Jump to content

Operation Unceasing Waves III


Recommended Posts

  • கருத்துக்கள உறவுகள்+

மூலம்: http://dictionary.sensagent.com/Operation_Unceasing_Waves_III/en-en/

 

இந்தச் சிங்களவன் விக்கியில் எழுதப்பட்டிருந்த கீழக்கண்ட கட்டுரையை அழித்துவிட்டான். ஆகையால் வேறொரு இடத்தில் இருந்து கிடைத்த அதே கட்டுரையை இங்கு இணைக்கிறேன். இது முன்னொரு காலத்தில் விக்கியில் எழுதப்பட்டது. இப்போது புலி ஆதரவெனச் சொல்லி சிங்களவன் நீக்கிவிட்டான். 

 

 

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Unceasing Waves III (ஓயாத அலைகள்-III in Tamil) was a major military operation launched by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam between late 1999 to May 2000. The offensive can be said to be the largest and longest military operation carried out by the Tamil Tigers, and unlike previous assaults which were usually against individual Sri Lankan Army bases, it was carried out against several massive garrisons. The operation has been described as a "bullet train that swallows everything in its path" in Narayan Swamy's book "Tigers Of Lanka: From Boys To Guerrillas"

 

 

Operation Unceasing Waves III
Part of the Sri Lankan civil war, Operation Jayasikurui
 
Belligerents
Military of Sri Lanka Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Commanders
Chandrika Kumaratunge Velupillai Prabhakaran and top LTTE commanders
Strength
30,000 + involved 5000+ involved
Casualties and losses
5000+ killed, 15,000+ wounded 1300+ killed, Wounded Unknown

 

Background

Since 1997, the Sri Lankan military was involved in its largest military campaign till then, Operation Jayasikurui. Amidst intense resistance from the Tamil Tigers, the Sri Lankan Army, backed by heavy artillery, armor and air power, managed to advance along the A9 Highway in its goal of dividing the Tiger held territory in half, and opening a land route to Jaffna. After several months, the Operation was paused temporarily after a few advances which cost them thousands of casualties and a devastating Tiger attack behind enemy lines (Thandikulam–Omanthai offensive).

With the pausing of Operation Jayasikurui, the military focused on opening a land-sea route to Jaffna via Mannar and Pooneryn. Operations Ranagosa I, II, III and IV were launched from Mannar, and the Tigers quietly withdrew, offering limited resistance. Operation Watershed was launched via sea to capture Pooneryn, but it was successfully thwarted by the Tigers.

The military operations in the Vanni had captured over 2000 Square Kilometers of land from the Tamil Tigers, including the villages of Oddusuddan, Mankulam, Puliyankulam, Kanakarayankulam and large areas of the Mannar District. Disaster struck when LTTE troops captured Kilinochchi during Operation Unceasing Waves II.


With pressure mounting and the Presidential Elections approaching, the Sri Lankan military hastily moved its fighting units from the A9 to Mannaar to launch a full-scale offensive from there.The Tigers took advantage of this situation to launch their attack. They had to deliver some victory before Maaveerar Day.

The Tamil Tiger leader, Prabhakaran, immediately started making preparations for a military offensive that would shake Sri Lanka like never before. The offensive was planned and key commanders Balraj, Theepan, Sornam, Jeyam, Amuthab, Gobith, Vithusha, Durga, Soosai, Pottu Ammaan and some others were to execute it.The Tigers' fighting formations- Charles Anthony Brigade, Jeyanthan Brigade, Sorthia Brigade and Malathi Brigade were paired up for the offensive. The "Border Force" and the Elite Imran-Pandyan fighting formation were given the role of guarding territory, while the Elite "Chiruthaigal" (Leopards) unit was given the task of carrying out infiltration attacks. In addition, several other units, including the Black Tigers, Kittu Artillery Wing, Kutti Sri Mortar Wing and Victor Anti Tank and Anti Armor Regiment were to take part.

At least 5000 cadres are believed to have taken part in the operation.

 

Just a few weeks before the Presidential elections, when the Sinhalese majority was in jubiliation that their army was going to defeat the Tigers, the nightmare began.

The Operation – Phase 1

Shortly after midnight, heavily armed Tiger cadres began a massive assault on several fronts. After several hours of intense fighting, Oddusuddan fell to the LTTE.

The Tigers continued on their rolling offensive.

Town after town fell into the hands of the Tamil Tigers. After Oddusuddan fell to the Tigers on November 2, 1999, the Sinhalese were in a state of shock. Over 800 soldiers had been killed and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) admitted heavy losses. On November 3, 1999, the Tigers overran Nedunkerni, six miles south of Oddusuddan. The SLA was withdrawing amidst heavy shelling while defences north of Oddusuddan were being reinforced. Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) aircraft and helicopters had come under intense Tiger anti-aircraft fire, according to the SLA.On the same day, the LTTE reported that a large area of over 30 square kilometers had been brought under their control in the last two days. The LTTE said that it lost 40 fighters in the assault on Oddusuddan SLA base.Meanwhile, six civilians had been killed in Mullaitivu in an airstrike by SLAF Kfir bombers.

On 4 November 1999, the Tigers released a statement that huge areas of Ampakamam had been brought under control from the Sri Lankan Army, and that over 1000 SLA troops had been killed in the last few days.Extracts from the LTTE statement:

"In the fighting that is raging ferociously in the Karupaddamurippu - Ampakamam sector, east of Mankulam, the LTTE forces have overrun the Sri Lankan front defence lines and taken control of vast sections of strategically crucial Ampakamam area, situated 5 kilometres north of Karupaddamurippu""After several hours of sustained fighting the LTTE units destroyed several mini-camps at Ampakamam today and caused heavy casualties to the enemy."LTTE fighters are also engaged in a fierce battle in the jungle areas between Nedunkerni and Pulliyankulam, as Sri Lankan troops attempted to advance from bases at Pulliyankulam towards Nedunkerni sector. Heavy exchange of artillery and mortar fire is taking place in the area.""The LTTE's offensive campaign, code named 'Unceasing Waves 3', continues ferociously for the third day today as the LTTE fighting formations swept westwards of Mullaitivu in the direction of A9 highway posing a serious threat to Sri Lankan bases on the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi route.""Over one thousand Sri Lankan troops have been killed and many more injured in the three days of intense fighting. So far 60 LTTE fighters have died in the battle.""The LTTE fighters have cremated, with military honours, hundreds of decomposed bodies of Sri Lankan soldiers scattered all over the jungle areas as ICRC was unable to get clearance from the Sri Lankan military establishment to handover the demised soldiers.""In Vanni area, jubilant crowds of civilians in thousands are actively supporting the offensive campaign of the LTTE. Civilian crowds are supplying food to the fighters and are helping to remove vast amounts of arms and ammunitions from various Sri Lankan armouries in the liberated areas."

On 5 November 1999, the Liberation Tigers captured the strategic town of Karupaddamurippu which had been under the heavy attack for the last 24 hours, said LTTE sources in London.

On the same day, the LTTE overran the massive SLA garrison at Mankulam. The base, which was the northernmost SLA position on the A9 highway, was attacked on three directions by LTTE fighters.

By Saturday, 6 November 1999, The Liberation Tigers captured another strategic town, Kanakarayankulam, on the A9 highway after overrunning Mankulam the previous day. The Tigers also took control of Nainamadu, another key town east of Kanakarayankulam. Kanakarayankulam is about 10 km south of Mankulam.

Later the same day The Liberation Tigers captured Puliyankulam, a strategic town on the A9 highway, about 27 km north of Vavuniya.

The next day, the Sri Lankan President imposed censorship on the local and foreign press under the Public Security Ordinance (Chapter 40) with effect from November 6, 1999. The clampdown on the press came in the wake of heavy fighting in the northern Vanni region where the Liberation Tigers had captured several strategic towns.

After a brief lull the Liberation Tigers have launched large scale attacks on the Sri Lanka Army positions in Pallamadu and Paalampiddy on the eastern sector of the Mannar District said LTTE sources in London today. They said Omanthai, about 13 km. north of Vavuniya, has also come under heavy artillery attack.


SLA sources said earlier that its troops had launched an offensive on three flanks to stall the Tigers’ advance. However LTTE sources in London denied this.An LTTE official in London said “after resting a day, yesterday, the LTTE fighters are moving southwards from areas captured recently.”The Liberation Tigers said in a press release, after capturing the strategic town of Puliyankulam, the northern garrison town Vavuniya has become “exposed”.Residents in Vavuniya when contacted by TamilNet said, the government troops in the town have been firing shells towards Omanthai.

The LTTE consolidated its positions and pressed the attack.The Tigers were sweeping for SLA mines and unexploded ordnance A large stretch of territory from the Mankulam-Mullaitivu road to the Puliyankulam area was captured by the LTTE. Meanwhile LTTE forces were advancing on Panikaineeravi, 3 km. south of Puliyankulam.Elsewhere, in the Manal Aru (Weli Oye) area, LTTE fighters have overrun six SLA camps including Thanikkal, Kent Farm, Ceylon Theatre.

The Tigers said 120 LTTE fighters, including 44 women have died since they launched operation 'Unceasing Waves 3' a week ago. The offensive was continuing, the Tigers said.

On 18 November 1999, The Liberation Tigers captured Paalampiddy, an interior village about 45 km northwest of Vavuniya in a predawn attack. Paalampiddy is about 18 km west of Iraniiluppaikulam, on the interior road which links the A9 and the highway from Mannar to Jaffna through Pooneryn.

On 14 November 1999, The Liberation Tigers said they captured a key forward defence locality of the strategic Thallady base on the island's northwestern coast. The defences of the Sri Lankan army (SLA) in Seththukkulam were overrun by the fighting units of the Tigers which have been advancing towards the Thallady base and the Mannar- Vavuniya highway in the latest phase of Operation Unceasing Waves III, according to a special news update by the Voice of Tigers.

By Monday, 13 December 1999, the Tigers had captured the villages of Aliavalai and Kodukkilai in Vadamarachi East.

On Wednesday, 15 December, The Liberation Tigers said their offensive in the Jaffna peninsula was continuing as LTTE commando units tightened their grip around the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) base complex at Elephant Pass. The LTTE said SLA claims of 500 Tigers being killed were baseless. So far, 60 Tigers have died in the five days of fighting, the LTTE said in a statement released in London.

On Thursday, 16 December 1999, The Liberation Tigers captured four more villages in the Vadamaradchi East Division of the Jaffna peninsula.

On 17 December 1999, the LTTE launched a massive attack on the SLA complex at Paranthan, under the leadership of commaander Theepan. An SLA source in Jaffna said that the southern defences of the Paranthan base had been overrun by the Tigers. Meanwhile the Liberation Tigers shot down a Sri Lankan air Force MI 24 helicopter around 10 a.m. over the lagoon near the Elephant Pass Sri Lankan army base.Two pilots and two gunners who were in the helicopter appear to have been killed, said an SLA Headquarters source in Colombo.

By Saturday, 18 December 1999, The Liberation Tigers' fighters who were advancing on the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) base at Elephant Pass were 3 km from the centre of the complex. Hundreds of SLA soldiers have been killed as two bases in Paranthan were overrun.On Tuesday, 21 December 1999, The Liberation Tigers began a concerted artillery attack on the Sri Lanka Army's (SLA) central base camp at the Elephant Pass after overrunning two more military bases in the area between Paranthan and Elephant Pass. The Southern defences of Elephant Pass collapsed.

On 24 December 1999, heavy fighting erupted between the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and the Liberation Tigers in Sangaththaar Vayal and Koil Vayal, close to Iyakkachchi, north of the Elephant Pass base complex.

On Saturday, 25 December 1995, the LTTE urged Elephant Pass base to surrender.

The Operation – Phase 2 (Elephant Pass and the advance for Jaffna)

After successfully reversing the gains made by Operation Jayasikurui, the Tigers planned to advance towards the Tamil heartland of Jaffna. Lying on the gateway to Jaffna was the massive SLA garrison at Elephant Pass.

The EPS garrison had been described as "impregnable" by US army standards. Commander Balraj led a daring and meticulously planned operation in which he led 1,200 LTTE fighters into the Sri Lanka Army (SLA)-held Jaffna peninsula to capture and hold a section of the key A9 highway linking the SLA base complex at Elephant Pass with the Jaffna rearbase areas. Thus the supply routes were cut off. The Sea Tiger special commander Soosai had said that it was a do or die mission, since there weren't enough fuel supplies for Balraj and his men to return if the offensive was called off. The plan went ahead.

The large LTTE strike force slipped into the heavily fortified peninsula by sea and trekked inland from Thalaiyadi to the Puthukkaattu Junction on the A9. With complex defences manned by thousands of Sri Lankan troops, such a move had hitherto been considered an impossibility.It was also considered impossible for a lightly armed strike force, surrounded by thousands of Sri Lankan troops supported by artillery, tanks and airpower, to seriously disrupt the key highway for very long.

However, holding what became called the ‘Vaththirayan Box’, a perimeter of a few kilometres deep inside the Jaffna High Security Zones, with no hope of resupply unless the Elephant Pass base fell to the LTTE, Balraj and his troops battled the Sri Lankan forces for 34 days with only the weapons they had carried with them.

When the LTTE assault on the Elephant Pass base complex began, the SLA garrison there was unable to receive supplies from Jaffna due to Balraj’s ‘cutout’.

The SLA therefore launched repeated onslaughts against Balraj’s position to clear the A9 and save the Elephant Pass base. As the situation became critical, top Sri Lankan commanders converged in Jaffna to mobilise the relief effort, but to no avail: the ‘Vaththirayan box’ held until the Elephant Pass garrison collapsed before a major LTTE offensive. At least four Sri Lankan commanders were put in charge, one by one, against the Tiger forces led by Balraj.

Balraj’s raid gave lie to the assumption that no rear defence in depth of a state's conventional army could only be seriously threatened by an armed force supported by strategic air power.

The fall of Elephant Pass, described as "impregnable" by a US army officer who visited the garrison months earlier, established the Tigers as the only non-state military force in the world today capable of complex manoeuvre war fighting.[citation needed]

Infantry formations and crack commando units of the LTTE overran the sprawling Sri Lanka army base complex straddling the gateway to Jaffna on 21 April.

On its southern front facing the LTTE’s military formations, the garrison was fortified heavily with three main lines of defence, in the Elephant Pass lagoon, its beach and on the land by the coast. These were reinforced with miles of concrete and steel structures, minefields, layers of concertina, minefields and beds of deadly spikes.

 

The Sri Lanka army had carefully studied the loopholes and weaknesses in the defences of its camps in Pooneryn (November 93), Mullaithivu (July 96), anf Kilinochchi (September 98) which the Tigers had exploited when they overran these garrisons; and with advisory input from US and British militaries planned and built a formidable system of fortifications to hold the strategic gateway to Jaffna.

These defences in turn were protected by a large Sri Lanka army camp in Paranthan, structured as a bulwark on the Vanni mainland directly ahead of Elephant Pass (EPS).

The SLA was long criticised by US and British military officers in Colombo for taking a "static approach" in organising the defences of its larger camps in the north.

They urged Sri Lanka's military leadership to engage in aggressive patrolling and ambush in a large area ahead of the first flexible, shifting lines of defence.

Their suggestions were not ignored when the fortifications of EPS were reorganised and reinforced. The EPS defence was, above all, designed to make it immune to any form of 'shock and awe' strategy by the LTTE.

The depth of the EPS defences was unprecedented in Sri Lanka’s modern military history.

Its rear – the Jaffna peninsula – was under the SLA’s controls barring covert activities by the LTTE there, which were considered militarily negligible. Three army divisions, 51, 52 and 53, were deployed there, well placed to achieve a concentration of forces in any part of the peninsula threatened by the LTTE.

The garrison had a macadamised Main Supply Route (MSR) from the peninsula’s main town and a contingency MSR along Jaffna Lagoon’s southeastern coast considered ‘totally’ safe.

An alternative to water supply for EPS from the fresh water wells of Paranthan was secure in the rear in Iyakkachchi, miles behind the base.

In addition to these, a firing base comprising a dozen pieces of artillery guns was placed in Palali, relatively ‘deep’ in the EPS garrison’s rear, to thwart attempt by the Tigers to penetrate behind the lines to destroy it.

However, the strongest aspect of the ‘depth’ given to the garrison's defences was the joint Sri Lanka army, Navy base in Kaddaikaadu-Vettilaikerni coast, which was designed to function as the supply route of the last resort, in the event of land and air communications being cut off.

The Sri Lankan military leadership therefore assumed quite rightly, in accordance with their western textbook knowledge of 'depth of defence', that the LTTE was incapable of manoeuvre against 'defence depth' of EPS, involving major sea crossings and the moving of large military formations with adequate speed.

Despite reports by Sri Lankan military courts of inquiry, the SLA hierarchy and its British/US 'defence advisors' were generally inclined to take the view that the Liberation Tigers had, in the past, succeeded in overwhelming SLA camps by launching intense barrages on forward positions and throwing waves of suicidal troops in frontal assaults to break through into and knock out command and communications centres.

This view was mainly promoted by Sinhala defence analysts and reporters who work closely with, or advise, western military and intelligence personnel in Colombo and abroad.[citation needed]

The SLA and its US, British friends obviously little expected the LTTE to possess the capability to co-ordinate a manoeuvre warfare strategy on the scale required to seriously threaten a garrison as large as EPS.[citation needed]

In the 20th century no anti-state armed group had ever succeeded in doing so—not even the Viet Cong.[citation needed]

(The battle for Diem Bien Phu was essentially a siege by more than 15,000 troops backed by 200 artillery pieces and 20000 regular commissariat men and women, which lasted for more than two months in a terrain that was singularly advantageous to the Vietnamese).

Their view, no doubt was logical given the facts of the war since 1997.[citation needed]

The Tigers lost key population centres in the Vanni (Puliyankulam, Nedunkerni, Kanakarayankulam, Mankulam), more than 3000 troops (wounded and killed) and valuable military supplies in their defensive battles against the SLA's 'Operation Jeya Sikurui' from May 1997 to November 1999.

Furthermore the LTTE had, in 1995–96, lost Jaffna, the organisation's largest revenue base in the island's northeast.

Therefore the SLA came quite logically to the conclusion that the LTTE was incapable of launching and materially sustaining complex manoeuvre warfare to capture the heavily defended parts of southern Jaffna.

In hindsight one may even venture to say that the SLA's confidence in the EPS garrison's 'textbook impregnability', reaffirmed in no small measure by the praises of British and US army officers and diplomats who visited it, also contributed to one of the worst debacles in south Asia's modern military history. The writing was on the wall when the Tigers overwhelmed the joint Sri Lanka army, Navy base in Kaddaikaadu - Vettilaikerni in December 1999.[citation needed]

Realising that the EPS garrison's vital beachhead was gone, the SLA quickly reinforced the Thalaiyadi camp, north of Kaddaikaadu, with the elite US trained 53 Division and built the Vaththiraayan Box.

This move was still based on the assumption that the Tigers were capable only of frontal assaults but not of amphibious manoeuvre.

(The concept of the Vaththiraayan Box, a heavily fortified rectangular bastion from Thalaiyadi to the Puthukkaattu Junction on the A9, was also based on this supposition).

According to Sri Lankan and standard western military wisdom, it was considered impossible for any LTTE penetration team to survive and pose even a minimally destabilising threat to vital SLA positions in the rear crucial to the defence of EPS. On 26 March 2000, Col. Balraj, the LTTE's senior military commander, gave the lie to the assumption that no rear depth of defence of a state's conventional army can be seriously threatened by anyone except an armed force with strategic air power, when the Sea Tigers fought their way through a sea barrier formed by a large Sri Lanka Navy flotilla in rough seas to land 1200 troops and their supplies at Kudarappu-Maamunai, in the SLA's rear, beyond the iron-clad Vaththiraayan Box.

In the three weeks that followed, the LTTE exploded many assumptions that still inform modern military wisdom by demonstrating it could fight and win set piece battles and hold its ground in the enemy's well-fortified rear without air support.

Few, however, noticed that it signalled a paradigm shift in the conduct of limited wars in the 21st century.[citation needed]

On 22 April 2000, the LTTE informed that Elephant Pass had been captured. The full text of the press release follows:

“Yakachchi and Elephant Pass bases forming the giant military complex of the Sri Lankan army on the gateway to Jaffna fell to the combat formations of the Liberation Tigers this afternoon following 48 hours of fierce and bloody fighting. Over one thousand Sri Lankan troops were killed and the rest fled in total disarray.”“LTTE’s Special Forces and commando units stormed into the Yakachchi military base in the early hours of the morning in a multi-pronged assault and overran the well-fortified camp after several hours of intense fighting. The LTTE commandos, who penetrated central base, destroyed several artillery pieces, tanks, armoured vehicles and ammunition dumps.”“Overwhelmed by the fury of the Tiger assault the Sri Lankan troops who desperately held the base without supplies and reinforcements for the last 2 days, fled in total confusion.”“With the fall of Yakachchi and with the collapse of the command structure of its defending troops, the LTTE combat units moved swiftly and stormed into Elephant Pass from different directions. Unable to withstand the LTTE’s multi-pronged assault the Sri Lankan troops ran amok in chaos.”“The majority of the soldiers of the 54 Division fled through Killali lagoon in the midst of heavy fire from LTTE fighters suffering heavy casualties.”“LTTE fighters are now in full control of the Yakachchi-Elephant Pass sector and have amassed a huge haul of heavy weapons, ammunition and military vehicles.”“The conquest of Elephant Pass complex, the largest and well -entrenched military base in the north, signified a major military victory of the Tigers in the current campaign against Sri Lankan troops in Jaffna. The fall of this crucial base at the gate of Jaffna will facilitate the LTTE to gain its strategic goal of liberating Jaffna.”

The offensive continued. On 30 April 2000, the SLA base at Pallai was overrun by the Tigers.

End of offensive

On Monday, 8 May 2000, The Liberation Tigers said that they were prepared to declare a temporary cease-fire to allow the Sri Lanka Army troops in the northern Jaffna peninsula to withdraw safely. In a statement from its London offices, the LTTE said its offer was "gesture of goodwill" to prevent further bloodshed and "to create a congenial environment" for the SLA "to withdraw from the unfavourable theatre of war with dignity and honour".

The full text of the press release follows:

"The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wishes to state that it is prepared to declare a temporary cease-fire suspending all armed hostilities against the Sri Lankan armed forces to facilitate the beleaguered government troops to be evacuated safely from the Jaffna peninsula."Our proposed cessation of hostilities will come into effect as soon as the Sri Lanka government indicates to us, without delay, its willingness to observe the same. We call upon the International Committee of the Red Cross to supervise and assist the orderly evacuation of troops."The leadership of the Liberation Tigers has made this decision as a gesture of goodwill to prevent further escalation of violence and bloodbath and to create a congenial environment for Sri Lankan soldiers to withdraw from the unfavourable theatre of war with dignity and honour."We call upon the government of Sri Lanka to consider our proposal seriously and respond positively without delay. A positive response, we are confident, will create cordial conditions for a permanent cease-fire, peace talks and negotiated political settlement for the Tamil national question. We also wish to indicate to the Sri Lanka government that it will bear total responsibility for the disastrous consequences of heavy military casualties if it rejects our proposal for de-escalation and continues the war effort."

 

 

 

 

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Archived

This topic is now archived and is closed to further replies.



×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

By using this site, you agree to our Terms of Use.