Sri Lanka: Looking beyond consolidation

Sri Lanka: Looking beyond consolidation - Update No. 118

By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

[This up date may be read in continuation of SAAG Note No 367 "Sri Lanka: Revisiting LTTE's options Update No 114 " dated February 24, 2007 available at URL http://www.saag.org/notes4/note367.html]

Consolidation in the East

The consolidation operations of Sri Lanka Security Forces are now nearing the final stage. During the last four weeks Security Forces have made good progress both in Trincomalee and Batticaloa sectors. However, two recent incidents in the east have highlighted the type of threat the Security Forces and the public would face from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) even when the consolidation process is completed because LTTE in the east has gone to the insurgency mode after giving up territory.

In the first instance, 16 people mostly women and children were killed and 25 others injured when a powerful bomb exploded in a bus going from Amparai to Badulla even as the passengers were getting down at the Kondavettuwan checkpoint on April 2, 2007. LTTE is believed to be behind the attack. In another incident, a LTTE suicide bomber riding a tractor loaded with explosives blew it up near the entrance of the Army camp at Chenkaladi on March 27, 2007 killing nine persons including three soldiers and four civilians of Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP). The EPDP office near the spot of explosion was destroyed. Significantly, LTTE mortars opened fire at the same time on the Army camp.

In the Trincomalee Sector, Security Forces have further exploited the gains made in area north of Trincomalee. LTTE has been evicted from Peraru jungles north and northwest of Trincomalee. Progress in this area is important because it opens the coastal area from Trincomalee up to Pulmoddai to the Security Forces. This would help troop build up to threaten LTTE in Mullaitivu area. This would also prevent LTTE interference on A12 (Trincomalee-Anuradhapura) and help in keeping A29 to Vavuniya open. Thus these successes are complementary to Security Forces’ operations in Vavuniya sector when they materialise.

The Navy had been successful in keeping the Trincomalee coast sanitized of Sea Tiger boats. Despite LTTE's announcement to prevent ship movements to Jaffna coast from Trincomalee, Sea Tigers have not been able to do much. In the latest encounter on March 28, 2007, the Fast Attack Craft (FAC) of the Navy destroyed three boats in an engagement with 10 Sea Tiger boats off Alampil coast. Loss of boats means loss of seamen and weapons. Coming on the heels of earlier successes, it is evident that the Navy has shown superior ability in gathering advance information on Sea Tiger boat movements as well as LTTE supply ships. Such information is probably sourced from other friendly countries with advanced information gathering systems. This does not diminish the Navy's improved capability shown in its encounters with the Sea Tigers during 2006-2007. Operationally, the Navy based in Trincomalee is now in a position, than ever before, to support military operations in the north as and when they materialise.

In the Batticaloa Sector, Security Forces are poised to launch the offensive on Thoppigala, west of Batticaloa, the last bastion of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the east. This base had been the heart of LTTE operations in Batticaloa sector for a long time. After the loss of a number of LTTE localities between Thoppigala and Batticaloa, LTTE cadres at Thoppigala are cut off from outside resources. They are running short of food, medical supplies and probably heavy weapons and ammunition.

During the last three weeks Security Forces had cleared the LTTE locations in area bound by the A5 on the west and A27 on the southwest. This triangular area (comprising key LTTE locations at Karadiyanaru, Unnichai, Vavunatiu, and Kokkadicholai -approximately 14 Km south of Batticaloa) had been providing depth to Thoppigala defences. Not only that, they enabled the LTTE to bombard Security Forces and prevent their free movement in Batticaloa area and the two highways. LTTE mortars in Vavunativu and Karadiyanaru could also bombard the traffic in Batticaloa airfield. (The LTTE artillery fire on a helicopter ferrying diplomats for a meeting at Batticalo on February 27, 2007 was one such instance.) Kokkadicholai had been the administrative nerve centre of Batticaloa sector and its fall on March 28, 2007 represents an important landmark in the consolidation operations.

However, it is interesting to note how LTTE had been avoiding head on conflict with Security Forces after the loss of Vakarai. Evidently they are pulling out to avoid incurring further casualties in conventional operations. This tactical wisdom of switching to guerrilla tactics in the east has apparently come to LTTE after the series of losses suffered in conventional operations during the last six months. The Security Force's success had been through better generalship and superior air support and artillery fire power particularly multi-barrel rockets. Karuna's knowledge of the ground and help in focusing the operations were undoubtedly a great help. Lack of seasoned LTTE leadership and paucity of recruits were two factors eroding their performance. LTTE's loss of heavier artillery during Vakarai operations perhaps was probably the final straw. So it was no wonder, the LTTE preferred to thin out than fight it out at Kokkadicholai by the time the Security Forces took the base.

However, LTTE's resilience and innovation in insurgency warfare should not be underestimated. Thoppigala is unlikely to fall like a plum, ripe for plucking. The 300 plus LTTE cadres at Thoppigala cut off from resources and external support could fight it out of desperation. With their exit routes blocked they will be literally fighting with their back to the wall. Thus Security Forces deployed in operations in Thoppigala could be tied down for a longer time than anticipated. Even after Thoppigala is captured attacks by mobile LTTE bands can be expected to continue in this sector.

Looking beyond eastern consolidation

Success at Thoppigala does not mean the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka's vow in January 2007 to totally "liberate" the north soon after his forces "rescued the eastern region from the LTTE ", would automatically be fulfilled. East has taken nearly eight months of sustained military operations to bring it under control. North is going to be entirely a different kettle of fish as it is the heartland of the Tiger country. No half hearted or causal forays are going to yield success. It is going to be a hard grind in the north.

Even without landmines of political decisions derailing military operations, there are some undercurrents that could hamper the northern operations. These include LTTE insurgency operations in the east to tie down Security Forces, leveraging the K (Karuna) factor for further benefit of Security Forces, weather and the burden of up rooted civilian population. If these factors were managed then the Security Forces would be able to progress operations in the north better.

The K Factor

In SAAG Note No 359 dated January 25, 2007 "Capture of Vakarai and the Contradictions in Sri Lanka's Agenda ? Update No 112" (at http://www.saag.org/notes4/note359.html) I had touched upon the growing influence and importance of Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan) and his Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) as LTTE gets marginalized in the east. This has already caused some unease in segments of Sinhala and Muslim polity. The Security Forces have greatly benefitted from his support in their operations in the east. As acknowledged by them, he had been a great help in identifying LTTE cadres, a difficult process when thousands of people are displaced and move into government controlled areas.

International NGOs and human rights activists' accusation of child recruitment by Karuna with the active collusion of the State reached a high pitch last month. There had been complaints of intimidation, abduction and extortion by TMVP cadres. Though the Government had promised to look into these accusations after vehemently denying the allegations of state collusion, no substantive change in Karuna's status as a pillar of strength to the Security Forces is likely. The TMVP is also trying to change its image from a breakaway insurgent group to a Tamil political party. On the vexed issue of de-merger of northeast province, the TMVP has suggested the creation of two separate interim administrative units for north and east. As this has materialised in a slightly different form, the TMVP's ambition to become a major political power centre in the east is likely to become a reality. This would further increase Karuna's influence in the east and impact the future course of war and peace.

Karuna with his intimate knowledge of both the LTTE and the terrain has already proved his worth as an ally of Security Forces. For Security Forces to make quick progress in Thoppigala operations his support would be indispensable. Karuna would probably extend his support wholeheartedly if he knows his political future is safe. Perhaps he would also like the east as his domain to freely operate. Given these considerations, Security Forces are likely to use more TMVP cadres to tackle LTTE at Thoppigala with the some troops providing support of heavy military weapons. The objective would be to keep the LTTE bottled up within Thoppigala to be tackled piecemeal over a period of time. This would relieve substantive strength of army and make them available for operations in the north. Karuna is also likely to induce more LTTE cadres to give up. Already quite a few LTTE cadres, deprived of motivation to fight, have surrendered to the TMVP in this sector.

Weather

The southwest monsoon, which becomes active (in areas other than Jaffna peninsula) from June to October, could affect direct air support so vital for operations in the north. In view of this the Security Forces have only the months of April and May to progress operations in the north. Given this urgency we may expect the Security Forces to contain Thoppigala rather than get entangled in a protracted conflict in jungle terrain. They are likely to quickly try and progress operations in Mannar, Omanthai and line Muhamalai- Nagarkovil. The skirmishes in the last few weeks in these areas support this assessment.

The objective of the operations would be uproot LTTE from their defences and grab as much territory as possible before the monsoon hits. Even a destabilised LTTE is likely to fight back in its heartland. So we can expect some hard fighting in this sector in the coming months.

Displacement of population and humanitarian issues

The operations in the east have displaced over 140,000 people to take refuge in and around Batticaloa. Though the Government had expressed confidence in taking care of them, international agencies and NGOs have expressed their increasing concern at the continuing plight of the population. The growing human disaster of these people can only be averted if normal life is restored in the east. However, the Security Forces are unlikely to give up occupation of tactically important areas to exercise control over the 'cleared' areas. Already Sampur area has been declared a high security zone. Thus a fresh lot of 'high security zones' is likely to be created in the east. This is likely to complicate an already muddled peace process, mired in the controversy over high security zones in the north, among other contentious issues.

Though friendly countries of Sri Lanka, including the U.S. and the EU apart from India, have been playing down the humanitarian issues so far, their pressure on the Sri Lanka President is likely to grow in the coming months. Much would depend upon how the President manages this pressure with the operations in the north and the likely displacement of even larger number of civilians. Given this background speed of operations would be the criterion of overall success of Security Forces foray in the north.

Conclusion

Having gained substantive success in the east, President Rajapaksa is likely to go ahead with the operations in the north during April-May. For the first time a President of Sri Lanka appears to be implementing a well worked out and coordinated politico-military strategy to turn his agenda into reality. Unfortunately, this strategy has military option as the main piece of its articulation. The international reaction to this strategy has so far been muted perhaps to give time to enable the President to militarily bring LTTE to manageable proportions. (That would explain their reluctance to get more intensely involved or vigorously pressurise both parties to go back the peace process.)

There had been a report in the State media of a proposal to hold a national referendum on the continuation of the ceasefire agreement. Though this report is as yet unconfirmed, it might be on the cards to give a veneer of legitimacy to the President's desire to rewrite the CFA. The CFA 2002 was a product of intense negotiation and any tinkering would be unacceptable to LTTE. (LTTE spokesman has already said so.) The resulting stalemate would bury the dying peace process, well and truly.

LTTE having lost the military initiative and territory has to focus on defending its turf in the north. Perhaps for the first time coordinated international action is underway to dismantle LTTE's global support system. This would restrict LTTE's battlefield response and capability when the operations in the north are joined in. With conventional operations limited to a defensive battle in the north, LTTE's unconventional attacks would probably take more substantive economic, military and political targets in other areas in the coming weeks.

Viewed in this background, the President would be in no hurry to present the political devolution package being worked out by the all-party committee. Thus more conflict, and suffering for a hapless population caught in the conflict, appears to be the next act in the human tragedy being enacted in Sri Lanka.

http://www.saag.org/notes4/note376.html