Tamil Tigers military operation the Unceasing Waves - 2

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Operation Unceasing Waves - 2
(Battle of Kilinochchi)

 

• Background:

The highly sophisticated Sri Lankan military fortifications that comprise a 15km stretch form the nodal Tamil town is now under Tamil Tiger's control. LTTE's battle for the taking over of the military-occupied Tamil area started at midnight on September 26 and ended in its capture on the evening of the 29th.    

The Liberation Tigers relocated their civil administration structures from Jaffna to Kilinochchi when the SLA took control of Jaffna in early 1996. In August 1996, the SLA launched an offensive and took control of the town after bitter fighting.

This nodal Tamil town was captured by the Sinhala armed forces two years ago(1996/Aug) in three successive operations code-named Sathjeya 1, 2 and 3.    

 

(Source: eelamweb.com)

Edited April 29, 2022 by நன்னிச் சோழன்

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New signs in Kilinochchi's sand

The success of Operation Unceasing Waves 2 demonstrates the LTTE's evolution towards a standing army, reports Viduthilai Puligal

 

Commander Vithusha raises the Tamil Eelam National flag at liberated Kilinochchi town

The Sri Lankan Army's Kilinochchi -Paranthan - Elephant Pass - Vettilaikerni military complex was a impregnable structure in the north of the island. It is also the
military 'bridge' which connects the 30,000 SLA troops in Jaffna withthe mainland.

The SLA's 54 division was based in this complex, under the command of . Major General Lohan Gunawerdane. Although a typical Sinhala division comprises 10,000 soldiers, the 54 had more in its ranks. Furthermore, many of these soldiers had combat experience.

The huge military complex was made up of three sections: the Kilinochchi base, the Elephant Pass-Paranthan base and the Iyakkachchi - Vettilaikerni base.

At least one brigade of SLA troops (under a Brigadier) was detailed to each base, along with support such as artillery and engineering units.

Kilinochchi itself was particularly well fortified. It was defended by the 54 division's experienced 3rd brigade (under the command of Brigadier Upali Ethirisinghe) and had well designed bunker lines.

The 3rd brigade comprised of four seasoned battalions (with 500-600 men each). They were the10th Singa Regiment (10.S.R.) in the 6th canal area, the 4th Singa Regiment (04.S.R.) in the Urithirapuram area, the 6th Gemunu Watch (06.G.W.) dispersed along the main road and the 7th Gemunu Watch (07.G.W.) in the Thiruvaiyaru area.

At the time it was attacked by the Liberation Tigers, the base sprawled over 20 square kms, and was roughly 4km across.

During the LTTE assault, two more battalions arrived from the Paranthan - Elephant Pass base. These were the 9th Gemunu Watch (09.G.W.) in 3rd canal area and 7th Sri Lanka infantry (07.S.L.T.) in Karadipokku west.

Overall, over 2,000 soldiers were defending the base. The SLA military headquarters was located near Kilinochchi's former People's Bank building in the middle of the town.

Kilinochchi's natural geography, with its large open spaces, also contributed to the base's defence. The massive concrete structure of the base had fields all around it.

Furthermore, the SLA had established other defences for the Kilinochchi complex.

Firstly SLA troops were deployed well outside the base.

Concealed observation posts were established in the surrounding area far from the perimeters of the base. The concealed listening and observation posts could provide
advance warning of LTTE movements.

The SLA also regularly deployed ambush parties in the surrounding area to eliminate LTTE reconnaissance groups.

Mobile SLA groups also frquently planted mines and awaited potential LTTE assaults. This first line of defence was intended to provide warning of an imminent assault, and to engage the attackers in a bid to disrupt it.

Secondly, the SLA established a protective cordon outside the main base. This line of forward defence bunkers were spaced 25-50 meters apart, with almost 500 such bunkers surrounding the base.

The bunker line was also protected by sand bunds, barbed wire and a minefield outside. The third line of defence was a series of 16 'mini'-camps strung around the main base. Special Forces units and regular SLA units manned these camps in a continuous state of alert. It is impossible to reach the main camp without crossing this line.

The fourth defence line (in depth) protected the heart of the Kilinochchi base. The mortar firing sites, main ammunition dump, and brigade headquarters were sited inside this. Until this final line is defeated, the base could have been expected remain operational.

Each SLA battalion within the base had its own mortar batteries, deploying 120mm and 80mm mortars.  A main artillery base which could be directed from the Kilinochchi HQ was also located in the Elephant Pass - Iyakkachchi area.

An array of 50 calibre machine guns, and RPGs, along with armoured vehicles completed the defences.

Air support from the Sri Lankan Air Force's Kfir jet bombers was also available. Kilincochchi was a strategic location for the SLA, particularly given its efforts to link up the land route from Jaffna to Vavuniya. It had already been attacked twice and was on alert for other possible attempts.

However, on November 26, 1998, the Liberation Tigers stormed the Kilinochchi base in Operation Oyatha Alaikal 2 (Unceasing Waves 2), overrunning it completely and killing over 1000 SLA troops.

The LTTE's military victory demonstrated several salient military points. Firstly, during Oyatha Alaikal 2, the SLAF's Kfirs failed to play a significant role, unlike in previous engagements.

This can be attributed to the LTTE's enhanced air defence capability. The LTTE's anti-aircraft units are now challenging the Kfirs' supremacy over the battlefield. During the SLA's Operation Sath Jaya to capture Kilinochchi in 1996, SLAF Kfirs flew 7 or 8 sorties a day, bombing at will. They had a major impact on LTTE defences.

However, this time, even though over 1000 SLA troops desperately needed close air support, the Kfirs flew only 1 or 2 sorties a day. Even then, they were unable to fly low. They released their bombs randomly from high altitude.The Kilinochchi base had well defended supply lines to ensure its viability. However, the LTTE sliced through these, isolating the base before overrunning it. Subsequent SLA attempts to retake the base were repulsed.

The ability to take and hold terrain demonstrates a measure of conventional warfare capability. Significant levels of manpower and firepower are needed to achieve this. That the LTTE was able to do so demonstrates that the Tigers are acquiring conventional warfare capabilities to match the SLA.

The LTTE is, in effect, evolving as a standing army. During the attack on Kilinochchi in February 1, 1998, the LTTE captured an area 1.5km long with a perimeter of 8kms. During Oyatha Alaikal 2 the LTTE further captured an area 4km long and 5km wide. Thus, in total, the LTTE has captured 24 square kms
in the Kilinochchi area.

Further the surrounding 75 square kms are no longer at risk of sudden SLA attack. Thus, 100 square kms of territory have been liberated. During Operation Sath Jaya, the SLA captured Kilinochchi and established a complex occupying 60 square kms and turned the surrounding 100 square kms into no man's land.

Now this militarised zone has been reduced to half its original size. The SLA was unable to prevent this sudden loss in territory. This is the military reality in the north today.

1,400 Tiger fighters laid down their lives on the Kilinochchi front since Sath Jaya was launched to date. During the fighting around Mullaitivu in 1996, SLA reinforcements were attacked and driven off. Reinforcements for the Kilinochchi base were also driven off during Oyatha Alaikal 2.

Though these two events may appear to be similar at a first glance, there are some key differences. Mullaitivu was an isolated SLA base and reinforcing it in sufficient strength was arguably difficult in military terms. Failure to reinforce Kilinochchi which was part of a massive military complex with a fortified main supply route (MSR) cannot be justified militarily. It amply demonstrates the relative strengths of the SLA and the LTTE.

The SLA's capture of Kilinochchi in 1996 was arguably a pyrrhic victory. About 700 SLA troops died during the three phases of Operation Sath Jaya. When the LTTE attacked the Paranthan - Elephant Pass base in 1997, 300 SLA troops were killed.  During the Tigers' February 1998 assault on Kilinochchi - Paranthan - Elephant Pass, another 200 SLA troops died. 500 SLA troops were also killed during subsequent efforts to recapture areas lost in this attack.

During Oyatha Alaikal 2, over 1000 SLA troops died.  So in the 26 months since launching Sath Jaya, the SLA has lost over 3000 troops killed in the Kilinochchi - Paranthan - Elephant Pass front. At least nine artillery pieces and seven tanks were destroyed in this area along with massive quantities of arms and ammunition. This is the reality of the SLA's 1996 Ôvictory' in Kilinochchi.

Sri Lanka's General Ratwatte has been trying to promote the capture of Mankulam as compensation for the loss of Kilinochchi. However, the two events are fundamentally different from a military perspective.

Courtesy: 'Viduthalai Puligal'

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Edited April 29, 2022 by நன்னிச் சோழன்

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ANALYSIS

 

From Kilinochchi, Jaffna beckons!

 

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