண உரையாடலில் சொல்லி உள்ளார். நடிகர் விஜே நடிப்பை அவதானித்து, விஜே காராட்டி கலையை முறையாக பயின்று வந்தவர் என்றும் சொன்னார். நான் அறிந்தவரையில், விஜே காராட்டி கலையை முறையாக பயின்றவர். நீங்கள் சொன்னது, chasm between western and eastern real and cinematic cultural taste.

ஐரோப்பாவில் உள்ளவர்கள் ஏறத்தாழ சமூகத்தில் ஒரே மட்டத்தில் உள்ளவர்கள். UK அதற்கு எதிர்மாறானது. இதில் UK இல் உழைத்து உயர்ந்தவர்களுடன், வெளியில், ஐரோப்பாவில் இருந்து கூட பல முறையற்ற வழிகளில் உழைத்து, பணத்தை கொண்டு வந்து முதலிட்டு இருப்பவர்களும் உள்ளார்கள். எனவே, மனிதருக்கு இருக்கும் உண்மையான குணங்கள் இயற்றக்கையாகவே வெளிப்படக் கூடிய சமூக வெளியை UK இல் இருக்கிறது. ஆனால், இந்த நிகழ்வு நடந்தது, இந்த பெண்ணின், கணவரின் தனது சமூகம் தவிர்ந்து உதவி பெற தயங்கியது. மற்றது, தான் இறந்தாலும் தனது சந்ததி பிழைப்பது (எப்படி என்றாலும்) என்பதை யோசிக்காமல், தனது பிள்ளை எப்படி வாழுமோ என நினைப்பது. இந்த பெண் இப்படியாக தனது மகனை யோசிக்காமல் விட்டது நலம். இப்படியான சிந்தனை, எமது மரபணுவில் பதிந்து உள்ளதாகவே நான் நினைக்கிறேன். எமது சமூக சிந்தனை மற்றும் வளர்ப்பிலும் இப்படியான மனநிலை வருவதற்கு ஓர் காரணம். 1) இந்த பெண் செய்தது. 2) கிழக்கு London இல் கடையில் வேலை செய்தவர் செய்தது. இது ஒப்பீட்டளவில் சாதாரண நிலையில் இருந்தவர்கள். 3) 3-4 கிழமைக்கு முதல் whatsapp இல் வந்தது. தமிழ் நாட்டில் மிகவும் உயர் திறமை சித்தி அடைந்து, US இற்கு வந்து, வசதியாக வாழ்ந்த ஒருவர், வேலை இழந்து, சிரமத்தின் காரணமாக, குடும்பத்துடன் தற்கொலை. 4) 2009 - 2010, இந்தியாவில் இருந்து US வந்து, மிகவும் வசதியாக வாழ்ந்தவர், 2009 stock market விழுந்து, பணத்தை இழந்து, தனது 16 வயது மகன், மனைவி, 14 வயது மக்கள் மற்றும் மாமியாருடன் தற்கொலை.

இது சினிமா துறையில் உள்ளவர்களால். stunt masters விமர்சனம்.

கொண்டல் கடலை (chick peas) உடன் சேர்த்து சாலட் செய்வதற்கு, பாவிக்க கூடிய மரக்கறிகளும், பொருட்களும். இவை எல்லாம் பாவிக்க வேண்டியதிலை. இதில் ஓர் முறை என்று இல்லை. உங்களிடம் உள்ளவற்றை வைத்து, எது எவற்றுடன் ஒத்து வரும், மற்றும் கண்மட்ட அளவு என்று பார்த்து செய்வது. இருப்பவற்றை வைத்து உடனடி salad இற்கு கொண்டல் கடலை (tinned) உகந்தது. அவித்தும் செய்யலாம். இது சுவைக்கும், texture இற்குமான சாலட். ஒவொரு தரமும் வெவ்வேறு சுவையும், texture உம் தரும். 1) கொண்டல் கடலை 2) bell பேப்பர் (1 cm துண்டுகள்). நேரம் இருந்தால் முழுமையாக நெருப்பில் அல்லது grill இல் நேரடியாக சுட்டு, கருகிய தோலை நீக்கி விட்டு, ஓரளவு நீளமான தூண்டுகைகளாக. 3) தயிர் 4) cheese ( விருப்புக்கு ஏற்ப) 5) carrots, சிறு துண்டுகளாக 6) தக்காளி (plum அல்லது baby tomato). Flame grill If big (beef) tomato. 7) முள்ளங்கி (சிவப்பு அல்லது ஊதா நிறத்தில் பாக்கு அளவில் இருப்பது. சிலவேளைகளில் ஓர் சுனைப்பு தன்மை இருக்கும், கொதி நீரில் .1 நிமிடம் போட்டு மூடி விட்டு பாவிக்கவும்) பச்சை மிளகாய் அல்லது எந்த மிளகாயும் உறைப்புக்கு ஏற்ற படி 9) Avacado 10) tinned tuna அல்லது salmon (இதை பாவித்தால் cheese, தயிரை தவிர்க்கவும்), slightly spiced, grilled, ovened or shallow fried chicken pieces or even any other meat or fish as you wish 11) salt, எலுமிச்சம் புளி, சாலட் ட்ரெஸ்ஸிங், ஒலிவ் ஆயில், மிளகு (dressing, தேவைக்கும், இருப்புக்கும் ஏற்றபடி) 12) வேறு எதாவது மரக்கறி- spring onion, salad onion 13) சிறிதளவு மிகவும் மெலிதாக அரிந்த உள்ளி மெலிதாக அரிந்த carrot உடன், brown sugar, எலுமிச்சபுளியுடன் ம் 14) chat மசாலா, மல்லி இலை அல்லது வேறு parsely, thyme, chives, oregano, காய்ந்தது என்றால் வேறு சுவை. 15) 15) உங்களிடமுள்ள உடனடியாக, பச்சையாக சாப்பிடக் கூடிய மரக்கறி. உ.ம். courgets (small pieces), மிகவும் சிறிய, இளமையான broccoli (விரல்களால் நுள்ளி எடுக்க கூடிய அளவு).

உணர்ச்சிகள் இல்லாமல் கணிக்கப்பட்ட உண்மை நிலவரம்: https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/indias-pangong-pickle-new-delhis-options-after-its-clash-with-china/ INDIA’S PANGONG PICKLE: NEW DELHI’S OPTIONS AFTER ITS CLASH WITH CHINA CHRISTOPHER CLARY AND VIPIN NARANG JULY 2, 2020 COMMENTARY In early May, “fist fights and stone-pelting” broke out between Chinese and Indian troops at two separate sites along their disputed border. India and China are no strangers to border incidents ­— even prolonged standoffs — so the skirmishes were newsworthy but not especially noteworthy. By the end of the month, Indian and Chinese media had focused attention on several points along the Indian territory of Ladakh in the western sector of the disputed border, known as the Line of Actual Control. In this sector, that official name for the boundary is a misnomer: There is no agreement on where any “line” is, nor is there a clear mutual delineation of the territory under “actual control” of either party. By the end of the month, this episode involved a level of military activity that was at least comparable to a multi-month standoff at Doklam near the Bhutan-India-China trijunction in 2017. Despite the regularity of Sino-Indian border standoffs, there had not been a fatality or shot fired on the border since 1975. This was in part because India and China agreed to confidence-building measures in 1993, 1996, and 2013 in an effort to prevent the use of force — especially deadly force — in the border dispute. That record of nonfatal confrontation collapsed on June 15 when simmering tensions boiled over and Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a brutal brawl in the Galwan Valley. Involving stones and nail-studded clubs but no firearms, this clash claimed the lives of at least 20 Indian soldiers — including a commanding officer — and an unknown number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. It was the bloodiest confrontation on the Sino-Indian frontier in over half a century. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi now faces a daunting strategic predicament. Having already seized several tactically important positions, China is not going to just pack up and go home. Yet India’s military options to compel a Chinese retreat are poor, forcing Modi to weigh the dangers of escalation against the certainty of strategic humiliation if India does nothing to restore the status quo. Options between full-scale war and capitulation — such as limited attacks to expel Chinese forces or indirect military, diplomatic, and economic efforts to coerce withdrawal — carry their own substantial risks, including the very real possibility that they will not work. These already-difficult calculations take place in the context of a COVID-19 outbreak in India that is slowly churning through some of the country’s largest cities while devastating its economy. Modi’s position is unenviable as he considers his responses. His options range from bad, to worse, to truly ugly. China’s Moves On the Border India’s efforts at “quiet diplomacy,” its standard playbook during border standoffs with China, have thus far failed. While local military commanders reportedly reached a preliminary agreement to disengage on June 6, there was apparently still disagreement over whether China would have to abandon a position near what India calls Patrol Point 14, at a bend in the Galwan River from which China can observe Indian military movements. While Indian troops were trying to remove the newly established Chinese position, tempers finally exploded on June 15, and forces that had been arrayed against each other for weeks at high altitude and under harsh conditions finally clashed. Although military disengagement talks continue, they appear stalled, with China apparently slow-rolling by continuing to blame India for the clash and using talks to schedule further talks, all the while gaining time to consolidate its defenses at a few tactically important positions. Why is China risking a conflict with its nuclear-armed neighbor amidst a global pandemic? China has been remarkably opaque, so there are more hypotheses than answers. As Yun Sun and M. Taylor Fravel have observed, the pandemic may have heightened Chinese concerns about domestic political legitimacy and therefore sovereignty — not just with respect to India but elsewhere as well, such as Hong Kong. These concerns may have magnified Chinese leaders’ preexisting desire to arrest Indian road- and bridge-building on the frontier that might weaken China’s ability to defend disputed terrain. Beijing may additionally fear that New Delhi’s August 2019 decision to change the constitutional status of Kashmir and Ladakh was a precursor to additional Indian moves along the border, notably over the disputed region of Aksai Chin, that need to be deterred. China’s limited messaging — and its habit of lying — makes it hard to distinguish between whether China is motivated by fear of future Indian nibbling at Aksai Chin, a key plateau linking Tibet to the rest of China, or by opportunism, seeing a chance to gain territory on the cheap from an India distracted by economic and public health challenges. Or, perhaps, Beijing is simply trying to teach New Delhi a lesson that in Asia’s pecking order, China is number one. What we do know is that the scope and swath of China’s recent incursions seems different this time. The Chinese military pressed not at one point as in the past, but at several tactically important pressure points with thousands of forces across hundreds of kilometers: at Pangong Lake, Hot Springs, Galwan Valley, and Depsang Plains. There are concerning reports that China may be opening, or preparing to open, fronts in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector of the disputed border. The buildup seems orchestrated by senior PLA leaders, rather than the product of local commander freelancing, and in several places Indian officials believe China has pushed forces beyond points it previously claimed. Whether this is into “Indian territory” or not is hotly debated, but there is no doubt China is attempting to change the status quo through a series of faits accomplis. Shallow incursions in the Galwan Valley and on the Depsang Plains give China significant vantage points over — and the potential to cut off — India’s recently constructed all-weather motorway, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldi Road, along the Line of Actual Control, as well as critical feeder roads to the line itself. Elsewhere, China may be less concerned about interdicting Indian roads, and more interested in securing a buffer to protect National Highway 219, the key artery connecting Tibet with the rest of China. If China is worried about India unilaterally fortifying or settling the boundary, or paranoid about Indian Home Minister Amit Shah’s recent statements about reclaiming Aksai Chin, taking these points may help prevent that. Regardless, it is clear that the Chinese military came to play, and does not intend to go away quickly or easily. India’s Options Going Forward: From Bad to Worse to Ugly India was surprised by the scale of China’s incursions and was initially caught unprepared. It now faces the difficult challenge of trying to restore the status quo. Unfortunately, the best time to resist a fait accompli is before it is fully completed. As research by Dan Altman shows, if a fait accompli is not quickly resisted or reversed, it becomes more difficult to do so over time as the aggressor consolidates and fortifies its position, establishing a new normal. Of 59 land grabs around the world where the aggressor held territory at the end of a militarized international dispute, Altman finds 47 where the aggressor held that territory uninterrupted for the next 10 years. Those are enviable odds for China’s ability to retain its new real estate in the Himalayas. With the PLA firmly ensconced at points further along Pangong Lake, Galwan Valley, and Depsang, and with time on China’s side, what are India’s options? First, it needs to stop the bleeding. The Indian Army has to deter Chinese forces from acquiring more territory, both at the current incursion points and at other potential points of vulnerability. This means adopting a robust defensive posture that denies any deeper incursions at the existing friction points. New Delhi should also identify any additional vulnerable points along its frontier with China, focus intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets on detecting potential Chinese threats to those points, and deploy forces to deny the PLA additional gains elsewhere. Simply put, India cannot afford additional fronts or any deeper penetration where it has already suffered losses. This will be easier said than done. China has not seized positions willy nilly: In many locations it holds positions precisely because they are valuable and easier to defend than alternative claim lines. For India, stopping additional transgressions thus risks advertent escalation if it must meet Chinese penetrations head-on. There is also the growing risk of inadvertent escalation if tempers flare again — altitude and harsh conditions stress the short fuse forces may have in this area — or if there is an accident, for example involving helicopters operating in bad weather and difficult terrain, or between the speedboats that both countries deploy on Pangong Lake. Aidan Milliff correctly points out that the mountainous, high-altitude terrain in eastern Ladakh may inhibit fears of a large-scale war, but that same terrain creates “multiple windows of opportunity at the tactical level” that might provoke clashes, many of which could prove deadly. Although India’s military mobilization is now substantial, with both ground and air forces shifted to the theater and postured to deter further Chinese penetration, China has also amassed substantial forces in depth along with artillery and air power. Moreover, India has eliminated previous restrictions on the use of firearms at the border and granted “complete freedom of action” to military commanders to respond to “extraordinary situations” after the June 15 clash, and it should be assumed that China has done the same. All the ingredients for further loss of life persist, then, even if India’s sole goal is to stop further Chinese incursions. If India is successful in preventing additional losses, in the medium to long term how can it attempt to restore the pre-May status quo? The problem with faits accomplis is that the defender’s options to reverse them once completed range from bad to worse to downright ugly. There are really only three options, all of which are difficult to achieve in practice. The first option is to try to expel Chinese forces directly. This means amassing enough military power to successfully execute limited offensives at the points China now occupies and drive PLA forces back, in order to reestablish control of the lost territory or at least deny Chinese control thereof. This is a substantial amount of terrain stretching approximately 200 kilometers, from the Depsang Plains in the north past the Galwan Valley incursion, and beyond the Hot Springs transgression to Pangong Lake further south, where China has apparently seized several additional kilometers of lakefront property. There are two problems with the direct expulsion option. First, time is on China’s side. The PLA is consolidating its new positions, making it more difficult for India to undertake limited coordinated offensives at any one point, let alone all of them. Second, the mountainous terrain likely benefits the defender — in this case Chinese troops who now occupy large portions of the disputed territory — because amassing enough forces and firepower to dislodge a fortified position with limited offensives may be nearly impossible now without significant escalation. India might have to open up a new front to put pressure on Chinese lines at more tactically vulnerable points or use artillery or airpower — or both — on or behind the Line of Actual Control for the first time in decades, inviting unpredictable responses from China. The second option available to India is to indirectly expel Chinese forces by generating leverage at other points or in other domains, and trade for withdrawal. New Delhi could symmetrically seize equivalent, relatively undefended, territory on the “Chinese side” of the border and trade it in a negotiation, or punish China elsewhere through other means. Such asymmetric punishment might include actions in another theater (e.g., the South China Sea), economic pressure, or diplomatic moves that signal India’s increasing willingness to align with a broader coalition to contain an aggressive China. Here, India’s options are again limited and unattractive. There are certainly places along the disputed border where India possesses local advantages, such as it showed in Chumar in 2014, and could theoretically seize land to trade away to restore the status quo ante. Unfortunately, India’s prospects for doing so now without the element of surprise are limited, as China will have likely anticipated such retaliation and improved its defenses in those areas, neutralizing many of India’s advantages. In the maritime domain, India’s navy certainly matches well with the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean region, but its punitive options beyond that (e.g., in the South China Sea or western Pacific) are extremely limited. Furthermore, the track record of naval pressure achieving results on land is not inspiring and at best, as Julian Corbett observed long ago, “its effects must always be slow.” India’s non-military options are also realistically limited. Economically, the two countries’ trade balance favors China, and India is dependent on China for key inputs in major sectors — such as active ingredients in pharmaceuticals or microchips in electronics — that are not easy to replace quickly. Even before the border crisis, India was seeking to curtail Chinese direct investment, which is fairly modest in scale though arguably disproportionately influential in certain areas such as India’s startup sector. India can also ban specific Chinese consumer goods and services, as it did on June 29 when it blocked nearly 60 mobile applications including TikTok, denying Chinese companies access to Indian users and data. However, in many areas these moves will prove more irksome or symbolic — and unenforceable — than coercive. Although India may attempt to reduce economic activity with China in the long term, its ability to do so in a timeframe that compels withdrawal from the heights of eastern Ladakh is limited. China is likely betting that any economic punishment will hurt India more than it hurts China, the world’s second-largest economy and one on which India depends for much of its vertical supply chain. Diplomatically, India may seek to strengthen its alignment with the United States and/or the other members of the “Quad” of democratic powers in Asia, Australia and Japan. But, such moves were already afoot before the latest crisis, and any further alignment with the West faces speedbumps — such as India’s heavy dependence on Russian frontline military equipment — that will not suddenly disappear overnight. Most diplomatic moves are not likely to be painful enough to China to incentivize relinquishing valuable territory it now holds, and may merely reinforce Chinese hawks’ belief that India was always anti-China and merited preventive action as a result. The third option is perhaps the ugliest, strategically and politically: India may have no choice but to accept China’s faits accomplis and anesthetize the domestic fallout by exploiting the ambiguity around the definition and non-delineation of the Line of Actual Control, claiming that it is not Indian territory, which of course depends on the definitions of “Indian,” “territory,” and frankly, “is.” There are hints that the Indian government is preparing itself and the domestic public to do just this, as Modi himself stated that no Chinese forces were on “Indian territory” after an all-party meeting on June 19. Subsequent clarifications only served to generate confusion. But faced with few military, diplomatic, or economic options to reverse Beijing’s faits accomplis, New Delhi may have no choice but to quietly accept them. The risk, of course, is that this approach may only further embolden China to be more aggressive toward India or seize additional territory. Even if ceding these particular points to China does not amount to a tactical loss for India on the ground, the broader impact of doing so could be quite costly. In order to prevent future land grabs, India might have to mobilize a much larger force along the 2,000-plus mile border. Already, retired senior officers are talking of the need to turn the Line of Actual Control into something akin to the heavily militarized and fenced Line of Control that divides Indian- from Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Attempting something this ambitious would be challenging during good times, and virtually impossible in the midst of a pandemic forecast to cause a 4.5 percent contraction in the Indian economy this year — the worst economic crisis India has faced in a generation. A New Delhi distracted by border disputes with China cannot focus on the broader strategic competition with Beijing, gives Pakistan some breathing room, and weakens itself by diverting precious resources to defending inhospitable terrain in the hinterland. Quiet acceptance of the accumulated Chinese revisions of the territorial status quo could amount to one of India’s greatest geopolitical and strategic setbacks in decades. Looking Ahead India finds itself in a very difficult position vis-à-vis China on their disputed border. At some point, India will have to determine how it could have allowed China to surprise it and execute faits accomplis in multiple places, and what the strategic and operational warning signs were that it missed or failed to act upon. But, at the moment, its immediate challenge is to stop the bleeding, which in and of itself has all the ingredients for a tense and potentially long and escalatory standoff between Asia’s two nuclear-armed giants. Even if it can halt additional gains by the Chinese military, New Delhi may find it difficult to restore the status quo, since its options range from bad to worse to ugly. This is precisely why faits accomplis are so attractive to states, and why they are so important to reverse quickly, before they are completed and consolidated. In international politics, possession is not just nine-tenths of the law, it is the law. Christopher Clary is an assistant professor of political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York and a nonresident fellow with the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program. Vipin Narang is an associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Image: Wikicommons (Image by Nitai Mondal)

US ஏகபோகமாக மேலாண்மை இருந்தபோது, ஆஸ்திரேலியாவுக்கு இது பொருட்டே இல்லாது இருந்தது. இப்புதைய பிரச்னைகள் இரண்டு. உடனடியான பிரச்னை, மற்ற நாடுகளுக்கும் சீனாவுடன் பிரச்சனைகளும், கருத்து வெறுப்படைய இருந்தாலும், US போல பனி யுத்தத்தில் இருந்த அணி (block) சேர்த்து அல்லது இணைந்து சீனாவை எதிர்க்கவில்லை. மற்றது, சீனா அணி என்பதில் அக்கறை காட்டவும் இல்லை. இந்த அணி சேர்ப்பில் US உடன் இனைணைந்தது, ஆஸ்திரேலியாவும், கிந்தியவனும். மறுவளமாக, இவை இரண்டுமே சீனாவுடன் இப்பொது நேரடி பிரச்சனைகளை கொண்டுள்ளது. ஆனால், சீனா, US இன் இந்த அணிசேர்த்து எதிர்ப்புக்கு, தன்னை பாதுகாப்பதடற்கு எடுத்த முயற்சிகள் கூட்டாகவும், தனியாகவும் US மற்றும் இந்த அணியை எதிர்க்காத, diplomatic finesse. கீழே இருக்கும் இணைப்பை வாசிக்கவும். வீடியோ ஐயும் பார்க்கவும். ஆனால் , ஆஸ்திரேலியாவின் நீண்ட கால கேந்திர பிரச்னை உள்ளது. ஆஸ்திரேலியாவின் புவியில் அமைவிடத்தில் இருந்து கொண்டு, சீனாவின் எழுச்சியுடன், ஆஸ்திரேலியா தான் இன்னும் Western எனும் சிந்தனையில் இருந்து விடுபட்டு, உண்மையான Asian-Pacific தேசமாக வருவது. அப்படி இல்லாவிட்டால் ஆஸ்திரேலியா மிகவும் நொந்து நூலாகி விடும் நீண்ட காலா போக்கில். ஆஸ்திரேலியா அரசியல்வாதிகள், சமூக ஆர்வலர்கள், சீர்திருத்தவாதிகள் இதை செய்ய வேண்டும். Chicken coming home to roost, அவுஸ்திரேலியா aborigines இற்கு செய்த வினைக்கு. நான் இங்கு எழுதியதை விட ஆஸ்திரேலியாவின் நீண்டகால இக்கட்டான நிலைமையை, Prof Kishore Mahbubani இலகுவாகவும் , தெளிவாகவும் உள்ள வீடியோ ஐ (நான் ஏற்கனவே பார்த்தது) கிடைக்கும் பொது இணைத்து விடுகிறேன். https://www.newsclick.in/US-China-Trade-Deal-Unravels US-China Trade Deal Unravels. What Next? On the geopolitical plane, except for India and Australia, there are no takers for Trump’s strategy to suppress China. M.K. Bhadrakumar 29 Jun 2020 The world community can heave a sigh of relief that there isn’t going to be a new cold war between the United States and China. A Cold War needs two blocs: while Washington is unable to cobble together a bloc, Beijing is disinterested in one, lacking a bloc mentality. But isolating China in the international community is easier said than done, as the US-led globalisation is replaced by a China-led globalisation. Nor is there any prospect of a Sino-American hot war. What is unfolding instead is a standoff between the Trump administration and Beijing in a geopolitical void whose trajectory will now largely depend on the outcome of the presidential election in the US in November. The world community at large is not party to this standoff except for just two ‘Indo-Pacific’ maverick exceptions that have got on to the US bandwagon — Australia and India. Asia itself remains unscathed. Japan has taken care not to provoke China. (See my blog Japan-US alliance gets less intimate.) The ASEAN countries refuse to take sides between the Trump administration and China.In fact, the ASEAN has just ensured that Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, which involves both China and Japan will be signed within this year, radically transforming the regional integration of the Asia-Pacific. Europe too stands detached and has begun working on the terms of engagement with China for a more equal and balanced partnership attuned to the compelling realities of the post-Covid-19 era in which China stands apart as the least wounded economy. PHOBIAS AT CENTRESTAGE In a nutshell, all this began with President Donald Trump’s decision to raise a China bogey as one of his main campaign planks in the US presidential election in November. Trump calculated that it would be a smart strategy where the winner takes it all. On the one hand, he assumed that the ‘Phase 1’ trade deal of January would oblige China to buy over $200 billion worth American products including massive quantities of agricultural products, which would inevitably show up as his foreign policy success. On the other hand, Trump also saw uses in projecting himself as the ‘toughest’ American president ever on China — a self-portrayal that he plays up to impress the domestic gallery and to differentiate his candidacy from his presumed main opponent John Biden’s, whom Trump would hunt down as incapable of standing up to an ‘assertive’ China. Over and above, by conjuring up the ‘Wuhan virus’, Trump hoped to distract attention from his incompetence and dismal failure in addressing the challenge of the Covid-19 pandemic that is conceivably surging as the likely nemesis of his presidential campaign. Arguably, Beijing might not have minded being targeted as a punch bag for Trump to look ‘strong’ as a politician in an election year.But the Trump administration officials unwisely proceeded to create synergy out of Trump’s game plan also on the diplomatic plane with a view to lay the foundations of a future cold-war like strategy toward China under US leadership. This entire architecture was built on a catastrophic misreading that the Covid-19 pandemic has lethally weakened China, derailed its economic growth which in turn is engendering social disaffection and alienating the public from the Chinese Communist Party, and posing grave unprecedented challenges to the leadership of Xi Jinping. That is to say, in the US narrative, the present moment presented itself as a rare opportunity to discredit and isolate China and destroy its prospects as a rising superpower rivalling America. Thus, US diplomacy under the stewardship of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (a former sergeant in the US Army who replaced James Mattis, a decorated general with a cautious mind) shifted gear with an anti-China agenda as its main focus. During the past couple of years as Trump launched the US-China tariff war, Pompeo went into an overdrive with an obsessive Churchillian ‘fight them on the beaches’ diplomatic agenda — ranging on the one hand from the incitement of unrest in Hong Kong, the tirade on alleged suppression of Uighur Muslims, the robust attempts to create an alliance system with India and Australia to counter China, the increasingly abrasive US military posturing in the South China Sea, the retraction from the sacrosanct ‘One-China’ policy commitments of 1972, and a global campaign of vilification against Huawei and China’s 5G technology to a series of calibrated moves on the other hand to roll back the broad sweep of US-China bilateral relationship (including sanctions and visa curbs lately), within an eventual long-term policy outlook to ‘decouple’ the US-China relations. China’s approach to Pompeo’s road map has been largely reactive. China avoided provoking the US or acting against its core interests regionally or globally. China’s ‘countermoves’ included, principally: the strengthening of China-Russia entente; overtures to the European Union member countries (especially, Germany and France) for a mutually beneficial partnership based on mutual respect and trust; creation of new supply chains to prepare for an eventuality of ‘decoupling’ from the US; focus on innovation and indigenous development of technology; calming down tensions with Japan; ‘regionalisation’ of its globalisation policies (ASEAN has replaced the US as China’s No. 1 trading partner); using BRI to spur China-led globalisation (including the mapping of a Health Silk Road lately to position itself as a global health leader in the COVID-19 pandemic); and, of course, forcefully rejecting the US interference in Hong Kong or in China’s internal affairs elsewhere and countering the perceived threats to its ‘territorial sovereignty’. Running a fine comb through the Chinese moves, it is not possible to see any of them as ‘anti-American’. MYTHS EXPLODE However, things began to change in the most recent weeks and months when Pompeo’s roadshows began increasingly frequent targeting and vilifying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), caricaturing the venerable party founded by Mao a century ago in 1921 as the fountainhead of all evil on earth. Conceivably, the American diplomacy got carried away by the (false) notion that the social base of the CCP has been dramatically eroded by the coronavirus and Xi Jinping’s hold on power has become very shaky, and that a historic opportunity is at hand to finish off the legacy of the Chinese revolution similar to what the US brilliantly exploited in the 1980s to weaken and destroy the former Soviet Union and bury the Bolshevik legacy. Indeed, the prevailing narrative among America’s China experts (and among analysts in India) is that Beijing is under such immense pressure due to the disarray in its internal affairs that the leadership is forced to ‘flex muscles’ abroad in a contrived fashion to dissimulate strength and political stability at home. However, paradoxically, the empirical data shows otherwise — that it is Trump who has come under pressure to project himself in the current election year as the ‘strongman’ capable of decisive leadership, stemming out of the polarisation and near civil war conditions in the US political economy — and fuelled by the Covid-19 pandemic, deep economic recession, racial unrest, and the two-party system locked in mortal political combat, cleaving the nation in the middle into two distinct halves. Joe Biden has increased his lead to 19 points per latest polls, which is daunting. If the pandemic becomes more acute in the US in the coming weeks and months ahead, which seems a high probability, Trump’s political judgment will come under severe scrutiny — in particular, his fateful decision to reopen the economy even before flattening the Covid-19 ‘curve’. Unsurprisingly, China’s patience has worn thin and it is hitting back at Trump where it hurts — by excusing itself from the obligation to buy hundreds of billions of American products unless Trump retracted from his hostile policies toward Beijing. China is retaliating, knowing fully well that the farm lobby is an important segment of Trump’s support base. It is a deadly body blow. (Trump is trailing Biden in the crucial state of Wisconsin.) Meanwhile, it is also beginning to emerge from recently released trade data that the balance sheet of Trump’s much trumpeted ‘trade war’ with China shows that the results are largely the opposite of what the White House has been counting on. Ironically, as two Carnegie scholars on China pointed out last week, “Tariffs have produced no real improvement in the United States’ underlying trade balance, while China’s trade surplus has increased and its export markets have become more diversified.” The data shows that “Trump’s reduction of the bilateral trade deficit with China was quite costly, with a significant contraction in economic activity and an inadvertent increase in China’s overall trade surplus.” While US imports from China fell by $87.3 billion year-on-year, it largely manifests as higher prices for retailers and households instead of hurting China’s overall trade surplus or triggering a ‘blue-collar’ boom in America’s manufacturing industry, which Trump had expected to happen. China has also effectively compensated for the drop in exports to the US by ramping up sales to nearly everyone else. Chinese exports to ASEAN alone went up by $38.5 billion. China’s retaliatory tariffs against American products brought down its import bill by $33 billion. It transpires now that despite the trade war with America, China ended up in 2019 with an overall trade balance exceeding $60 billion. And this is despite the fact that, as the Carnegie study puts it, “China’s dominance in global manufacturing has been gradually waning since its peak in 2015, due to structural shifts in the Chinese economy, such as its continued graduation from low-skill manufacturing such as clothing and textiles, the decline of China’s role as a location for final assembly, and rebalancing toward consumption and services, which are less trade-intensive than capital investment.” Clearly, what the above trends underscore is that the trade war with the US and the pandemic-induced supply chain shifts will only further accelerate the trends that Beijing has set for itself as its economic strategy as a middle income country. In sum, Trump’s goal of reducing trade deficits and weakening China’s economic prospects is yet unrealised. Judging from investment, consumption, and price levels, China’s economy has not been significantly affected by the crackdown on trade and science and technology from the US. Whatever ailments Chinese economy suffers today are not due to Trump, but are, as a Chinese scholar wrote recently, “caused by the contradiction between domestic supply and demand, the financial bubble caused by land financing, which has not been fully digested by society, and the bumpy economic cycle between the long-repeated Keynesian aggregate demand stimulus and the excessive issuance of M2 (per monetary school theory).” WAR IS NOT A OPTION Suffice to say, Beijing had made its calculations while drawing the red line on the sand in Hawaii at the meeting on June 17 between the powerful Chinese politburo member and top diplomat Yang Jiechi and the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. (See my blog China warns Trump not to risk trade deal.) The heart of the matter is that since there is no great disparity in the economic strength between the Chinese and American economies today, war against China is no longer an option for Washington.All of Trump’s trade war, the war of science and technology or the war of ideology cannot make a difference to the power gap between China and the US, which is narrowing at an accelerated pace. On the contrary, the pandemic outbreak has struck heavy losses on the US economy as evident from the sight of the American stock markets successively triggering their circuit-breaker mechanisms in the period since March. Also, the cumulative impact of the extremely high unemployment rate and the death of over 100000 Americans on social stability is going to be very lethal. On the geopolitical plane, except for India and Australia, there are no takers for Trump’s strategy to suppress China. What isolates the US most is that the European Union countries are ploughing an independent furrow toward China to advance their distinct interests, with emphasis on Europe’s cooperation and partnership with China despite the vigorous economic competition between the two sides. The EU insists that engaging and operating with China is“both an opportunity and a necessity”while robust efforts will continue to rectify China’s unfair economic practices. The point is, Europe is heavily dependent on China in trade and investment and cannot and will not share Washington’s obsessive focus on geopolitics. Nor will Europe participate in any US military adventures against China. Even in their rhetoric, European leaders eschew any attack on China in a confrontationist, unyielding, punitive idiom.Most important, Europeans are deeply distrustful of the Trump administration and regard it as unreliable and unpredictable. Suffice to say, the Trump administration’s current policy of suppressing China and effectively contain the further development of that country’s comprehensive national strength has no future. Trump feels embittered to be seen as a ‘loser’, a role that he despises. The bitterness shows.It has become personal lately, as seen in the extraordinary outburst at the White House this week bracketing Xi Jinping with Joseph Stalin as a tyrant and an incorrigible Marxist-Leninist, the ultimate pejoratives in Trump’s political vocabulary. Having said that, polemics apart, Trump is also a realist who would know that his administration’s suppression policy against China in his first term has not only failed to bring the desired dividends to boost his re-election prospects but also fell short of inflicting any serious damages on the lifeline of the Chinese economy.If Trump wins a second term, this realisation may prompt him to adjust his China policy. A new start is possible with a new foreign-policy team on board and with electoral compulsions no longer requiring him to do grandstanding. If that happens, China will respond to any overtures. Indeed, a radical turnaround is almost certain if Biden wins the presidency. Biden’s China policy can be expected to be rational and pragmatic, although he was one of the choreographers of the ‘rebalance’ strategy in Asia during the Barack Obama presidency.Biden and the Democrats in general have a relatively more positive and open attitude to navigating the problematic period ahead with China rapidly narrowing its power gap with the US. Channels of dialogue will reappear, replacing the contrived posturing of the Trump presidency which demonises China as an existential threat.In a Biden presidency, the overall climate of US-China relations can only improve — although the fierce competition between the US and China will continue in the high-tech fields and in setting global standards, as the world economy transits an era of accelerated technological progress and new innovations whose rapid application and diffusion causing abrupt changes in society. The bottom line is that like the European countries, Biden too will face a host of domestic issues — such as climate change, racial issues, social justice, domestic economic recovery after the pandemic, etc, which create a matrix in which cooperation and coordination with Beijing will become a strategic necessity and the current American economic and technological suppression of China is bound to be tempered by the sobering effect of the prioritisation of dealing with domestic issues in a multilateral international milieu. Courtesy: INDIAN PUNCHLINE

தடை EU இற்கு வெளியில் இருந்து வரும் கறிவேப்பிலைக்கு என்று இணைப்பில் இருக்கிறது. https://www.freshfruitportal.com/news/2015/08/14/u-k-turns-up-heat-on-non-eu-countries-with-fresh-curry-leaf-import-ban/ Florida, Dominican இல் இருந்து கனடா இற்கு ஏற்றுமதி செய்து ன் EU இற்கு கனடாவில் இருந்து இறக்குமதி செய்து, பின்பு UK இற்கு கொண்டு வரப்படுகிறதா?

கறிவேப்பிலையில் வரும் நோய் (அல்லது புழு) இங்கு உக் இல் உள்ள ecosystem த்தை முழுமையாக தாக்கி அளிக்கிறது என்றே தடை கொண்டு வரப்பட்டது. அறிந்தவரையில் இப்போதும் இந்த தடை அமுலில் உள்ளது. இதே தடை thai basil இற்கும் உள்ளது. இங்கு கருவேப்பில்லை என்று விற்கப்படுவது உண்மையான கருவேப்பிலை அல்ல என்ற ஓர் கருத்தும் உள்ளது. உள்ளியை பற்றியும் ஓர் கருத்து உள்ளது. சொரியாக வரும் உள்ளி சீனாவில் இருந்து. இதன் வளர்ப்பு முறையில் பாவிக்கப்படும் நீர் untreated water என்று விற்கும் கடைக்காரர் ஒருவர் சொல்லியதாக அறிந்தேன். விற்றபவர்கள் இந்த சொரி உள்ளியை பவிப்பதில்லை. மாறாக, ஸ்பெயின் இல் இருந்து வரும் உள்ளியை பாவிக்கிறார்கள்.

இது அவர்களுக்கும் (கஸ்தூரி) தெரியாமல், அரசு-corporate உத்தியோக பூர்வமற்ற கட்டமைப்பால் ஏற்கனவே எடுக்கப்பட்ட முடிவா? மேற்கில் கூட, system த்தால் குறிப்பிட்ட நபருக்கு தெரியாமலேயே பதவி உயர்வு வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ளதை உணர்ந்து கண்டு இருக்கிறேன். கஸ்தூரியின் தனிப்பட்ட திறமை மற்றும் தகுதியை இங்கு விமர்சிக்கவில்லை .

இதை கிந்தியவிடமும், கிந்திய மற்றும் பிராமண கொள்கை வகுப்பாளர்கள் இடமும் கேட்க வேண்டும்? அதாவது, கிந்திய மற்றும் பிராமண கொள்கை வகுப்பாளர்கள், படுக்கை அறைக்கு வந்து நாலு சுவற்றுக்குள் நடப்பதை அவர்களின் மேற்பார்வையிலும், அவர்கள் சுவற்றுக்குள் செய்யாததை ஈழததமிழர் தமது உடம்பாலும், உழைப்பாலும், ஆற்றலாலும் செய்ய முயற்சி செய்தால், அவர்களிடம் உள்ள ஆற்றாமையால் அதை தடுப்பதும் எவராவது பாத்துக்கொண்டு இருப்பார்களா என்று?

அல்பேர்ட் ஐன்ஸ்டின் எழுதிய நூல், சாதாரணமானவர்களுக்கு சார்பியல் கோட்பாடு புரிய வேண்டும் என்று. amazon.co.uk இல் எந்த நாட்டில் இருந்தாலும் வாங்கலாம். https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0774Y4KNW/ அல்பேர்ட் ஐன்ஸ்டின் எழுதிய நூல், சாதாரணமானவர்களுக்கு சார்பியல் கோட்பாடு புரிய வேண்டும் என்று. amazon.co.uk இல் எந்த நாட்டில் இருந்தாலும் வாங்கலாம். இது விளம்பரமோ அல்லது amazon மற்றும் அந்த நூலுக்கான ஊக்கமோ அல்ல. ஓர் தகவல் மட்டுமே.

ஹிந்தியா இழந்ததாக ஏற்றுக் கொள்ளும் 20 வீரர்களில் இழப்பில், 17 குளிரில் விரைத்த இறந்ததனர் என்று இப்பொது வாய்வழி ஊடாக தெரிகிறது. இரு பகுதியுமே ஆயுத்தமாகதான் இருந்து இருக்கிறது. ஏனெனில், சீன தரப்பு அகற்றுவதற்கு இணங்கிய கூடாரத்தை ஹிந்தியை தரப்பு பிடுங்கி எறிந்ததிலே இந்த மோதல் தொடங்கியது. ஆயுதமற்றவர்களையும் சீன பிடித்து அடித்து கொன்றதாக கிந்தியா ஆரம்பத்தில் கதை விட்டது. எனவே ஆயுதமற்ற இந்திய தரப்பு என்பது அனுதாபத்தை கிளப்பும் கதை. இது முற்றாக கிந்தியா தரப்பு முறியடிக்கப்பட்டதேயே காட்டுகிறது, மோதலுக்கு ஆயுத்தமாக இருந்தும். சீன தரப்பு உயிருடன் இந்திய தரப்பை பிடித்ததின் காரணமும் இது ஆகும்.

ஹிந்தியா இழந்ததாக ஏற்றுக் கொள்ளும் 20 வீரர்களில் இழப்பில், 17 குளிரில் விரைத்த இறந்ததனர் என்று இப்பொது வாய்வழி ஊடாக தெரிகிறது. ஆயுதமற்றவர்களையும் சீன பிடித்து அடித்து கொன்றதாக கிந்தியா ஆரம்பத்தில் கதை விட்டது. இரு பகுதியுமே ஆயுத்தமாகதான் இருந்து இருக்கிறது. ஏனெனில், சீன தரப்பு அகற்றுவதற்கு இணங்கிய கூடாரத்தை ஹிந்தியை தரப்பு பிடுங்கி எறிந்ததிலே இந்த மோதல் தொடங்கியது. எனவே ஆயுதமற்ற இந்திய தரப்பு என்பது அனுதாபத்தை கிளப்பும் கதை. இது முற்றாக கிந்தியா தரப்பு முறியடிக்கப்பட்டதேயே காட்டுகிறது, மோதலுக்கு ஆயுத்தமாக இருந்தும். சீன தரப்பு உயிருடன் இந்திய தரப்பை பிடித்ததின் காரணமும் இது ஆகும்.

உண்மையில் இரும்பு பாத்திரங்கள் பொதுவாக உடல் நலத்திற்கு பிரச்னை இல்லாதவை. ஆனால் அதிகளவு ஓட்டுதல் தன்மையினாலும் மற்றும் பராமரிப்பாலேயே இவை அதிகம் விரும்பப்படுவதில்லை. seasoning ஆள் ஓட்டுதல் தன்மையை மிகவும் குறைக்கலாம். இரும்பு சத்து அளவுக்கதிகமாக உடம்பில் சேகரிக்கப்படும் உடல் நல பிரச்னை உள்ளவர்களுக்கே இரும்பு பாத்திரத்தில் சமைப்பது தவிர்க்கப்பட வேண்டும். பார்வைக்கு, உங்களுடைய பாத்திரத்தில் ஏதோ ஓர் எண்ணெய்யை கொதி நிலை வரைக்கும் பல தரம் சூடாக்கி பாவித்ததால் ஆக்காங்கே தொட்டம் தொட்டமாக ஏற்கனவே (நீங்கள் பாவித்த எண்ணையினால் உருவாகும்) seasoning இருப்பதாக தோற்றம் இருக்கிறது. இவை அநேகமாக கரடு முரடாக இருக்கும். உங்களிடமுள்ள பாத்திரத்தை இனி unrefined avacado oil ஆல் season செய்யுங்கள். அப்படி செய்யும் போது பாத்திரம் வெள்ளி தன்மை உள்ளதால் மேற்பரப்பில் கறுப்பாக உண்டாகும் படை வெளிப்படையாக தெரியாத தொடங்கும். பாத்திர அளவுக்குக்கு பார்வைக்கு ஆக குறைந்தது 7-8 தரம் எண்ணெய் பூசி, அடுப்பேற்றி புகைக்க விட்டு, இயல்பாக ஆற விட வேண்டும். முன்பு சொன்னது போலவே unrefined avacado oil ஐ பாவியுங்கள், 270 செல்சியஸ் கொதிநிலையால் (புகைக்கும் நிலை). நான் அறிந்த வரையில் மற்ற எண்ணெய்கள் 250 செல்சியஸ் ஐ தாண்டாது புகைப்பதற்கு.

விஞ்ஞான அடிப்படியிலான காரணங்களை சொல்லி விட்டேன். நீங்கள் அதன் ஓட்டுதல் தன்மையில் சொல்லலாம். ஏனெனில், 2-3 கோட்டிங் non-stick உண்டு. ஆனால், நுண்ணிய அளவு non-stick அகற்றப்படவில்லை என்று சொல்ல முடியுமா? உண்மையான ஒட்டுதல் தன்மை அறிய, எண்ணெயோ அல்லது வெறு எந்த சமைக்கும் liquid இல்லாமல், ஓரிரு முட்டைகளை பொரித்து (bulls eye) எடுத்து பாருங்கள். வாங்கிய போது இருந்த ஓட்டுதல் இல்லாத தன்மை இப்போதும் இருக்கிறதா என்று பாருங்கள். பார்வைக்கு non-stick coating விளிம்பில் உராயப்பட்ட தன்மை தெரிகிறது. இப்போது தான் PFOA, PFTE பற்றிய புரிதல் வந்துள்ளது, 1940 களில் அறிமுகப்படுத்தப்பட்டாலும். seasoning என்பதின் நோக்கம், pans இன் மேற்பரப்பில் நேரடியாக உணவு தொடுகை இல்லாமல் சமைப்பதற்கும் உட்பட. எனவே ஏலவே பயன்பாட்டில் இருக்கும் pans இற்கும் பொருந்தும், கைவிட விருப்பம் இல்லை என்றால். இவை facts. pans இப்போதும் உங்களினதோ அல்லது எவரினதோ பாவனைக்கு உகந்ததாக உள்ளதா என்ற போட்டி அல்ல. அதில் எனக்கு அக்கைறையும் இல்லை. எதுவும் உங்களின் விருப்பம்.