Muhamalai debacle: The shocking story - By Iqbal Athas

[சோழன்]

Muhamalai debacle: The shocking story

President, NSC and JOH were not aware of Wednesday's ill-planned operation

Hundreds of soldiers trapped in the killing fields of the LTTE

Disastrous operation reverses military successes of recent weeks and embarrasses Govt.

By Iqbal Athas

A photograph in a Tamil website shows Tiger guerrillas in the process of retrieving one of Army's Main Battle Tanks that was stuck in a soggy ditch.

Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar's telephone rang on Wednesday morning. It was a senior member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) complaining that the Security Forces had launched a major military offensive.

Infantry backed by battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers were advancing from their defended localities at Muhamalai towards guerrilla positions. Air Force Kfir jets were bombing areas nearby. Artillery and mortar were raining on their bunker lines and behind, he said.

The caller protested that this was despite assurances given to Mr. Brattskar by their Political Wing leader, S.P. Tamilselvan, last Tuesday that the LTTE would accept "unconditionally" the dates suggested by the Government (October 28 and 29) to resume peace talks in Switzerland. He said the attack had come despite an LTTE warning that the Security Forces were preparing for a major offensive from Muhamalai just days earlier. This charge was strongly denied by the Government.

Later that morning, Mr. Brattskar wanted to ascertain the factual position. He raised issue with Palitha Kohona, Secretary General of the Government's Peace Secretariat during a previously scheduled meeting. It was meant to discuss matters relating to the upcoming round of peace talks. Last Tuesday, Mr. Brattskar had, in fact, used his satellite telephone to speak to Mr. Kohona from Kilinochchi. That was to tell him that the LTTE was willing to resume talks and had accepted the dates offered by the Government. An official announcement in this regard was made in Oslo by the Royal Norwegian Government only thereafter.

Mr. Kohona flatly denied the Security Forces had launched any fresh offensive. He would have known if there was one. It was his Secretariat that had set out the Government's official position vis-à-vis military action against the LTTE. Their website said the Government reserved the right to counter measures if the guerrillas undertook actions of "an offensive and provocative nature." Moreover, he was present when President Mahinda Rajapaksa told envoys of Donor Co-chairs on Monday that the Security Forces would not carry out any offensive military operations against the LTTE in the run-up to the peace talks. That was a credible assurance coming from the highest in the land. He, however, re-iterated the military's right to retaliate only if attacked.

If there were any "offensive" or "provocative" acts and a retaliatory response by the Security Forces, Mr. Kohona would have known. He was also conscious of President Rajapaksa's firm assurance to the Donor Co-chairs. Hence, his strong denial that there was a military offensive under way.

That no doubt would have left the much maligned Norwegian Ambassador perplexed. Having succeeded in getting the protagonists to resume talks, sorted out dates and a venue, there was now a fresh obstacle. The guerrillas were claiming they were under attack from the Security Forces. The head of the Peace Secretariat, one of the key Government agencies he dealt with, was vehemently denying it. Evidently, Mr. Brattskar could not ascertain the ground situation from members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) since they were not present in the area.

It was the Government Peace Secretariat, and not the Ministry of Defence, that gave the reason for this on Wednesday evening. "The Government cannot guarantee the safety of the Ceasefire Monitors in the Muhamalai area due to sporadic shelling and attacks by the LTTE," a statement said. Such a situation, quite clearly, has arisen for the first time during the ceasefire. As Eelam War IV continued, the role of the SLMM had diminished.

As hours ticked by the confusion began to spread. Has the Government launched a military offensive to seize more guerrilla territory ahead of the peace talks? Was this the reason why the Government declared that it reserved the right to retaliate if the LTTE resorted to "offensive" or "provocative" action? These were among the many questions raised in Colombo's diplomatic community, media circles and civil society groups.

Their concerns were heightened by the first known account to enter the public domain through the pro-LTTE website Tamilnet. A report on Wednesday morning said the Army has launched ground troop's movement into LTTE-controlled territory with heavy artillery and MBRL (Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher) fire since 6.30 a.m. Wednesday. Pointing out that the SLMM had been notified of the attack; the website quoted their "Military Spokesman" Irasiah Ilanthiriyan as saying that the new offensive, shattering peace hopes, comes few hours after an official announcement by Norway that the parties agreed to meet in Switzerland.

If there was a major military offensive, which indeed has turned out to be the case, the political leadership was completely unaware. So were high ranking officials except for one who had tried to persuade an "over enthusiastic" military official, awaiting an extension of service only few weeks later, not to go ahead. Like many others during past occasions, did he under estimate the enemy capability? Much has been said on this subject in The Sunday Times in the recent weeks. Even this official was unaware of the magnitude of the measures planned and how they were to be executed.

The guerrillas are seen with a gun removed from the same MBT.

The Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH), the unified apparatus of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, tasked to jointly carry out counter terrorist operations, The Sunday Times learnt, was unaware. Nor was its head, Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Donald Perera. It has come to light that air support to take on specified targets was sought and obtained from Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Roshan Gunathilaka. It has also come to light that some of the senior officers engaged in the action expressed serious reservations earlier but were over ruled.

Even the National Security Council chaired by President Mahinda Rajapaksa on Wednesday morning, The Sunday Times learnt, was not in the picture. "If they, particularly President Rajapaksa, were aware, he would have called a halt to it. He is very pleased and proud of the successes of the Security Forces. That showed he was willing to face threats of violence but wanted to negotiate a political settlement. He made his commitment known both to the people and to the international community," said a source at the Presidential Secretariat. Those remarks, later confirmed by The Sunday Times, showed that other military top brass were blissfully unaware that whilst they were at the NSC, something disastrous was taking place in the battlefields of Muhamalai.

Official silence was broken when a staff member of the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) sent out SMS messages on a mobile phone to media personnel, particularly foreign correspondents. It said "LTTE attack Muhamalai, Nagerkovil and Eluthumaduval FDLs since last few days and strong build (sic) in front of FDLs. Tps (troops) retaliate."

Late Wednesday afternoon the MCNS said in a news release: "the security forces have not attacked any area in the North and East. The Government forces have no intention of carrying out such attacks." It added: "Security Forces successfully repulsed continued LTTE attempts to breach the Muhamalai forward defences since last (Tuesday) night. To counter the intensity of these attacks the assistance of the Air Force was sought."

The MCNS statement declared, "the Government believes that the LTTE is engaged in a calculated attempt to mislead the International Community by propagating false media reports through Tiger sympathetic media groups." There was also a significant assertion in the MCNS statement. This was a line which said, "The Government categorically stated in the conditions to resume talks that the Security Forces retain the right to retaliate if the LTTE continued with their attacks." This is the first official confirmation that that the right to retaliate is very much a condition for resumption of talks.

As for the denials, whether the MCNS was unaware of the goings on at Muhamalai battlefields on Wednesday morning, like the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH), remains an important question. Or, were they forced to do damage control without knowing the fuller picture? The questions are best left unanswered.

For many days from last week, Security Forces have been directing artillery and mortar fire from their defended localities that straddle the one time Entry-Exit point at Muhamalai towards Tiger guerrilla positions. By hindsight, it became clear this was to soften up guerrilla targets. I cannot comment on whether the Security Forces offensive was prompted by guerrilla build-ups and attacks. However, it was planned to be launched last Monday and had been delayed by two days. From morning until late afternoon on Monday, there had been very heavy downpours, signs that the North-East monsoon was setting in. Nor can I give a detailed account of the debacle, how exactly the fighting broke out and ended in just over two hours, the shortest but the worst during the four-year-old ceasefire. This is due to severe constraints.

However, it can be said that the action against the LTTE was carried out by the Army's 53 Division which has been placed in a reserve role in the Jaffna peninsula. That was made up of the Air Mobile Brigade and 533 Infantry Brigade. They were supported by men of the 55 Division that has been tasked for a holding role.

On Tuesday night, Special Infantry Oriented Teams (SIOT) from the Air Mobile Brigade moved out of the defence lines. They had stealthily walked towards the guerrilla defence lines and were helping in directing artillery and mortar fire. They were also providing the required battle field information on the radio to their commanders. That included enemy disposition, machine gun emplacements and mortar positions.

On Wednesday morning, troops finished an early breakfast of tuna fish curry, dhal and rice. Backed by Czech-built T-55 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and Chinese-built armoured personnel carriers they moved out. The break out was two pronged -- from the general areas of Kilali (east of A-9 highway) and Muhamalai. The H hour, the time when concentrated artillery/mortar fire had to be directed to enable the mechanized and infantry units to attack guerrilla positions was 8 a.m.

When a couple of minutes to 8 a.m. approached, artillery and mortar fire at guerrilla positions were increasing. The loud explosions reached a crescendo. It was then that some of the mechanized columns faced trouble. One of the MBTs was hit by an anti tank mine. The track was destroyed and the tank was immobilised. Another MBT that overtook the damaged one faced the same fate. Another fell into a soggy ditch, a tank obstacle near the guerrilla lines. Three more tanks were disabled. Three armoured personnel carriers too were hit. Infantry movement at this point was slowed down by heavy barrages of RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) and mortar fire.

Yet, the troops pushed ahead bravely. After the mechanized units burst through a part of the guerrilla defences, infantry troops dismounted in order to engage them. This was in an open area. Within seconds, it became clear the troops had moved into a guerrilla killing field. Mortar fire began to rain on the concentration of troops. Just then, guerrillas also opened up on them with Machine Gun fire. Troops fell dead on the ground. Some who ran for cover stepped on the heavily mined areas. At some points, troops were fighting close quarter battles. They had dislodged the guerrillas from some of their bunkers and occupied their defence lines. Most of the soldiers, who saw their colleagues fall dead, were so strong willed that they pushed forward to fire at their enemy. In the process, many of them sacrificed their lives.

But soon troops began to realize they had unwittingly walked into a trap and began a tactical withdrawal. Communications were cut off. There was a paucity of information and confusion reigned. Later that evening troops had all reached their original positions, giving up the areas they captured, some of the mechanized vehicles and other military hardware. The battle had just ended in a little over two hours. Yet, field commanders found it difficult to discern a fuller picture of what had happened and what went wrong. They had a bigger priority on hand - rush the large number of injured for treatment. Several private buses were requisitioned and the casualty evacuation exercise began.

A hangar like building, located adjoining the Control Tower of the Air Force base in Palaly, was immediately converted into a temporary hospital due to pressure on the Army Hospital in Palaly. This building was once used as a reception hall for passengers taking flights. A serious lapse, in planning the military attack seems the failure to give consideration to casualties if a serious eventuality occurred. Was it over confidence and an under estimation of the enemy capability? Even ambulances were in short supply and there were no arrangements in Colombo to receive a large number of casualties. From the two hospitals, cases that needed greater medical attention were flown in Air Force flights to Anuradhapura and Colombo.

With the task of dealing with casualties over, it was only on Thursday that battalion commanders got down to the job of taking a count of their men. The purpose was three fold - who were missing, who were known to be killed and how many were exactly injured. Even yesterday, a full and clear picture has not emerged in terms of statistics. Figures available on Thursday night showed that 8 officers and 47 soldiers were killed. A further 78 including four officers were declared missing in action. But the same night the LTTE handed over to delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) the bodies of 74 troops. They were in turn handed over to the Army at Omanthai (Vavuniya) in the presence of members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. This LTTE handover of bodies proved wrong the MCNS claim that there were no Security Forces attacks in the North and East.

The figures available show 129 soldiers were killed. Three more wounded soldiers died on Friday. The LTTE said the body of another soldier had been recovered on Thursday evening. It is not clear whether it has been handed over. That would bring the total to 133 dead. Whilst one soldier is in LTTE custody, in terms of these figures, two are not accounted for. Senior Army officials say the figures could become higher when a final count is made. But this cannot be verified. Even in official accounts, the figures are not fully reflected. A situation report circulated to senior political and military leaders on Thursday declared two officers and 35 soldiers missing - just half the number of 72 bodies returned by the LTTE on Thursday night. The Army strongly denied LTTE claims that more bodies of dead soldiers lay in the "no man's" land that divided their defence lines from the rebels.

Soldiers injured, according to figures available, have been placed at 483. Of this number, 283 are described in military parlance as P 1 and P 2. They are considered serious cases. The three deaths reported on Friday would bring this number down to 280. The rest are P 3 or those who received minor injuries. Here again some officers argue the figures are higher but this cannot be verified.

The guerrillas remained silent over their casualties. A guerrilla radio intercept by a security arm spoke of 23 dead and 101 wounded. But Security Forces claim the number was over 200. However, this cannot be independently verified.

The LTTE, which suffered one military reversal after another, sought to make capital out of Wednesday's incidents. Several pro-LTTE websites, particularly ones in Tamil, ran video footage of burning battle tanks and the bodies of soldiers to gain propaganda mileage. Guerrilla vehicles escorting the ICRC convoy carrying the bodies of the dead soldiers were bedecked with white flags and moved slowly along the A-9 highway from Kilinochchi to Omanthai. Prior announcements were made for civilians to view this and learn more about the LTTE's latest "achievements."

Even if they threatened to pull out of the upcoming talks if attacked by the Security Forces, the LTTE still wants to travel to Switzerland. The mood that was one of despondency for them seems to be now upbeat. Whether they would make it, their turn to place preconditions cannot be ruled out.

More than anything else, Wednesday's ill planned operation conducted without the knowledge of the political leadership and against the wishes of senior officials has clearly embarrassed the Mahinda Rajapaksa Government. Its credibility has been brought to question in the eyes of the international community. The great sacrifices made by the Security Forces and the Police to deliver success after success, to give the Government a stronger bargaining position at the talks and the Sri Lankan public a greater morale boost have now taken a nose dive.

There was compelling need for a careful appreciation of ground realities before engaging in last Wednesday's military action. Firstly, the LTTE complained in writing to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that the Security Forces were planning an offensive operation. This was strongly denied by the Government. In the wake of this, the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) reported that the LTTE had fortified their defence lines in Muhamalai. They also reported that cadres had been pulled out from other deployments and assigned to the defence lines in fear that a major attack was in the offing. Did not the military action require a more careful study and endorsement by the political and defence leadership?

If there is one glaring fact Wednesday's incident reveal, it is the wide gulf between the political and military leadership. The former does not seem to have proper and closer control. Any deterioration of the situation, no doubt, would not be in the best interest of the Government or the public who have voted it to power.

Gaining a military edge over the LTTE, by weakening it, is no doubt a key aspect. But to a Government that has committed itself to a negotiated settlement, the political aspects matter equally. One cannot be ignored at the expense of the other.

With the series of military successes, the Government was sitting pretty. President Mahinda Rajapaksa was riding a very high wave of public popularity. Just one ill conceived military action that led to a major reversal threatens to undo all that.

(Situation Report, Sunday, October 15, 2006)

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/061015/Columns/s.../sitreport.html

[விது]

தமிழில யாராவது மாத்தி தாங்கோப்பா......மண்டைகாயுது

[mooki]

இதையும் பாருங்கோ.

Tigers go to talks seeking upper hand: analysts

by Amal Jayasinghe

COLOMBO (AFP) - The Tamil Tigers' pummeling of Sri Lankan troops has proved that, despite apparent battlefield setbacks, they are still a force to be reckoned with ahead of peace talks later this month, analysts say.

In just six hours last Wednesday, the Tigers turned back a government push into their territory, deftly using feints and false attacks to route army columns into a narrow kill zone before cutting them down with artillery.

The historically out-gunned rebels inflicted record losses on the government, killing at least 130 troopers and wounding 500 more in the army's worst defeat since the 2002 ceasefire.

Colombo, which only days before claimed to have destroyed 75 percent of the Tigers' fighting capabilities, was also forced to give up ground in the northern Jaffna peninsula that it had taken two weeks earlier.

"What (the Tigers) lack in man-power, they make up with better tactics and leadership," said Namal Perera, a defence analyst for the Ravaya newspaper.

"The military had underestimated the strength of their enemy."

While this single defeat was not the end of the army's war against Tiger fighters, it exposed chronic weaknesses in the military's leadership, said former Tamil rebel-turned-politician Dharmalingam Sithadthan.

Despite boasting a military strength of 150,000 troops to the Tigers' 10,000 fighters, the army continues to make the same tactical blunders on the battlefield, Sithadthan said.

"The military has better fire-power, but they make big mistakes by trying to rush things. Sometimes decisions are taken to boost political fortunes," he said.

"The decisions are not always based on military judgement," he added.

Both sides are seeking the upper hand going into peace talks at the end of the month, observers say.

"Both wanted to go to the table after picking up bargaining chips on the battlefield," said Sithadthan.

But while the government had hoped for a big win to impose its will at the negotiations, the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) took a more studied approach, said retired air force chief Harry Gunatillake.

What were widely seen as battle losses in recent months were actually a series of tactical retreats, he said, adding that the Tigers knew enough to back off when they were weak, only to strike hard when they knew the world would be watching.

Despite international condemnation of last week's upsurge in violence, the message the LTTE sent to the government, as well as foreign critics, was unmistakable: they would not roll over for anyone.

"It was clear that the Tigers would not go to the (negotiating) table limping," said a diplomat close to the peace process.

"The Norwegians, as well as the others supporting the peace process, knew there would be more bloodshed before they would go to talks," the diplomat added.

Observers admit that the recent violence could doom this latest round of talks, but they say they want to bring the two sides together before the situation veers further towards all-out war.

Both sides claim to only be fighting defensively, and that no major campaigns are planned.

But "the big fear is they may not stick to that position for too long," said the diplomat, asking not to be named.

Sri Lanka's main financial backer Japan is sending special peace envoy Yasushi Akashi to the island Sunday to meet with the government and the LTTE.

Norwegian peace broker Jon Hanssen-Bauer is scheduled to arrive Tuesday to work out details for the peace talks set for October 28 and 29.

Norway has been working to restore the 2002 ceasefire and end spiralling violence which has claimed more than 2,200 lives since December, according to an official tally.

More than 60,000 people have been killed in the three-decades-old conflict for a Tamil homeland on the Sinhalese-majority island.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20061015/wl_st...HNlYwMlJVRPUCUl

[ஜெயதேவன்]

ஆப்பு விது!

உந்த சோழனாருக்கு "அர்ச்சுனன் கண்ணுக்கு தெரிந்தது குருவி மட்டும்தான்" மாதிரி, உவருக்கும் உந்த "சிற்றிவேஸன் றிப்போட்" மட்டும்தான் தெரிச்சுருக்கு!!! வெட்டி வடிவா ஒட்டியிருக்கிறார்!! உதே பெரிய வேலை!!! உந்த ரான்சிலேஷனுகளை அவரிடம் கேட்காதீர்கள்! பாவம்!! :cry:

அதுக்கு உதுக்குள்ளை திரிகினம் நாராயணாகுறுக்காலைபோனதுகள்!!! :idea:

[narathar]

இக்பால் அத்தாஸ் வழக்கம் போல தெரிந்த செய்திகளை வைத்து தனது புளுகுகளுடன் புனை கதை எழுதி உள்ளார்.இந்த இராணுவத்தாக்குதல் அதாவது சிறிலங்கா இராணுவத்தின் சகல வளங்களையும் திரட்டி வான் படை உதவியுடன் நடாத்தப்பட்ட தாக்குதல் பற்றி இராணுவ உயர் அதிகாரிகளுக்கோ அல்லது மகிந்தவுக்கோ, பாதுகாப்புச் சபைக்கோ தெரியாதாம்.படு தோல்வியினால் வெளிப்பட்ட அரசின் கபடத் தனத்தை இவர் மறைக்க முயற்சிக்கிறார்.உவருக்கு இப்படி எழுத தகவல் வழங்குவது சிறிலங்கா இராணுவ புலனாய்வுத் துறை.ஆனால் இருக்கும் தடயங்கள் எல்லாமே வெகு அப்பட்டமாக இவர்களின் கபடத்தனத்தை உலகின் முன் காட்டி உள்ளது.இவர்களின் திட்டம் புலிகளே இந்த தாக்குதலைத் தொடுததாகக் காட்டிக் கொண்டு ஆணையிறவு வரை முன் நேறுவதே ,படு தோல்வியில் முடிந்த இந்தத் திட்டத்தால் அம்மணமாகி இருக்கும் அரசை நிலை நிறுத்த இப்படிக் கட்டுரைகள் எழுதுகினம்.தோல்வியினால் அரசு பேச்சுவார்த்தைகளைலையே நம்பிக்கை வைப்பதாகவும் இராணுவ நோக்கம் இல்லை என்றும் நாடகம் ஆடுகிறார்கள்.அவர்களின் இராணுவத் திட்டம் இப்படி தவிடு பொடியாகியதால் இழந்த மனதிடத்தை மேல் எழுப்ப இப்படியான கட்டுரைகளை எழுதுகிறார்கள்.இவை பற்றி அலட்டிக் கொள்ளாமல் சிறிலங்கா அரசின் உண்மையான கபடமான இராணுவத்திட்டத்தை தொடர்ந்து சர்வதேசத்திடம் அம்பலப்படுத்த வேணும்.

[சோழன்]

இது அரைகுறை இராணுவ ஆய்வாளரும், புலியெதிர்ப்பு ஒட்டுக்குழுக்களின் ஆலோசகரின் வழமையான சிங்கள மக்களுக்கான ஆய்வு....

Armed forces suffer debacle as Tigers fight back - By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

It was the day of the Tiger on Wednesday in the northern theatre of war. The 'defensive' offensive launched on October 11 by the armed forces of the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) headed by President Mahinda Rajapakse was repulsed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by Velupillai Pirapaharan in a day of fierce fighting from dawn to dusk in the Kilaly - Muhamalai region of Jaffna peninsula.

The Sri Lankan Army commanded by Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka suffered what was easily the single biggest debacle in recent times after the GOSL began its series of "Defensive Offensives" against the Liberation Tigers. At least 130 soldiers were killed and 519 wounded while the LTTE suffered 22 deaths and an unknown number of injured cadres. Both sides have now returned to their earlier positions and are engaged in sporadic, low - intensity artillery fire.

The military advance was not unexpected as preceding events pointed to a high military build - up in the area. There had been intermittent exchange of artillery fire for many days between both sides along the Forward Defence Line (FDL) axis of Kilaly - Eluthumattuvaal - Nagar Kovil axis in the lower peninsula. There was also aerial bombardment of areas described as LTTE positions by the GOSL for many days.

Both sides strengthen defences

The past few days had also seen a massive increase in military preparations by the GOSL. The Tigers protested at this visible military build - up to Norway. At the same time the LTTE also began strengthening its defences .The GOSL denied that it was planning an offensive. It re-iterated that the armed forces would only defend themselves or enhance defence by "neutralising" LTTE positions. Since this has been the usual excuse of the GOSL in justifying military operations it was a foregone conclusion that a 'defensive offensive' was on the cards.

The night of October 10 saw the intermittent artillery fire escalating. The morning saw military movement on ground. Troops first broke out before dawn from the Nagar Kovil camp in Vadamaratchy East along the peninsula's eastern coast. Troops from Kilaly along the South - Western coast of the peninsula commenced moving out at first light. Troops from the Eluthumadduvaal base in the peninsula's south started out after daybreak.

By 6. 30 am there was forward movement by troops on all three fronts. K- fir bombers and Mi 24 helicopter gunships engaged in aerial bombardment to help facilitate troop movement on ground. Naval gunboats fired from the sea at coastal points between Nagar Kovil and Thalaiyaddy.

Diversion

The LTTE also began firing their artillery. By 7. 30 the Nagar Kovil troops called it a day and turned back. It was an apparent manoeuvre to divide enemy attention. Naval gunboats however continued to patrol the coast along Vadamaratchy east and Pachilaipalli.

Troops moving out from Eluthumadduvaal did not focus on Muhamalai as expected. The army had already advanced about 800 metres into LTTE controlled Muhamalai and reached the outer perimeter of LTTE lines. Instead of pressing home this advantage further, the armed forces veered south - westwards and continued.

The troops moving along the coast from Kilaly also changed course. These personnel moved inwards in a South - Easterly direction. Both columns were now spreading out and advancing in the region between Muhamalai and Kilaly. If this advance was successful, the troops could go around Pallai and reach the A- 9 highway or Jaffna - Kandy road at a point close to Iyakkachchi. From there it would have been only a 'short, short way' to Elephant Pass.

The troops were also using a lot of battle tanks, armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers and heavy vehicles like bulldozers to clear the way. After pathfinder troops advanced the tanks and armoured cars followed and established a safe route through the underbrush . Then bulldozers cleared and flattened the area as far as possible. The main formations of infantry troops then advanced along ground cautiously.

The LTTE resistance to these rapidly advancing columns seemed feeble. The artillery fire lacked vigour. Earlier attempts to advance through Muhamalai via the A - 9 axis had seen the LTTE deploying innumerable claymores and anti - personnel mines along the route. This time the mines and booby traps were conspicuously scarce. It looked like the army was going to repeat its Mawilaru, Muttur, Sampur, Muhamalai successes.

GOSL propaganda

The GOSL and its armed forces had certainly been confidently cocksure in the recent past. It considered the limited successes it had enjoyed earlier as a predictable pattern. The GOSL has been engaging in propaganda that the Tigers were at a low ebb. This propaganda was widely believed and had led to a strident demand in the south, that an all out war be conducted against the LTTE. As former air force chief and father of present air force commander, Harry Goonetilleke observed the "Government believed its own propaganda."

The seeming docility of the LTTE had given the wrong picture to the GOSL. The strategic withdrawals by the LTTE in recent times had bolstered this feeling. Even during the current battle the Tigers had let the army move in without much resistance. An overconfident army had either walked into or been lured into a deadly trap.

By 9. 30 am the GOSL troops seemed to have penetrated nearly 2 - 3 miles deep into Tiger territory in the Pallai region. Some vanguard troops were even further up from the main body. It was around this time that the roaring Tiger pounced. The advancing troop formations were breached in three points.

The vanguard column was attacked at a certain point and pressured to retreat sideways. The troops found a chain of deadly mines being triggered like some gigantic fireworks display. LTTE firing intensified. A whole company was wiped out. The main advancing body was attacked frontally . Tigers also attacked the military in the rear. It was a virtual encirclement of GOSL troops.

The fighting soon transformed itself into artillery and mortar firing. The LTTE kept up an intense barrage. One tank was demolished. Three other armoured vehicles were greatly damaged. The intense battle went on for five hours till 2. 30 p.m. The air force flew only one sortie during this period. It was unable to engage in customary indiscriminate aerial bombardment because it may have hit GOSL troops. Helicopter gunships were worried about getting hit by LTTE's surface to air missiles. The army was all alone.

There was practically no close combat or face to face fighting. The bulk of the fighting consisted of tank and anti - tank firing, artillery shelling and mortar fire. The GOSL usually fires artillery barrages indiscriminately and intensely, against perceived LTTE positions. Superior firepower is used to its advantage.

Army restricted

This however did not work out in this instance as the GOSL troops had advanced and were widely scattered. It was not possible to fire from Kilaly or Eluthumadduvaal at random for fear of hitting own troops. The army was therefore restricted initially to field artillery and mortars. The LTTE apparently advanced to comparatively close quarters and fired RPGs and 60 mm shells from portable artillery.

The LTTE at one point advanced beyond original FDL's into army controlled areas. They turned back after a while and began clearing operations. The heavy fighting gradually subsided after 2. 30 p.m. Intermittent artillery fire of low intensity continued throughout the night. It continued even on Thursday (12).

The armed forces had incurred heavy losses. About 20 privately owned vans and mini-buses were commandeered by the armed forces to supplement army vehicles in transporting the dead and injured back from the frontlines. Troops suffering major injuries were taken to the Varany camp in the Thenmaratchy sector. Three helicopters then air lifted them to Palaly. Thereafter they were flown to Colombo and Anuradhapura for treatment. Vehicles took those with minor injuries and dead bodies along the road in Jaffna to Palaly.

Initially, GOSL and defence services spokespersons tried to obscure the truth. They gave ridiculously low casualty figures. Later the various security force websites began increasing casualty figures. Different news agencies quoting unnamed defence sources began giving out comparatively accurate figures. By the end of Oct 12, an accurate picture began emerging.

At least 130 soldiers had been killed. Of these 55 bodies were retrieved by security forces themselves. 75 were retrieved by the LTTE. 74 of these bodies were handed over to the Red Cross at the Kilinochchi playground by the LTTE's Paavannan who usually interacts with international organisations. One of the bodies retrieved by the LTTE was not given to the Red Cross on time due to a transport problem.

A total of 519 soldiers were injured. Of these 283 were brought to Colombo and 40 to Anuradhapura. Colombo residents saw and heard ambulances and sirens throughout night and day. The other injured soldiers, many of them walking wounded, are in the Palaly hospital.

More bodies

According to LTTE defence affairs spokesperson Ilanthirayan, there may be more dead soldiers whose bodies are yet to be located. Some of the injured soldiers could succumb to their wounds. He said the final tally of dead soldiers could be over 200. It must be noted that according to some reports, the army says 78 personnel are still "missing."

Interestingly enough some GOSL and defence spokespersons are saying that the LTTE suffered more than 200 deaths. One newspaper has put the LTTE casualty figure at 400. One journal, which usually goes to town with stories of security force victories remained silent. There were no stories from the battlefront. News agencies, which initially wrote about "contradictictory" claims of casualties on both sides, had after 48 hours concluded that the armed forces had suffered a major debacle.

According to Ilanthirayan there were 10 LTTE deaths at the end of October 11. With some of the seriously injured dying, the toll had risen to 22 the following day. There is a strong possibility that the Tiger casualty figures could go up in the coming days. The number of injured LTTE cadres is not known. Of those killed, the most senior Tiger so far is a woman 'Capt' Isaichelvi. Among those killed at least four were from the auxiliary force known as "Makkal Sirappu Padai."

Tigers guilty of deception

Given the recent LTTE track record there is a strong possibility that the Tigers are deliberately playing down their casualty figures. The glaring disparity between GOSL and LTTE casualty figures make many suspicious. There was a time when the LTTE never hid its casualty figure, but in recent times, the Tigers have been guilty of deception. Even if the LTTE is being economical with the truth, in this instance the "supressed" figures may not be large because of the nature of fighting.

The GOSL was advancing and the LTTE defending. The defender is usually at an advantage. The army was also practically encircled at one point. Also the Tigers seem to have used mortars and RPGs with deadly precision, thereby killing and injuring many soldiers. It must be remembered that hand to hand fighting was virtually non-existent. One story doing the rounds among defence circles in Colombo was that the LTTE had fired some sophisticated artillery or missiles never used earlier

At least one soldier was taken alive by the LTTE. Samantha Weerasinghe of the Fourth Gemunu Watch is now undergoing treatment at the Kilinochchi hospital. The ICRC has inspected the 18 year old youth. According to Colombo sources the Fourth Gemunu Watch has been practically decimated. The special airborne and mechanised units have also been affected. It is said that soldiers of the 53rd Division comprised the assault force numbering over 5,000.

Major loss for LTTE

Significantly the LTTE suffered a major loss before Wednesday's fighting. On October 7, Lt. Gen. Akbar of the LTTE was killed along the Muhamalai FDL as a result of an army shell. Akbar who is a Batticaloa Tamil was the head of the Victor anti-armoured artillery unit, which specilises in combatting tanks and armoured vehicles. Akbar who joined the LTTE in 1990 got married in 2003. He was from its inception, the chief of the Victor unit. It was named after former Mannar Tiger commander Victor.

This unit known generally among LTTE cadres as the "RPG Commando" had its roots in the "Col" Kittu artillery unit and its baptism of fire was during "Operation Sathijaya." It then became a sub-division of the "Imran-Pandian" until named after two of Pirapaharan's trusted bodyguards. By 1997-98 the anti-armoured artillery unit began functioning independently under Akbar. Members of this unit have vertical and not horizontal stripes on their uniforms. Though many stalwarts of this unit like Maj. Navachandran, Lt. Col. Manivannan and Lt. Col. Chutta are no more. Akbar had survived despite being a veteran of many "Jayasikuru" and "Oyatha Alaigal" battles.

Blood sacrifice

Akbar's death at a critical time may very well have affected LTTE fortunes as the Victor unit was of crucial importance in countering army advances. His death however seems to have inspired his unit members to perform well during war. Instead of being a bad omen, it seems to have become the 'blood sacrifice' made to the gods before war to ensure victory. This was a practice in the lost martial tradition of the Tamils that is now being revived by the Liberation Tigers.

Whatever the statements made by GOSL and defence spokespersons about the armed forces responding to attacks by the LTTE on the Kilaly-Elathumadduvaal-Nagar Kovil FDL, it was common knowledge before hand that a major onslaught of a 'defensive-offensive' nature was imminent. The objective was to take Elephant Pass before talks began in Geneva.

It was only last week that this writer drew attention to this prospect in these columns. A brief excerpt: "Mahinda and his minions are more concerned with the taking of Elephant Pass before talking in Geneva. Against that backdrop the Elephant Pass offensive seems a definite possibility unless extra-heavy international pressure is exerted on Colombo to desist. Poor Norway is powerless in this. Only the super powers and regional powers can restrain the Rajapakse regime in this. If the IC is really genuine about a political settlement some positive, pre-emptive pressure on Colombo is a pre-requisite."

At a time when the country was being carried away with the belief thatthe Tiger had become a kitten (Koti dan poos patiyek) this writer warned that such an assumption was wrong. "There is also an unknown factor. Colombo's calculations are based on the assumption that a military success over the LTTE is inevitable in Elephant Pass. The best laid plans of men and mice go awry. Whatever the crowing in Colombo, the Tigers are still not a spent force. They have 'lost' battles, but not the war. It is also a moot point as to whether Velupillai Pirapaharan would continue to let the Rajapakses and Fonsekas define the venue and terms of conflict. There may be unexpected twists and turns on the road to Elephant pass," was what I wrote last week.

Major offensive

It became soon apparent that a major offensive was being planned. Military vehicles had been moving south along the Jaffna - Kandy road, bringing in men and material to Kodikamam - Mirusuvil - Varany region. Some vehicles had taken stuff to Ariyaalai and Ariyaalaimunai, its coastal point along the Jaffna lagoon. Vehicles had also moved along the Jaffna - Point Pedro road and then de-toured to Varany on the Point Pedro - Kodikaamam road. The vehicular movement indicated that war materials were being brought from Palaly - Kankesanthurai in readiness for a large - scale operation.

The GOSL denied charges of an offensive being planned. It was acknowledged that war materials were being moved to the frontline, but the explanation proffered was that depleted stocks were being replenished as a matter of routine and not for offensive purposes.

The LTTE also warned of an imminent GOSL offensive under the pretext of combatting alleged LTTE attacks. Tiger political commissar Suppiah Paramu Tamilselvan asked the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to go to the frontlines and ascertain for themselves who the real aggressors were. The GOSL however refused to provide access to the SLMM. The excuse was that their safety could not be guaranteed. This act showed that the GOSL was hiding something.

Sea - borne attack

The armed forces also commandeered more than 200 boats belonging to Gurunagar - Pashaiyoor fisherfolk. Marine exercises were undertaken with these boats on October 9 and 10, in the Jaffna lagoon. It appeared that the armed forces were planning to launch a sea - borne assault, across the lagoon to Poonagary on the lagoon. Since the waters were shallow, heavy naval boats could not be used and hence the lighter fishing boats it was felt. Intensive aerial bombardment and artillery firing on Poonagary and adjacent Kalmunai strengthened this belief.

On Tuesday (October 10), the GOSL authorities in Jaffna announced a 45 hour curfew from 8 a.m to 5 a.m and on Thursday ( 12), in certain places like Koilakkandy, Thanankilappu, Kachai etc. These were all vantage points on the peninsula from where a lagoon crossing to the mainland could have been done.It was widely believed then that an amphibean operation was to be conducted soon.

Colombo's intentions

The conduct of President Mahinda Rajapakse provided further clues about Colombo's intentions.When representatives of the four Co - Chairs of the peace process met Rajapakse, they requested the GOSL to refrain from undertaking military operations, because talks were scheduled on October 28 and 29. Rajapakse however parroted his familiar stance about reserving the right to defend the country from LTTE attacks. If that was one indication, there was also the symbolic gesture of climbing the cockpit of an Israeli K- fir Jet. These bombers have wrought much civilian destruction and the pilots responsible are potential contenders for a war crimes trial. Yet Rajapakse deliberately identified himself with these embodiments of aerial terror.

Against that backdrop, there seems little chance of the campaign for war ceasing. There may be a lull in the fighting, but the GOSL will certainly continue with 'defensive - offensive' operations. The Rajapakse regime is built on a war agenda. Rajapakse and his sidekicks have gone too far in projecting themselves as latter day Dutugemunus to hold back now. The Rajapakse regime has enhanced its image in the south, that it will not bow down to Tiger might. It cannot go for talks after a resounding defeat.

In the self - perception of the GOSL and its armed forces, too much is at stake to call off war now. More battles are likely to follow, until a decisive stage is reached.The LTTE too cannot lower its military resistance.This situation cannot change for the better until and unless the international community is serious and sincere about ending the war and promoting peace in Sri Lanka.

So then, the fighting will very likely continue. The sword - bearing lion and grimacing Tiger cannot purr and meow like lesser felines. The Sinhaya has to roar and the Puli has to growl. The country in general and the Tamil people in particular can only cry out Aiyo!

http://www.thesundayleader.lk/20061015/iss...ssues.htm#Armed

[kurukaalapoovan]

இக்பாலின் புனையில் புதைந்திருக்கும் சில உண்மைகள்...

"புலிகளின் அவ்வப்போதை தாக்குதல்களால் முகமாலை முன்னரங்கப்பகுதிகளிற்கு காண்காணிப்பு குழு செல்வதற்கு பாதுகாப்பை உறுதிப்படுத்த முடியாது என்று சிறீலங்காவின் பாதுகாப்பு அமைச்சு அல்லாது சிறீலங்காவின் சமாதான செயலகமே காரணம் கூறியுள்ளதாம்."

இது அவருக்கே வினோதமாக தெரிவதான பாணியில் எழுதியதன் மூலம் புலிகள் தமது தரப்பு ஒத்துளைப்பை தெரிவுத்ததை கவனத்தில் எடுத்தால் களவு எங்கு உள்ளது என்று புரிகிறது.

அது ஒரு பாரிய வலிந்த (சிறீலங்காவின்) இராணுவ நடவடிக்கை நடக்கிறதாக இருந்தால், உண்மையில் அதுவாகவே இன்று அறியக் கூடியதாக உள்ளது இதை பற்றி உயர் அரசியல் மற்றும் இராணுவ தலமைப்பீடத்திற்கு எதுவும் தெரியாது. இன்னும் சிலவாரங்களில் சேவை நீடிப்பிற்கா மிகவும் எதிர்பார்ப்புகளுடன் காத்திருக்கும் ஒரே ஒரு இராணுவ உயர் அதிகாரி மாத்திரம் தான் இந்த இராணுவ நடவடிக்கைக்கு ஆதரவாக இருந்தார். அவர் எதிரியை குறைத்து மதிப்பிட்டுவிட்டாரா? அவரிற்கு கூட தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட தி;ட்டங்களின் அளவும் அவை நடைமுறைப்படுத்த பட இருந்த வழிகளும் தெரியாது போய்விட்டது.

முப்படைகளின் கூட்டுத்தலமையகம் அதன் தலைவர் இற்கும் இந்த வலிந்த நடவடிக்கை பற்றி தெரியாது. இந்த நடவடிக்கைக்கான விமான தாக்குதல் உதவிகள் விமான படை தளபதியிடம் கேட்டு; பெற்றுக் கொள்ளப்பட்டது. இந்த நடவடிக்கையில் ஈடுபட்ட சில மூத்த அதிகரிகளின் சந்தேகங்களும் கணக்கில் எடுக்கப்படவில்லை.

சிறீலங்கா தேசி பாதுகாப்பு சபைக்கும் அதன் தலைவர் மகிந்தவிற்கும் இந்த இராணுவ நடவடிக்கை பற்றி தெரியாது. முக்கியமாக மகிந்தவிற்கு தெரிந்திருந்தால் நிறுத்தியிருப்பார் அவர் அமைதிப் பேச்சில் தீர்வு காண ஆர்வமாக இருக்கிறாராம்.

அதாவது பிழையை மொத்தத்தில் 1 உயர் இராணுவ அதிகரியின் தலையிலும் மிகுதி இடைநிலை மற்றும் களத்தில் நடவடிக்கையில் ஈடுபட்டவர்கள் மீதும் போடுகிறார். ஆனால் இதை சிறீலங்காவின் வலிந்த தாக்குதலாக இறுதில் ஏற்றுக் கொள்கிறார்.

தாக்குதல் தினம் அன்று காலையில் படையினர் என்ன உணவு உண்டார்கள் எத்தின மணிக்கு ஆரம்பித்தார்கள் போன்ற தகவல்களை தருகிறார். முதல் நாள் இரவு கலாற்படையின் முன்னேற்றத்திற்கு முன்னேற்பாடாக தகவல் சேகரிக்கும் ஏயர்மொபைல் பிறிகேட் இன் விசேட (வேவுப்?) பிரிவு புலிகள் பகுதிகளிற்கு முன்னேறியது என்று கூறுகிறார். படையினர் கவசவாகனங்கள் டாங்கிகள் சகிதம் விரைவாக முன்னேறினார்கள் புலிகளின் முன்னரங்களை உடைத்துக் கொண்டு உள் நுளைந்தார்கள். கவசவாகனங்களில் இருந்து படையினர் வெளியே இறங்கி சண்டை பிடித்தார்கள். போன்ற பல விபரங்களை தருகிறார்.

இந்த நடவடிக்கை நடந்த முடிந்த பின்னணியில் தற்பொழுது இராணுவத்தினர் கடந்த கிழமை ஏன் புலிகளின் முன்னரங்க நிலைகளை நோக்கி எறிகணை தாக்குதல் நடத்தினார்கள் என்று விளங்கிக் கொள்ளகூடியதாக இருக்கிறது. புலிகளின் நிலைகள் நோக்கிய முன்னேற்றத்திற்கு முன்னோடியாக அவர்களின் நிலைகளை பலவீனப்படுத்த நடத்தப்பட்டிருக்கிறது என்பது தெளிவாகிறது. ஆனால் புலிகளின் சீண்டலால் அவர்களின் படைக்குவிப்பால் தான் படைகள் அவ்வாறு நடந்தது கொண்டார்களோ என்று சொல்ல முடியாமல் இருக்கிறது. ஆனால் திங்கள் ஆரம்பிக்க இருந்த நடவடிக்கை கடும் மழை காரணமாக 2 நாட்கள் பிற்போடப்பட்டிருந்தது. எது எப்படியோ சண்டை எப்படி ஆரம்பமானது என்று தெரியவில்லை ஆனால் 2002 ஆம் ஆண்டு யுத்தநிறுத்த உடன்பாட்டிற்கு பின்னர் நடந்த மிகவும் குறுகிய காலம் நீடித்த ஆனால் மோசமான இழப்புகளையும் தோல்வியையும் சந்தித்த நடவடிக்கை இது. இதற்கு பல கட்டுப்பாடுகள் காரணம் என்று மொட்டையாக கூறுகிறார்.

புலிகள் கண்காணிப்பு குழுவிற்கு கடிதம் எழுதியது ஆனால் அரசாங்கம் மறுத்தது. சிறீலங்கா புலநாய்வுத்துறை அறிவித்தது புலிகள் தமது நிலைகள் நோக்கி ஒரு பாரிய முன்னேற்ற நடவடிக்கையை எதிர்ப்பாத்து ஆயுத்தங்கள் செய்கிறார்கள் என்று. ஒரு இராணுவ நடவடிக்கை கவனமான தயார்படுத்தல் மற்றும் அரசியல் இராணுவ தலமைப்பீடங்கள் அனுமதியும் தேவையில்லையா என்று கேள்வி எழுப்புகிறார்;.

ஒன்று மட்டும் தெளிவாகிறது. இராணுவ தலமைப்பீடத்திற்கும் அரசியல் தலமைப்பீடத்திற்கும் இடையில் பாரிய இடவெளி இருக்கு என்கிறார். அரசியல் தலமை இராணுவத்தின் மீது உருப்படியான கட்டுப்பாட்டை கொண்டுள்ளதாக தெரியவில்லை என்கிறார். ஆரம்பத்தில் சேவை நீடிப்பை எதிர்பார்த்திருக்கும் ஒரு உயரதிகாரியும் களத்தில் உள்ளவர்களும் தான் இந்த வலிந்த தாக்குதல் நடவடிக்கைக்கு காரணம் போன்ற விளக்கத்தை கொடுக்க முயன்றவர் இறுதியில் அரசியல் தலமைக்கும் இராணு தலமைக்கும் இடையில் பாரிய இடைவெளி உண்டு என்கிறார்.

தேசிய பாதுகாப்பு ஊடகமய்யம் ஆரம்பத்தில் புலிகள் முகமாலைப் முன்னரங்கங்களில் தாக்குதல்கள் நடத்துகிறார்கள் என்று சர்வதேச ஊடகங்களிற்கு SMS மூலம் அறிவித்தார்கள். இது அவர்களிற்கும் என்ன நடக்கிறது என்ற தெளிவில்லாமையால் நடந்ததா? இவற்றிற்கு விடை காணாது விடுவதே மேல் என்கிறார்.

புலிகளோடு இராணுவ மேலாண்மைய ஏற்படுத்துவது முக்கியமாக இருந்தாலும் பேச்சுக்கள் மூலம் தீர்வுகாணவதில் அர்பணிப்பாக உள்ள அரசாங்கத்திற்கு அரசியல் விடையங்களும் சம அளவில் முக்கியம் என்று ஒரு புது கோசத்தை வைத்திருக்கிறார்.

ஏனைய அவதானிகள் சர்வதே மற்றும் உள்ளூர் ஊடகங்கள் இராஜதந்திரிகள் இந்த இராணுவ நடவடிக்கை அரசியல் இலாபங்களிற்கா இராணுவத்தினர் மீது நிர்ப்பந்திக்கப்பட்டு தோல்வி கண்டிருக்கிறது என்ற ஏகோபித்த கருத்தை கொண்டிருக்கிறார்கள். ஆனால் இக்கபால் அரசியல் பீடத்தை பாதுகாக்க முற்பட்டிருக்கிறார் என்பது தெளிவாகிறது. இக்பால் அந்த நிர்ப்பந்தத்தில் எழுத வெளிக்கிட்டு இராணுவ நடவடிக்கை ஏப்ப நடந்தது என்றும் ஏன் நடந்தும் என்றும் விபரங்களோடு விளக்க முற்பட்டவருக்கு அதிசியமாக யார் நடத்த சொன்னது என்றதில் தடுமாறிப் போனதாக காட்ட முனைந்துள்ளார்.

[kurukaalapoovan]

டிபிஎஸ் இன் தற்போதைய எழுத்துக்கள் இனவாத சிங்களவர்களிற்கு கடுப்பேத்துபவையாக இருக்கும். பன்றிகள் பறக்கும் மட்டக்களப்பிற் பின்ன உவர் எடுத்திருக்கிற நிலைப்பாடு சர்வதேசத்தின் பார்வையில் இருந்து எழுதுவது என்பது தெளிவாக தெரி;கிறது. தமிழ்ச் சமூகத்தில் இவருடைய அமெரிக்க தொடர்புகள் பற்றி சில ஆய்வுகள் செய்யப்பட்டிருந்தது.

முற்று முழுக்க புலிஎதிர்பு வாதியாகவும் புலிகளை பந்திக்கு பந்தி நக்கலடித்தும் கொச்சைப்படுத்தி கருணா பிரிவு மற்றும் சுனாமி காலத்தில் எழுதிவந்தவர். பின்னர் படிப்படியாக அதை குறைத்து ரணில் ஆதரவாகவும் மகிந்தவிற்கு எதிரான பாணியிலும் ஜநாதிபதி தேர்தல் காலத்தில் எழுத தொடங்கினார். மகிந்த ஆட்சிக் காலத்தில் நடந்த அப்பட்டமான சிறீலங்கா பயங்கரவாதம் டிபிஎஸ் இற்கு தன்னை ஒரு தமிழ் உணர்வுள்ளவர் போன்ற தோற்றப்பாட்டை மாற்றிக்கொள்ள உதவியது. இன்று கிட்டத்தட்ட புலிகளின் திறமைகள் வெற்றிகளை நடத்தைகளை அவ்வப்போது நாசூக்காக புகழ்பவராக பெருமைப்படுபவராக மாற்றமடைந்து வருகிறார். தமிழர்களின் மனத்தில் இடம்பிடிப்பத்து நம்பிக்கையை பெற முயல்கிறார் என்பதில் சந்தேகம் இல்லை. தமிழர்மீதான சர்வதேசத்தின் மிரட்டல்கள் அதட்டல்களை எதிர்காலத்தில் உவரின் ஆக்கங்களில் எதிர்பார்க்கலாம். அதற்காக வாசகர்களின் மனதை தயார்படுத்தி வருகிறார்.

இன்று சிங்கள இனவாதம் சார்பாக சர்வதேசம் அதிர்ப்த்தியாக இருக்கிறது என்பதை இவருடைய அண்மை கால எழுத்துகளில் கவனிக்கலாம். இவருடை புலியெதிர்புவாத எழுத்துக்கள் இவரை சிங்கள இனவாதிகள் மத்தியில் நல்லதொரு ஆய்வாளர் என்ற தகுதியில் வைத்திருக்கிறது. அந்த தகுதியை வைத்து இவர்மூலம் சில செய்திகளை சர்வதேசம் சொல்ல முற்படுகிறது சிங்கள வாசகர்களிற்கு.

அதை செய்து கொண்டு எங்கள் மனங்களையும் குளிர்விக்க முனைகிறார்.

[விது]

ஒன்று மட்டும் விளங்கிது இலங்கையில் ஒரு ராணுவஆட்சி வருவதற்கான வாய்ப்புக்கள் மிக அதிகமாகவுள்ளது!!!