Operation Unceasing Waves - 1
(Battle of Mullaitivu)

 

• Background:

 

Operation Unceasing Waves was the code name assigned to the LTTE assault on the Sri Lankan army's military complex at Mullaitivu launched on 18 July 1996. A week of intense fighting followed and the result was an overwhelming victory for the Liberation Tigers.

Apart from inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, and capturing vast quantities of arms and ammunition, the operation boosted the morale of the Tamils both in the homelands and abroad. Sri Lankan propaganda claims that the LTTE had been destroyed were disproved.

A few documents related to the operation have been drawn together here. A summary of the battle and a subsequent analysis published by the LTTE in their official periodical, Viduthilai Puligal have been translated.

An analysis of the implications of Operation Unceasing Waves written by Mr. Vasantha Raja, has also been reproduced with his kind permission.

Pictures drawn from photographs and video footage of the operation have been compiled to provide further details of what was a milestone in the Tamil struggle for self determination.

 

(Source: eelamweb.com)

Edited April 29, 20223 yr by நன்னிச் சோழன்

The Tiger's Leap On Mullaitivu

 

(What went wrong with the General's vision)

 

Vasantha Raja   (Part I)    

The massive Mullaitivu defeat suffered by the Sri Lankan military in late July, where over 1200 soldiers were killed by the Tamil Tiger forces in a conventional-type attack capturing the base with relative ease, could turn out to be the decisive turning point in the LTTE's 13-year war with the Sinhala-dominated government of Sri Lanka. Some Western journalists saw clearly its parallels to the Viet Cong guerrillas' Tet offensive in Vietnam; one even described it as the biggest military debacle any conventional army in South Asia had suffered in the post-independence era.

The curious point is that no one closely following the national conflict in Sri Lanka thought there was the slightest possibility that the LTTE could launch an attack of that magnitude so quickly after the government's military successes in Jaffna. The spectacular overpowering of the Mullaitivu garrison came as a total shock. All the 'pundits' - that includes the Sri Lankan government, its military leaders, advisers to the Western states and most Western journalists - who seriously thought the back-bone of the LTTE had been broken after the dazzling success of Riviresa operations 1,2 and 3, were somewhat baffled.

The army commander, in a recent interview, assured that the LTTE could no longer carry out "Poonaryn-type" attacks (the Poonaryn attack was a ferocious rebel onslaught in October '93 on a northern military base in which hundreds of soldiers were killed, albeit relatively smaller in comparison with the storming of the Mullaitvu base).

Also, Gen. Anurudda Ratwatta had announced the LTTE was effectively a spent force and that crushing whatever strength remained in the Vanni jungles and East was just a matter of time. The government tried to assure the outside world that its two-pronged - military/political - offensive was on track and that soon the Sinhala-dominated troops occupying some five per cent of the Tamil homeland would be able to win the hearts and minds of the Tamil people living there and impress those still living in the LTTE-held territories as well.

The obvious but fascinating question is what could have made all these supposedly reasonable people so gullible and naive?

But before answering that let us briefly examine the model on which the government's anti-LTTE strategy was based.

The basic assumption running through the entire strategy is the belief that the majority of Tamil populace in the North are fed up of the LTTE and eagerly anticipating the military defeat of the LTTE, provided the government takes steps to "devolve certain powers" to "redress their grievances".

Hence the two-pronged strategy: on one hand, the military offensive to capture a significant portion of rebel-held territory and weaken the LTTE substantially so its activities could be reduced to minor hit-and- run attacks by a "dwindling fanatical group" in the periphery; and on the other hand, the political offensive to establish a government-administration backed by occupying troops which would be used as a base to impress the people living there through "reconstruction and rehabilitation".

It is important to note that the political aspect of the strategy was not to try and impress the LTTE. It was aimed at driving a wedge between the LTTE and the Tamil people. In other words, it was subordinate to, and part and parcel of, the military aim to crush the LTTE. For, the military and the government firmly believed that the Prabhakaran-leadership would never agree to a settlement which would split the Tamil homeland and leave the Sinhala-dominated Centre intact, whereby the final say on the destiny of the Tamil homeland would remain at the mercy of the Sinhala-dominated government in Colombo. (Indeed, the LTTE's subsequent calls for a settlement involved substantial re-structuring of the Centre, in addition to devolution of power at the periphery).

So, the primary target of both the military and political offensives was to militarily defeat the LTTE. The government also knew that the bargaining strength of those Tamil political groups collaborating with them in Colombo was dependent on the survival of the LTTE. Once the LTTE was destroyed, imposing on the Tamil people an even more diluted version of the present political package would be no problem at all; and the government knows it. That probably explains why, encouraged by the relatively easy capture of the Jaffna peninsula and the highly bullish predictions of a quick victory, the government was reluctant to force the blatantly opportunistic UNP-Opposition to a parliamentary debate on the political package.

Let us now dwell on more general features of the government's strategy.

Unlike the previous military leadership, the new command (under the influence of deputy Defence Minister Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatta) planned to equip the forces with expensive new technology to launch a massive operation in the LTTE stronghold itself in the hope of dismantling the LTTE's de facto administration and installing a new military administration over a section of the Tamil people. This was expected to facilitate the conditions for marginalising the LTTE. Also, the government had high hopes of buying off Tamil people's loyalty by introducing some form of political package. This, it was thought, would pave the way for a Tamil administration with the help of the Tamil quisling groups in Colombo.

In the hope of putting this plan into practice the military launched its war effort on the 9th of July 1995. In order to test the water, the military started with the Operation Leap Forward and then proceeded with the major "broad front" offensive (code named: operation Riviresa One) to take Jaffna, with tens of thousands of well-equipped troops, backed by indiscriminate shelling and bombing, steam-rolling their way into the Tiger stronghold.

However, one unexpected development crippled the military objective - the massive exodus of Tamil people in the face of the approaching army. This left an empty territory for the troops to occupy. Hundreds of thousands of people who fled either went to the Vanni district where the LTTE leadership had retreated or to other areas within Thenamarchchi district which was still under Tiger control. Without the people the government's "victory cry" sounded very hollow indeed.

Operation Riviresa 2 was launched primarily to redress this. The military proceeded by terrorising the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had settled in Thenamarachchi by indiscriminate aerial bombing while sealing off the only available exit to Vanni, and then surrounding a section of the refugee populace and "persuading" them to return to the homes they left in and around Jaffna (Valigamam).

By then the LTTE had learnt vital lessons from Operation Riviresa 1, and consequently chose not to confront the conventional forces head-on at that stage. The Tigers are reported to have encouraged people to return while advising them to be watchful of the Sinhala troops occupying Jaffna. On their part, the Tigers had made a tactical withdrawal mainly to the jungle terrain of Vanni while leaving pockets of guerrillas to continue hit-and-run attacks within the military-controlled areas.

Encouraged by the LTTE's non-confrontational stance the military immediately expanded its main target and hurriedly moved into strategic spots within the remaining parts of Jaffna peninsula too, thereby, over-stretching its resources considerably.

After occupying about five per cent of the Tamil homeland around the Tamils' cultural centre (Jaffna) a military administration, mainly run by Sinhala soldiers, was set up in the hope of carrying out the political aspect of the two-pronged strategy, i.e. to try and win the loyalty of the Tamils through "reconstruction work" and displaying a political package which, the government claimed, had gone some way towards meeting the aspirations of the Tamil people. (In truth, the new proposals are designed to maintain Sinhala/Buddhist supremacy at the Centre and split the territorial unity of Tamil homeland).

I suspect that the deceptively dazzling military victory in the North mesmerised the government into a false sense of self-confidence. The military and political leaders thought the total crushing of the LTTE was round the corner. Hence, a head-on confrontation with the vociferous Sinhala opposition in the South, by introducing even the diluted devolution-package in parliament, was avoided, because a total victory over the LTTE would make the political efforts to win the hearts and minds of Tamils (risking the support of the Sinhala electorate) not terribly urgent. So, the political package took a back seat.

In fact, the Tamil political parties in Colombo, who have been backing the government's war against the LTTE, ended up in an extremely awkward position when the government began to backslide on the political package, pushing even the wavering sections among the Tamil civilians in Colombo towards the LTTE. The leaders of EPDP, TELO, EROS etc., have begun to confess openly about the mistake they made by giving up arms and joining the political main-stream in the South. They appeared to feel betrayed by the Sinhala government, as if the government had been using them in a Machiavellian way to crush the Tamil struggle.

This development has gone a long way towards substantiating my earlier allegation that the Tigers were correct in thinking that the government was conducting the ill-fated peace process in bad faith and using it as a tactical episode in a military strategy to try and marginalise the LTTE from the Tamil people and eventually crush them.

By now, it has become abundantly clear that the government is no longer keen to implement the political package risking its popularity among the Sinhala electorate but is concentrating instead on the military aspect of the strategy to defeat the LTTE. The government "think-tank" mistakenly thought that dismantling the LTTE administration in Jaffna and replacing it with a military administration would serve as a solid basis for crushing the LTTE militarily.

From a purely military point of view the government had good reasons for optimism. To start with, the capturing of Jaffna, quite apart from giving a tremendous boost to the government's image locally and abroad, was seen by the military as a severe blow to LTTE morale (even though developments since have demonstrated that the occupation of Jaffna has in fact hardened the LTTE's resolve to face the challenge as never before).

Also, losing hundreds of thousands of people from LTTE-control had cut off a vital source of income for the rebels. The government never saw the LTTE's sudden retreat to Vanni as a tactical withdrawal which kept its leadership, cadres and weapons in tact. The government saw it as an act of desperation in the face of its own newly acquired military might.

Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatta, the deputy Defence Minister in charge of the overall war strategy, has been assuring President Kumaratunaga that over 60 per cent of the LTTE strength has already been crushed and that it would take only five days for the army to flush the LTTE out from the eastern province. According to him, the LTTE guerrillas restricted to the Vanni jungles could then be easily crushed in a matter of six months. The important thing was to throttle the LTTE forces by cutting off funds and weaponry from abroad.

The Indian navy's collaboration with the Sri Lankan military to track and sink LTTE vessels bringing arms to Tiger territory was a major blessing for the Sinhala government's effort to crush the Tamil struggle. The Delhi government's and the Tamil Nadu administration's open hostility towards the LTTE had been crucial to the government's strategy. (Whether the Indian stance has been significantly altered since the major changes in India's political landscape after the recent general elections has yet to be seen).

The only remaining loophole in the military strategy, in the government's view, was the huge financial support the LTTE was getting from the Tamil Diaspora; hence the allocation of massive funds by the Sri Lankan government to launch an unprecedented propaganda campaign to undermine that link. The Foreign Minister with a Tamil name had to set out on a globe-trotting mission of shuttle-diplomacy to convince the governments of those countries where Tamil expatriates reside in significant numbers that the government was at the verge of defeating the LTTE totally only if the foreign states led by the US took decisive action to clamp down on LTTE activities in their countries so that the flow of funds to LTTE coffers can be drastically curtailed. The fact that those foreign political advisors in Colombo, who brief their relevant governments, had already swallowed the Sri Lankan government's interpretation of its military advancement, was of enormous use to the foreign minister, Kadiragamar, in carrying out his global mission.

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Part II)

 

In order to facilitate a suitable atmosphere for the foreign governments to carry out the crack down, it was important to brand the LTTE as a 'terrorist' organisation internationally, while hiding the extreme atrocities being committed against and the human sufferings being inflicted on the Tamil people as a direct result of the government's war effort. A costly disinformation campaign was launched internationally to achieve the former target, while a ban on journalists visiting the war theatre and harsh press censorship was imposed to achieve the latter. The "placing" of selected and doctored "news items" in the world press and manipulation of certain foreign journalists to publish highly biased "analyses" of the Tamil struggle reached such heights that blatantly unprofessional editorials to brand the LTTE as "a bunch of fanatical terrorists" began to appear even in prestigious newspapers like "The Times" in the UK. (This bears similar hallmarks to the now well-known global media manipulation preceding the Gulf War). Certain false stories presented at military press-briefings to demonise the LTTE were freely disseminated all over the world as "facts". (In fact, the LTTE leadership issued a strong statement protesting against this phenomenon in August 96.)

Lakshman Kadiragamar's efforts to get the international support to cover the remaining gap, i.e. the flow of funds from Tamil expatriates, seemed successful as the Canadian and Swiss governments moved to arrest the leaders of LTTE organisations in those two countries. The Tamil refugee population was highest in Canada and Switzerland and consequently the greatest financial backing for the LTTE also came from Tamils living in these two countries. Therefore, it might not have been accidental that the international effort to cut off the LTTE's financial life-line started there. In fact, it looked intriguingly as though there was a sort of international 'conspiracy' among the governments of Sri Lanka, Delhi and the rich countries to try and crush the leadership of the Tamil struggle.

Now let me summarise the main elements in the Sri Lankan government's military strategy:

a) To capture at least a substantial portion of the Jaffna peninsula, dismantle the LTTE's de facto government there, and in the process destroy a sizeable portion of the LTTE cadres and set up a military administration in the North.

b) To launch a similar operation in the East to force the remaining LTTE cadres there to the jungles in Vanni.

c) To launch another military operation from Elephant Pass, through Paranthan and Kilinochchi to secure a supply route linking the occupied territory in the North with the South.

d) To restrict the LTTE cadres to Vanni jungles and steadily strangle them by effectively cutting off their armaments and financial life-lines from abroad.

It is probably true that the government would have been delighted if it could get the political package, which splits the Tamil homeland and protects Sinhala domination at the Centre, approved in parliament. That certainly would have been extremely useful in misleading the international community during its war effort to demolish the Tamil struggle. But, it was the divisions within the Sinhala political establishment (for purely opportunistic reasons) which prevented that happening.

It is obvious that the UNP, realising that the very war-hysteria and chauvinism whipped up by the government is working against the package, has been trying its best to avoid any association with it as long as possible. The government too, sensing the opportunistic motives of the Opposition, has begun to backslide from the political package fearing unpopularity within the Sinhala electorate and instead is concentrating purely on the military aspect, about which it was (until Mullativu) becoming increasingly confident.

The Tamil political parties in Colombo, who were being discredited among the Tamil people by the hour, kept insisting on a North/East merger if they were to accept the package. The PA government, dominated by the ultra-chauvinist SLFP, would never have agreed to this, and hence it was obviously in President Kumaratunga's interest too to postpone a parliamentary debate on the package until she concluded the war, i.e., crushed the LTTE. For, she knew that once the LTTE was out of the picture the so-called moderate Tamil parties' preferences would be effectively irrelevant. (This is why I do not include the political package in my description of the military's equation summarised above ).

In purely militaristic logic, the above mentioned strategy may sound solid. But then how was the LTTE able to launch its biggest ever attack on the Mullaitivu base, jeopardising all government calculations, just a short while after its biggest defeat.

The simple answer, I think, is the spiritual depth of national liberation struggles. This is the crucial factor missing from the government's military equation. Conventional military analysts tend to limit their enquiries to more tangible factors such as the unique logistical vulnerability of the Mullaitivu camp over-looked by the military leaders, the guerrilla-friendly jungle terrain in Mullaitivu as opposed to the open Jaffna-terrain favourable to conventional forces, the post-victorious complacency of the government troops etc., etc. Although it is true that such factors did play a significantly contributory role in making the Mullaitivu attack a dazzling success for the Tigers, they fail to explain the unique immensity of the accomplishment so soon after a demoralising retreat. (I deliberately used the term "retreat" instead of "defeat" to highlight the fact that the government troops' occupation of the Jaffna peninsula did not involve a great victory for the military in a physical sense, but, it merely forced the LTTE forces to make a tactical withdrawal keeping its cadres, weaponry and the leadership intact). Arguably, the most plausible way to explain such inimitable achievements is to acknowledge the incomparable resolve and commitment of national liberation fighters to sacrifice their lives for a deeply felt cause. (The heroism of the LTTE forces can usefully be compared with the large scale desertions presently taking place within the Sri Lankan army). Military analysts' failure to differentiate guerrilla forces fighting national liberation struggles from guerrilla groups in general is extremely misleading indeed. It would be strategically and politically prudent to understand that there is a world of difference between guerrillas fighting a national liberation struggle from their home-ground against an alien army and guerrillas fighting, for example, a civil war to overthrow a government from within.

Liberation fighters throughout the world have routinely turned defeats into bigger victories. Defeat only strengthens their resolve to rise again. Whatever the obstacles conventional military strategists pose they will always find ways of overcoming them. There will be no shortage of cadres to continue the struggle as long as the relevant nation exists. As history has shown, all national liberation struggles have either ended up victoriously for the liberationists or else dragged on inconclusively causing economic ruin and political chaos to the countries concerned. There can be no military solutions to such struggles; only political solutions. Hi-tech war efforts can only delay the final outcome, i.e. the victory of the liberation fighters. Unless of course the adversary is capable of wiping out the entire nation.

In Sri Lanka there are some who would be quite happy to consider that last option. But judging from the level of military and political maturity the Tamil struggle and its leadership have reached, and judging from the rapidity with which national consciousness has strengthened among the Tamil people, and judging from the economic and political vulnerability Sri Lanka has reached as a direct result of the war, and judging from the deepening divisions within the Sinhala political establishment, any attempts in that direction could only accelerate the already gathering momentum which is plunging Sri Lanka towards an economic and political Black Hole.

Gen. Anurudda Ratwatta's attempts to underplay the significance of the Mullaitivu catastrophe by saying "In every military campaign, some battles are lost and others won" (Daily News, 8 Aug 1996) could prove to be a fatal mistake for the government; for, more than anything else, it demonstrated the unique potential of national liberation struggles as opposed to conventional warfare.

Perhaps it is not accidental that Gen. Ratwatta, in his statement on the Mullaitivu debacle to the parliament, has chosen not to dwell upon the possible reasons for the shocking magnitude of the Mullaitivu attack which has ridiculed all his insights into LTTE's post-Riviresa vulnerability. Instead he chose to limit his analysis to provide possible reasons as to why the LTTE launched this attack. According to Ratwatta, Mullaitivu attack was "a last ditch attempt to recover their lost prestige, and thereby (to boost up) their sources of income", and also "to prevent the troops from marching (from Elephant Pass) towards the South of the mainland".

A more honest attempt to find out what went wrong with his military vision would have been an eye-opener for many Sinhala chauvinists to see that it would be in the interest of the Sinhala South to find some formula to stop the war as soon as possible, withdraw the Sinhala troops from the Tamil homeland, and re-start negotiations with the LTTE with a genuine view to achieve peace with justice.

 

12 Aug 1996

(Source: eelamweb.com)

 

Edited April 29, 20223 yr by நன்னிச் சோழன்

Operation Unceasing Waves
(an analysis)

 

In military terms alone, Operation Unceasing Waves can be compared to the LTTE's operation at Elephant Pass (Operation Akaya Kadal veli). However, even though both battles were similar, they had differences too.

The Elephant Pass operation was a combination of an offensive action against the Elephant Pass base, and a defensive action against the reinforcements at Vettilaikerni. Similarly, during Unceasing Waves an offensive action was carried out on the Mullaitivu base, and a defensive action was carried out in Silvaturai, to resist air dropped relief troops. However, in the Elephant Pass battle, the Tigers were not able to succeed on both fronts.

Operation Unceasing Waves was significant for four reasons:

1. It was successful in killing a large number of enemy troops.
2. A substantial quantity of arms and ammunition was captured.
3. The relief forces were repulsed successfully.
4. A vast amount of territory was liberated.

The killing of over 1200 soldiers in a single engagement will go down in military history. Such a large number of troops would normally have been killed in a conventional war between nations, and not in a guerrilla war.

In 1954, French troops suffered similar defeat at Dien-Bien-Phu (Vietnam). However, the siege of the base lasted for 56 days, in which period, 8000 French troops were killed as well as a much larger number of Vietnamese fighters.

A significant aspect of 'Operation Unceasing Waves' is that a thousand enemy soldiers were killed for the loss of far fewer (Tamil) fighters, in an assault that was completed in under 3 days. This is undoubtedly an extraordinary military event. Twice as many of the enemy were killed in Unceasing Waves as in Operation Frog (the assault on Elephant Pass).

The [Mullaitivu] attack would have come as a surprise to the Sinhala people who had believed the government's propaganda that the Tigers had been de-clawed and de-fanged in [the Sri Lankan] 'Operation Rivirasa'. A nagging fear of the Sinhala armed forces now, is that their high command is unable to establish with certainty how this disaster came about. This is the psychological aspect of the victory. In addition, the battle turned into a fiasco when Sri Lankan commandos needed to be sent in to rescue the relief force itself.

The timing of this operation was crucial, as it came at a time when the people of the island and abroad were convinced of [Deputy Defense Minister] Ratwatte's mathematical analysis which stated that over 70% of the Tigers' capability had been destroyed [in Jaffna] and that the remainder could be destroyed in the Vanni.

It was also a time when observers all over the world were curious to see if the Tiger's final chapter was about to be written. The Tamil people were also disheartened. However, much to the world's surprise, Leader Velupillai Pirabakaran engineered a huge victory for the Tamil nation, by completely wiping out the Mullaitivu base.

As well as killing the 1200 troops, the LTTE also captured artillery, Buffel armored vehicles, 120mm mortars and a large quantity of other arms and ammunition. They also destroyed a heavily armed naval vessel. These events rocked the institutions of Sinhala hegemony.

When the events at Mullaitivu were confirmed, observers the world over were surprised. Analysts were unable to ascertain how this military success could have come about. Comparisons were drawn from history in attempts to explain it.

One foreign journalist compared this attack to the Vietnamese 'Tet' offensive in 1968, when Vietnamese fighters attacked the American forces. During the American involvement in Vietnam, the Viet Cong movement launched a major onslaught against the American forces simultaneously across the towns of South Vietnam on the same day.

The timing of this operation was important as it came at a time when the American leadership claimed that they had destroyed the Viet Cong movement. The American people had also believed this. When the Viet Cong launched this conventional attack, it politically embarrassed the American government.

Just like the Tet offensive, Operation Unceasing Waves was carried out at a time when the Sinhala government had declared the Tigers' chapter as closed.

The Tet offensive was led by a famous Vietnamese General, Giap and the Unceasing Waves operation was led by Pirabakaran. Though the two operations had similar psychological and political aspects, they had different military implications.

Although the Tet offensive stretched the American forces, they managed to repulse the onslaught. Tet was not a military success for the Viet Cong.

However, Operation Unceasing Waves brought significant psychological, political and military gains for the Liberation Tigers. Unlike the [Viet Cong in the] Tet offensive, the Tigers attained their target. They completely wiped out the Sinhalese forces stationed in the base, captured the entire armoury and freed the territory from enemy occupation.

The foreign analyst who compared both attacks was quite correct in terms of the external circumstances surrounding them.

The attack was also compared to the Pearl Harbour attack in 1941. The Japanese achieved complete surprise when attacking the heavily fortified naval base, a landmark event in military history. Operation Unceasing Waves had military features similar to the Pearl Harbour attack in terms of losses suffered by the enemy and the sudden nature of the attack.

It should be noted that the (Liberation) movement had faced setbacks in 1995, and hence it had almost stalled.

Whenever the [Tamil] war engine takes a blow, Leader Pirabakaran takes personal responsibility for revitalising the movement. He did so this time through Operation Unceasing Waves. After instructing the fighters to withdraw from Vadamaratchi and Thenmaratchi, [on the Jaffna peninsula] he worked hard to mend the military imbalance.

He decided to carry out this huge attack in the Vanni and to wipe out the Mullaitivu base in order to swing the balance back to the Tamils. He also knew the consequences of failure in this battle: it could have paralysed the [Liberation] struggle.

So, ultimately, he undertook the duty of ensuring victory in the battle by taking direct responsibility for the fighters' training, espionage, casualty treatment,troop movements and supply lines.

Maintaining the secrecy of the battle plans was paramount, as was strict adherence to the plan during its implementation, hence Pirabakaran kept firm control of the operation. The fierce determination shown by our fighters in these resulted in victory.

Victory in Unceasing Waves brought new hope to the Tamil people who had been disheartened. The victory also increased the Tamil army's military power by the acquisition of a large quantity of sophisticated weaponry.

For the first time in the Tamils' struggle for independence, medium range (15km) artillery came into the Tigers' possession. In addition to these, they captured RCL and 120mm mortar launchers and ammunition. These weapons will help the Tigers in their efforts to transform themselves into a conventional army. Pirabakaran can be expected to achieve much more with these weapons.

Apart from the military aspect of capturing weapons and killing a larger number of enemy troops, the operation will assume prime importance in the overall war between the Sinhala and Tamil armies.

The other important aspect of this operation was defeating the Sinhala government's attempts to reinforce [the garrison] with the full might of its combined forces. This was a milestone in the Tamil liberation struggle and also an indication of the growth of the struggle.

Sending reinforcements can be compared to giving life blood to a human body. They boost the morale of troops marooned in a besieged camp. The relief commandos landed in Silvaturai, backed by the mighty power of the Navy and Air Force, but were unable to advance to the target [amid Tiger resistance]. This clearly demonstrates the Tigers' ability to fight back a conventional army. This development would have caused concern to the Sinhala military authorities.

In general, rescue operations can be classified into two categories: a commando style operation and a conventional one.

A commando style operation can be carried out by sea or by air. This is normally a surprise attack on the enemy. It will be carried out in secret with an approach based on opportunism and an acceptance of risk. A smaller number of troops will be involved in this kind of attack and it will normally be used in situations like attacking a specific military installation or killing an important person or destroying an enemy target. The military command doesn't need to worry much as even if the operation fails, it will lose only a few troops.

The conventional style rescue operation is quite the opposite. A large number of troops will be deployed with the full support of the navy and air force. This kind of operation is normally carried out when a military camp is in danger or to capture territory. Failure in this kind of operation will have severe implications. A large number of troops will be lost and the imbalance in the military power between the two forces will also be revealed.

The rescue operation carried out in Silvaturai was more or less a conventional style operation and no one can deny the fact that it failed. This will cast doubt on the viability of other military installations in the North where the government believes safety is assured with the support of the Navy.

Although the Sinhala forces managed to land rescue forces despite the heavy resistance from the Tigers, they couldn't inch forward towards the besieged camp, through the Tiger positions. The first batch of reinforcement troops were air lifted on the very first day of the operation (18th June 1996) to a location which is only 2km away from the camp perimeter. The troops were not regular forces, but highly trained special forces. The conventional warfare of the Tigers prevented these troops moving forward, despite the support of the Navy and Air Force.

The Tigers achieved this success which they had failed to in Vettilaikerni, five years earlier. This historical event was a clear indication of the growth of Tigers' capability in conventional warfare.

One cannot conclude that Sinhala army will not attempt this kind of rescue operation in the future. However, the Sinhala army high command cannot deny that future operations like this are going to be a gamble.

 

Courtesy: Viduthalai Puligal

(Source: eelamweb.com)

 

Edited April 29, 20223 yr by நன்னிச் சோழன்

CAPTURED ARMS

 

LTTE Headquarters,
Tamil Eelam.
30. August 1996

MULLAITIVU :

THE ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS RECOVERED IN OPERATION 'UNCEASING WAVES' The list of arms and ammunitions recovered by the LTTE forces in the victorious operation 'Unceasing waves' have been released now. During this operation LTTE forces destroyed the Sri Lankan military complex in Mullativu and liberated Mulaitivu town and surrounding areas. Apart from the listed items large numbers of valuable communication sets, Sea boats, land vehicles and outboard motors were also seized by the LTTE forces during the operation.

THE LIST OF ITEMS RECOVERED FROM THE MULLAITIVU MILITARY COMPLEX:

122MM Howitzers.....(02)
120MM Mortar...(02)
106MM RCL M-40A1...(01)
81MM Mortar...(12)
60MM Mortar...(30)
40MM CIS 40 grenade launcher...(26)
T69-1 RPGlauncher...(29)
Type W-85 anti aircraft machine gun...(03)


AK model rifles...(1402)
G3A...(305)
FNC...(01)
RPD LMG...(93)
T-81 LMG...(02)
PKGPMG...(26)
L-300...(04)
45 Colt...(01)
Browning 04
TT-33 Tokarev 02
CZ-75 02
Revolver 380...(01)
HK 69 A1 40MM grenade pistol...(039)
PK GPMG Extra Barel...(22)
PKGPMG Tripod...(16)
PK GPMG Bolt...(01)


Bullets:

5.56-45 ss109...(121,193)
7.62-51...(8,483)
7.62-54...(4,452)
12.7-98...(10,243)
12.7-108...(23,377)

Linked bullets:

7.62-39...(28,300)
7.62-51...(80,800)
7.62-54...(8675)

40MM grenade...(42)

Rifle grenade...(487)
40MM Rocket Propelled grenade....(821)
106MM RCL ammunition....(59)
122MM Howitzer shells...(903)
25 pounder shells...(672)
120MM Mortar shells...(2,297)
81MMMortar shells...(1,350)
60MM Mortar shells...(1,071)
82MM Mortar shells...(30)
Hand grenade...(2,846)
Smoke grenade...(138)
Claymore...(334)
Hand Electrical firing device...(227)
Jumbing mines...(360)
Presure mines...(3,222)
Vehicle mines...(369)
Control mines...(65)


The items captured from the military reinforcements that landed both by sea and air in Alampil, 10km away from Mullaitivu:

60MM Commando Mortar...(01)
60MM Mortar...(03)
81MM Mortar...(04)
Mechem 40MM MGL...(02)
AK model rifles...(85)
RPD LMG...(16)
MAG GPMG...(02)
T-69 RPG launcher...(05)
PK GPMG...(01)
Sniper rifle model AW...(01)
UZI...(01)

Bullets:

7.62-39 (AK Bullets)...(146,000)
7.62-51...(874)
7.62-54...(5,915)


Linked bullets:

7.62-39...(900)
7.62-51...(2,500)
7.62-54....(2,675)

Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam

(English translation of the LTTE statement released by LTTE International Secretariat, 
211 Katherine Road, 
London E6 1BU,
United Kingdom. 
Tel/ Fax: 0181-470 8593)

 

(Source: eelamweb.com)

 

Edited April 29, 20223 yr by நன்னிச் சோழன்