ANOTHER PRE-EMPTIVE LTTE AIR STRIKE - INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 220

By B. Raman

In an attempt to pre-empt an apprehended military offensive by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces on the territory controlled by the Lberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, the LTTE Air Force has carried out a successful air strike on the Palaly military base of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in the Jaffna peninsula. The Palaly military base serves as the headquarters for operations against the LTTE in the north. It is also the supply base for the thousands of soldiers stationed in the region. Any serious damage to the base could hamper the military offensive on the LTTE-controlled areas in the Northern Province. In the past, the LTTE used to direct artillery fire at the base, but this is the first time it has resorted to an air strike by its newly-created air force called the Tamileelam Air Force (TAF).

2. Two planes of the TAF flew over the military base without being detected at 1-20 AM on April 24, 2007, dropped two bombs on an arms and ammunition storage area and returned safely to base. As in the case of the first air raid on the Katunayake air base near Colombo in March, 2007, this was again a well-planned and well-executed conventional air strike and not an act of air terrorism. As it did during last month's attack on the Katunayake air base, the LTTE had taken precautions not to cause civilian casualties through wrong targeting.

3. Like the Katunayake air strike, the Palaly air strike too was carried out at night. The two planes of the TAF flew at very low altitude in order to evade radar detection and reportedly came not from the direction of the LTTE-controlled territory, but from the direction of Colombo in order to confuse the ground defence staff of the base into believing that these were planes of the Sri Lankan Air Force making a night strike on the LTTE positions in the Northern Province as a prelude to the planned military offensive. Since the Katunayake air strike by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Air Force has been carrying out----at least claiming to be carrying out---night air strikes on LTTE positions in order to remove impressions in the minds of the public that it does not have the same night operational capability as the LTTE.

4. After the LTTE's Katunayake air strike, the Sri Lankan military authorities had strengthened their radar detection capability with the help of the Pakistan Air Force and set up ground watchers at all police stations to specially look out for suspicious-looking aircraft. The fact that despite all this, the TAF was able to carry out the night strike on a most well-defended military base, which functions as the nerve centre of the Sri Lankan military operations against the LTTE in the North, speaks well of the training and capability of the TAF pilots. Even if the air strike had not caused any damage, the very fact that the two planes were able to reach the base without being detected, drop two bombs and return unharmed would itself be considered an achievement for a fledgeling air force like the TAF. Independent reports from the military base say that at least one of the bombs struck a storage area causing moderate casualties and serious damage to the military holdings of arms and ammunition.

5. In keeping with its policy of exaggerating the results of its land and air strikes and playing down those of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Government initially maintained a silence over the successful air strike by the LTTE. Subsequently, it admitted the air strike, but projected it as a failure due to timely detection and counter-action by its ground staff at the base. According to the official version, after being thwarted in their attempts to bomb the military base, the TAF aircraft while flying back dropped a bomb on a ground position of the army outside the base, which injured six soldiers.

http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2216.html

ராமன் சொல்லுவது..

பலாலி மீதான விமானத்தாக்குதல் பயங்கரவாதத் தாக்குதலாகக் கருதமுடியாது.

பொதுமக்கள் உயிரிழப்புக்களைத் தவிர்ப்பதற்கு மிகவும் கவனம் எடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

சிங்களப் படைகளைக் குழப்பத்தில் உள்ளாக்குவதற்காக சிங்கள விமானப்படை பாவிக்கும் ஆகாய மார்க்கமாகத்தான் புலிகளின் விமானங்கள் வந்தன.

சிங்கள அரசு தாக்குதலை மூடி மறைக்கப் பார்த்தது.. எனினும் விமானத்தாக்குதலை பின்னர் ஒத்துக்கொண்டுள்ளது. எனவே உண்மையான தாக்கம் உடனடியாகத் தெரியாது. வன்னி மீதான தாக்குதல் உடனடியாக ஆரம்பிக்கப்படாவிட்டால் பெரியதாக்கமாகவே கருத வேண்டும்..

COUNTERING LTTE'S AIR CAPABILITY

By B. Raman

(To be read in continuation of my earlier article titled LTTE'S AIR STRIKE---AN ASSESSMENT at http://www.saag.org/papers22/paper2185.html)

There are four likely components of the air capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-----air defence capability, interception capability, bombing capability and capability for air terrorism on ground targets.

2. In the past, the LTTE had exhibited fairly effective air defence capability in the form of anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. This has been considerably weakened since 2001 due to its inability to procure and smuggle in ammunition for its anti-aircraft guns and replacements for its missiles. It has kept reserved whatever ammunition and missiles it still has for the protection of Prabakaran, its leader, and its headquarters in the Northern Province. It has not brought them into use against the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) since the SLAF went into action against the LTTE-held positions and its naval wing after April, 2006. This has so far given the SLAF a complete command of the skies for nearly a year now. There has not been a single confirmed instance of the SLAF losing an aircraft due to effective ground action by the LTTE.

3. The LTTE has not so far exhibited any mid-air interception capability. The kind of small aircraft it has are not suitable for interception roles. Moreover, interception requires greater professional skills, which can normally be acquired only in a professional training institution of a state air force. They cannot be acquired in a flying club even if it has retired air force officers as instructors.

4. The Tamileelam Air Force (TAF) has a good bombing capability as seen from the well-planned and well-executed air strikes carried out by it at night on the Katunayake air base near Colombo on March 26, 2007, and on the Palaly military base in the Jaffna peninsula on April 25, 2007. It has shown technical skills in converting small aircraft, which are not meant for such bombing missions, into specialised planes capable of undertaking bombing missions. It has also managed to get its pilots trained in bombing missions. It is not possible to acquire such conversion and bombing skills in a normal flying club. Either they must have acquired them in a flying club having retired air force pilots as instructors or it has been assisted by retired air force officers of some country. It could be retired Tamil pilots of the SLAF, if there are any, or retired air force pilots of some foreign country or the other.

5. The LTTE should be presumed to have a capability for air terrorism, though it has not so far exhibited it. Air-mounted terrorism does not require any special skills. All it requires is individual motivation, a flying object which could be even a glider and the ability to glide or fly which could be acquired in any flying club. The use of an aircraft for air-mounted terrorism would result in the definitive loss of the aircraft. The TAF is estimated to have not more than five small planes. It is doubtful whether it would undertake an act of air-mounted suicide terrorism and lose a plane except in a desperate situation.

6. The small TAF does not pose a strategic threat to Sri Lanka. A well-planned and well-executed ground strike against a strategic target causes more damage than a strike from the air. One had seen the damage caused to the SLAF by the LTTE's ground strike in 2001 against the Katunayake airport. The TAF is unlikely to turn the tide of the conflict in Sri Lanka in favour of the LTTE. Its value is as an image symbol in the eyes of the Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka and abroad and as an additional psywar tool. Every unintercepted air strike of the TAF will weaken the credibility of the SLAF in the eyes of its people. Moreover, the TAF will add to the defence expenditure of the Government.

7. The most worrisome aspect is that the LTTE has been able to acquire even this limited capability without being countered by the intelligence and security agencies of Sri Lanka, India and many other countries. Indian media reports after the TAF's first air strike of March 26, 2007, had quoted Indian intelligence sources as claiming that they knew that the LTTE had procured five small aircraft and had passed on the intelligence to the Sri Lankan authorities. Their contention was that there was, therefore, no intelligence failure. The pertinent question is not whether the TAF has one or a dozen planes, but how it was able to clandestinely procure them and smuggle them in right under the nose of so many intelligence and physical security agencies without their being able to prevent it. It is a serious intelligence and physical security failure. If the LTTE can do it today, many other terrorist organisations can do it tomorrow.

8. There are so many questions for which there are no satisfactory answers. Where did the LTTE procure the planes? How did it pay for them? How did it manage to smuggle them into the areas controlled by it? How and where did it get its pilots trained not only in normal flying, but also in bombing missions? Did former pilots of the air force of any country play a role in this? Who are they? Wherefrom has it been smuggling the aviation fuel? How has it been able to have it transported without being detected? Without answers to these questions, it would be difficult to assess the magnitude of the intelligence and security lapse.

9. The SLAF has been operating against the LTTE since April, 2006. Its operations have been more reactive and punitive than proactive. While it has been able to mount some successful reactive operations against the Sea Tigers after their ships had ventured out into the seas, it has not mounted a single proactive strike against the LTTE's ships in their hide-outs while they are not out operating. Successful proactive strikes require precise intelligence of their hide-outs, which the SLAF apparently does not have. Despite this, it must be noted that the SLAF---even through its successful reactive operations--- has been able to restrict the operations of the Sea Tigers.

10. The SLAF's strikes against suspected ground positions of the LTTE have been reactive and punitive---more punitive than reactive. They were blind and indiscriminate causing large civilian casualties and adding to the anger of the Tamils against the Government. There have been very few confirmed targeted strikes against the operational nerve-centres of the LTTE. The LTTE has carried out a number of decapitation suicide strikes against Government and Tamil leaders in Colombo. The Government has, therefore, the right to retaliate in kind through targeted strikes against important political and military leaders of the LTTE. The SLAF has been fighting shy of doing this either due to want of precise intelligence or due to fears of reactions in the Tamil community were Prabakaran and others to die in these strikes.

11. The SLAF is still confused as to how to deal with the TAF. It has bombed some suspected air strips of the TAF, but this has not prevented the TAF from operating. This is because for these small planes no regular air strip is required. They could take off from and land in any open space such as a playground or a road with a metalled surface. Absence of precise intelligence regarding the hide-outs of these planes comes in the way of proactive bombings to destroy them on the ground. A good radar cover would help prevent future air strikes in the Colombo area, but may not in the Palaly area due to the very short distance involved. The SLAF needs a good mid-air interception capability to seek and destroy the TAF planes after they are air-borne even if they manage to evade ground fire. The kind of Russian, Ukrainian and Israeli planes the SLAF has presently are good for bombing missions, but not for mid-air interception roles. Moreover, they require regular airfields for take-off and landing. They can't scramble fast. The SLAF requires some small, easily manoeuvrable aircraft, which can take off and land almost anywhere, with specially-trained pilots.

12. The LTTE, despite all its bravado, cannot use its planes frequently. Loss of aircraft due to ground fire or accidents would impair its air capability. The law of probability of loss of aircraft would operate more effectively against the TAF than against the SLAF. Availability of fuel would be another constraining factor. A three-fold strategy is called for: First, ensure that the LTTE would not be able to add to its fleet. Second, ensure that it would not be able to replenish its stocks of fuel and spare parts for its existing fleet. Third, collect precise intelligence about the location of the hide-outs of the planes and target them.

13. Sri Lanka alone would not be able to do this. Other countries, including India, should help it by effective action against clandestine procurement and smuggling by the LTTE. India could take the following steps. First, help Sri Lanka in improving its radar cover. Second, intensified and independent sea patrolling by ships of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard. All suspect ships should be stopped, boarded and searched. Third, issue advisories to all Indian flying clubs that no Sri Lankan national should be admitted without the clearance of the Government of India. Fourth, verify the background and antecedents of those already under training. Fifth, take action to prevent any smuggling of aviation fuel by pro-LTTE elements from India. Sixth, use unmanned aerial vehicles to spot suspected hide-outs of the TAF. Seventh, periodically use an ELINT aircraft of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) to look for possible ELINT signals emanating from the TAF. The TAF pilots would almost definitely observe radio silence during their operations and hence the possibility of ELINT signals is remote. But still, one must look for them. Eighth, share all actionable intelligence promptly with the Sri Lankan authorities.

http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2217.html

B.RAMAN'S VIEWS ON LTTE

By B. Raman

In response to my previous article on Countering the LTTE's Air Capability, I have been in receipt of a large number of queries and comments. A typical comment from a reader and my reply to it are given below:

2. Comment from the reader: "Your article on this matter is intriguing. On more than one occasion, you criticised the current Sri Lankan Govt. for refusing to follow up on the peace process agreed to by the previous govt. and going aggressive on the LTTE to force its unilateral will on the Tamils, that is, reneging on the previous understanding. Aren't you taking the position that neither the snake should die nor the stick should break in the process? Isn't this a conundrum? While you call other countries to eliminate the TAF capability, shouldn't this be tied to the calling on the same nations to force the current Sri Lankan Govt. to come to terms with the peace process that was already agreed to by the previous Govt.? "

3. My reply: "Thanks. I have been consistent in my views that:

(a). "The Sri Lankan Government has been trying for a dictated peace. This should not be accepted by India and other members of the international community.

(B). "The Sri Lankan Tamils need the LTTE to protect them from the Sinhalese extremists, but it should be the LTTE minus Prabakaran and others involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

©. "India should not have anything to do with the LTTE so long as it is led by Rajiv's assassins. If it removes them, the Govt. of India should give it its full backing.

(d). "The LTTE should not be allowed to have its own air and sea capabilities under any circumstance. If it gets away with them, we can't control our own terrorist organisations tomorrow."

http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2218.html

COUNTERING LTTE'S AIR CAPABILITY---AN INTERESTING FEED-BACK-

(In response to my article titled "Countering LTTE's Air Capability" at http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2217.html , many interesting comments have been received. I am giving below the most interesting of them, which gives a lot of elaboration and also questions/corrects some of my observations. This has been received from Mr.Prasun K Sengupta, a Southeast Asia-based regional security analyst who is a regular contributor to FORCE magazine published out of India ,and is also Contributing Editor of TEMPUR, a monthly regional security affairs magazine published from Malaysia. We thank him for his detailed comments, which would enable a better assessment of this issue----B.Raman)

With reference to your analysis titled 'Countering Tigers In Air ' and the following questions raised by you, kindly allow me to offer the following answers:

1) There are so many questions for which there are no satisfactory answers. Where did the LTTE procure the planes?

The aircraft—Zlin Z242L model to be precise—based on published photos thus far by the TAF, were bought from a private South African flying club. The aircraft were and are built by Moravan Aviation s.r.o., Letištì 1578, 765 81 Otrokovice, Czech Republic. You yourself can go to the company's website at http://www.zlinaircraft.cz/ and check out the aircraft's details yourself.

2) How did it pay for them?

That is the least of the LTTE's problems as any one of the LTTE's front companies based in Europe and South Africa could have made the payment. The LTTE usually maintains its proxy bank accounts with Standard Chartered Bank. One such account was in existence way back in 1999 with US$190 million.

3) How did it manage to smuggle them into the areas controlled by it?

The Zlin Z242L ultra-light model is delivered from its manufacturer in completely knocked-down condition and therefore it can be transported unsuspecting in kit form and can easily be disguised as automobile parts or components for heavy commercial vehicles. By all accounts, the aircraft were ferried by sea-freight using forged bills of laden and false declarations were made to the Colombo Port-based Customs authorities to deliberately disguise the nature of the consignment. Once on land, due to its completely knocked-down nature, it was probably transported by land on board commercial freight carriers bound for the north-east.

4) How and where did it get its pilots trained not only in normal flying, but also in bombing missions? Did former pilots of the air force of any country play a role in this? Who are they?

All aspects of flying training and attainment of pilot proficiency levels were obtained from the same South Africa-based flying club that ordered the aircraft from the Czech Republic. As far as dropping ordnance is concerned, this training too was provided in South Africa as there is no dearth of mercenaries there who are highly experienced in such flying sorties (they did it day in and day out during the numerous civil wars prevailing throughout the African continent). That is why it is significant that the first air raid on Colombo was conducted at night, an act that requires a high degree of flying proficiency using instrument flying ratings (IFR) for the TAF aircrew. It is a well-known fact that South African pilots excel in this area. This technique is popularly known as 'bush-flying'.

5) Where from has it been smuggling the aviation fuel?

Aircraft like the Zlin Z242L are powered by engines that are multi-fuel, i.e. they do not require avgas or aviation fuel. They can be run using ordinary diesel. In fact, most flying clubs are nowadays resorting to re-equipping their aircraft with such multi-fuel engines as it results in a dramatic reduction in the direct operating costs per hour of such aircraft.

6) Successful proactive strikes require precise intelligence of their hide-outs, which the SLAF apparently does not have.

Again, this is an area in which the SLAF does have a capability, but it is not yet proficient in exploiting its capability. Precise intelligence can only come from either ground-based HUMINT, or by airborne assets like long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles like the Searcher Mk2 UAVs already in service and delivered by Israel Aircraft Industries. However, UAVs can only locate the dispositions of such light aircraft and the ultimate destruction on the ground of such Zlin aircraft will have to be performed by either field artillery or by a heliborne special operations force.

A good radar cover would help prevent future air strikes in the Colombo area, but may not in the Palaly area due to the very short distance involved.

This issue also begs one to raise one more question: did the TAF carry out its first air strike on March 26, 2007 knowing fully well that both the BEL-built Indra-2 tactical air defence radars were inoperable due to periodic maintenance requirements? Or was the radars' shut-down a sheer coincidence? But it must be said here that deployment of radars like the Indra-2 is like using a sledgehammer to kill an ant. Such radars are used only for detecting low-flying aircraft (at an altitude of 500 feet) inbound at high speeds, NOT an experimental-category aircraft like the Zlin, which is normally used for recreational flying and therefore has a minimal radar cross-section. The Zlin has been employed before in South Africa to drop light ordnance when flying at an altitude of only 200 feet. Therefore the India-origin radars of the SLAF are next to useless as of now. What the SLAF now needs to do is to procure tactical low-level manportable radars like the EL/M-2106NG made by Israel Aircraft Industries' ELTA Systems Division. This type of radar has its operating parameters optimised for detecting airborne targets with radar cross-sections similar to those of the Zlin ultralight. It is reliably learnt that the SLAF, due to cost grounds, is now negotiating with China for procuring a similar radar with matching performance. Contract negotiations are now underway for procuring up to four such radars for the air defence of Colombo.

7) The SLAF needs a good mid-air interception capability to seek and destroy the TAF planes after they are airborne even if they manage to evade ground fire. The kind of Russian, Ukrainian and Israeli planes the SLAF has presently are good for bombing missions, but not for mid-air interception roles. Moreover, they require regular airfields for takeoff and landing. They can't scramble fast. The SLAF requires some small, easily manoeuverable aircraft, which can take off and land almost anywhere, with specially-trained pilots.

With due respect, you have gone off on a tangent here. Both the Kfir C-2/7 (from Israel) and MiG-27M (acquired from Ukraine, with six more ordered late last year) of the SLAF are equipped with both airborne cannons as well as short-range air-to-air missiles like the Vympel R-60T. Manoeuvrability is not a factor here as even the Zlin cannot pull off high-G manoeuvres! The main limiting factor of the MiG-27M is its ability to search for an airborne target as it does not have an internally-mounted airborne fire-control radar, which is required if an aerial interception is required to take place at night. The Kfir C-2/7 on the other hand does have such a radar and can be used for aerial interception at night. The MiG-27M, though, can be effectively used to launch the R-60T during daytime when there are no visibility problems. As far as scramble times go, both these aircraft types can scramble within 1 minute 57 seconds but only if they are maintained on an alert status known as quick reaction alert (QRA). But then again, it will be highly expensive and unwise to use combat aircraft to shoot down the Zlins. What the SLAF needs are a small batch (only a Battery) of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles like the FIOM-92A Stinger or the Chinese FN-6 or the Russian IGLA-S, all of which can be integrated with the early warning alerting mode of low-level air defence radars like the EL/M-2108NG. This is a more cost-effective approach.

In terms of pro-actively seeking out the TAF's aircraft assets, a two-pronged approach could be adopted on a one-off basis: using satellites equipped with synthetic aperture radars (like the private Canadian RADARSAT); or using aircraft such as Su-30MKI Mk3s to make a couple of sweeps over suspected TAF hideouts, provided the Zlins are stored at ground level, and not in underground bunkers.

8) Periodically use an ELINT aircraft of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) to look for possible ELINT signals emanating from the TAF.

Again, such action is deemed highly cost-prohibitive. SIGINT and ELINT aircraft are normally employed for at least 10-hour continuous flight durations and the sortie profile is pre-arranged because the end-user/operator knows precisely what to look for and where to look. In the LTTE's case, such airborne ELINT/SIGINT sorties are totally worthless. A far more pragmatic approach will be to install such SIGINT/ELINT mission sensors on board both the Indian Navy and Coast Guard Do-229-201s that are tasked with flying routine surveillance sorties adjacent to the airspace of northern Sri Lanka, and installing similar hardware on board the Coast Guard vessels patrolling the seas off Rameshwaram and Jaffna.

http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2222.html

மொழி பொயர்ப்பாளர் ஈழவன் எங்கிருந்தாலும் இப்பகுதிக்கு உடனடியாக அழைக்கப்படுகின்றார்

LTTE AIR FORCE BOMBS COLOMBO FUEL TANKS -By B.Raman

An aircraft of the Tamileelam Air Force (TAF) of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bombed a Sri Lankan military fuel storage tank at Kolonnawa near Colombo at 1-50 AM on April 29,2007. Another plane of the TAF bombed another military fuel storage tank at Muththuraajawala near Colombo 15 minutes later. The LTTE has projected the two attacks as carried out by two "squadrons" of the TAF, but independent reports say that only two planes were involved in the two bombings. The planes managed to carry out the bombings and return to base without being brought down by ground fire and without being intercepted in air.

2. The bombings show once again the skills acquired by the TAF pilots in night operations. According to a South-East Asia based strategic analyst, it would seem to have acquired the planes and the skills through a South African flying club. The detailed comments of the analyst on the operations of the TAF are available at http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2222.html

3.The third successful air strike of the TAF since it went into action on March 26,2007, caused considerable panic and confusion in Colombo----with power being switched off for some time by the Sri Lankan authorities. Since the small planes being used by the TAF provide very limited radar signature, the radars presently available with the Sri Lankan authorities are apparently unable to detect in time the approach of the planes----particularly when they fly very low.

4.A Shell building near Colombo caught fire following the TAF air attack, but a Government spokesman has claimed that there was no damage to the storage tanks.

5. Irasaiah Ilanthirayan, the military spokesperson of the LTTE, has claimed that the two bombings were a retaliatory strike. He added:

"We sent two squadrons to target facilities that provide fuel to military aircraft after two Sri Lankan Air Force jets bombed a suburb of Kilinochchi (inside LTTE-held territory) just past midnight.The military had bombed the outskirts of Kilinochchi, 330 kilometres (206 miles) north of the capital, using Israeli-built Kfir jets.Within an hour of the Sri Lankan war planes carrying out the attack, we scrambled "two squadrons" to attack targets in Colombo and returned to their secret location two hours later."

6. After the air strike on the Palaly military base in the Jaffna peninsula on April 24,2007, the LTTE had indicated that it would not carry out any more air strike till the World Cup cricket final between Sri Lanka and Australia, which was played in the West Indies on the night (local Sri Lankan time) of April 28,2007, was over, to enable the people in the territory controlled by the Government and the LTTE to watch the match. There was no similar assurance from the Government. It would appear that as the people in the LTTE-controlled areas, including many leaders of the LTTE, were watching the cricket match, the SLAF mounted a night air strike at one of the points outside Kilinochi where the Sri Lankan intelligence expected some of the LTTE leaders to be watching the cricket match.

7. It is not known what damage the SLAF air strike caused and whether the LTTE leadership suffered any casualties. The fact that the TAF retaliated almost instantaneously, without worrying about any possibility of its losing an aircraft, indicates that the SLAF air strike on the cricket match watching LTTE leaders and cadres might have caused some serious casualties. Hence the rage of the LTTE and its immediate retaliation. No details of the casualties or damage in the Kilinochi raid are available so far.

http://www.saag.org/papers23/paper2223.html

7. It is not known what damage the SLAF air strike caused and whether the LTTE leadership suffered any casualties. The fact that the TAF retaliated almost instantaneously, without worrying about any possibility of its losing an aircraft, indicates that the SLAF air strike on the cricket match watching LTTE leaders and cadres might have caused some serious casualties. Hence the rage of the LTTE and its immediate retaliation. No details of the casualties or damage in the Kilinochi raid are available so far.

ராமனும் ஆசை, தோசை, அப்பளம், வடை என்றாகிவிட்டார்.

கிறிக்கெற் பார்த்துக்கொள்ள ஆசைப்பட்டது சிங்களத்படைகள்தான். புலிகளின் தலைவர்கள் கிறிக்கெற்றைவிட தமிழீழத்தின் பாதுகாப்பிலும், தமது பாதுகாப்பிலும் அக்கறை கொண்டவர்கள்..