Thoppi(gala) for Tigers

With the security forces wresting control of the Chenkaladi-Maha Oya Road on Wednesday, the East, barring the isolated Toppigala jungles, has been cleared before the Sinhala and Hindu New Year.

South of Chenkaladi, Illupayadichchenai and further down, Karadiyanaru and the Rukam town on the A-5 highway, have been cleared. The entire operation to wrest control of the Badulla Road from Chenkallady to Maha Oya and the adjacent Tiger bases, including the Karadiyanaru jungle, took 46 days, reminiscent of the month-long Vakarai operation.

Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has already recommended several promotions based on merit. Accordingly, if the Defence Ministry approves them, several Lt. Cols. will be promoted Colonels and appointed Brigade Commanders, while several Colonels will be made Brigadiers and put in charge of divisions. On the recommendations of Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, eight Brigadiers, Daya Ratnayaka, L. Amaratunga, Athula Jayawardena, Rajitha Silva, A.S. Saheer, Aruna Jayatillake, Milinda Pieris and Srinath Rajapakse were promoted Majors General.

This may be there New Year gift, before the war resumes on the northern front with greater vigour.

Col. Charlie Gallage of the Commandos, commandeered the latest eastern operation, supervised by 23 Div Commander Brig. Daya Ratnayake and monitored by East Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Parakrama Pannipitiya.

In each of the operations, two commandos were part of the team of infantry men -drawn from different regiments- who were given specialised training in jungle warfare, night exposure, engineering and medical care, not to mention basic survival techniques.

The regiments employed were 6 Gemunu Watch (GW) commandeered by Lt. Col. Deshapriya Gunewardena, 7 GW led by Lt. Col. S.S. Waduge, 8 GW led by Lt. Col. Jayampathy Tillekeratne and 7 Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI) led by Lt. Col. Ranjith Abeyratne. The teams infiltrated Tiger strongholds and gave the relevant coordinates to those manning the big guns – artillery and Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs). The whole idea being to minimize casualties- civilian and military- while the Tigers, fleeing heavy gunfire, were to be ambushed. The military reported the loss of 11 security force personnel in the one-and-a-half-month operation and a further 41 injured.

The military maintains that 184 Tiger cadres were killed in this operation, which the LTTE denies, adding that dozens of civilians died.

During the operation, civilians, at regular intervals, evacuated these areas, to avoid being hit by indirect fire or, be caught in the crossfire, in the event of a retaliation. Unlike during the Vakarai operation, the Tigers were not seen forcibly holding onto civilians.

After Vakarai, the Government overran Unnachai, Kokkadicholai and Taravakulam. Next was to secure the A-5 highway and the all-powerful Karadiyanaru base.

On several occasions, the SLAF softened future targets such as Karadiyanaru. In targeting the Karadiynaru base, infantry was drawn from 6 GW and 7 SLLI, in addition to commandos. Troops from 7 GW and commandos targeted the Rukam area, while those from 8 GW infiltrated Illupayadichchenai, with those from 7 SLLI penetrating Koduvamadu. By Wednesday 2:00 p.m., security forces had captured Karadiyanaru and Illupayadichchenai.

As mentioned last week, the security forces launched surprise attacks on Karadiyanaru and Rukam on April 3 at 2:00 a.m., heralding what was in store for the Tigers in these two areas, this week.

Troops turned torrential rain into their advantage. On Tuesday night they ambushed and killed more than two dozen cadres, according to the military. By Wednesday, the security forces announced the capture of the entire road, with the fleeing Tigers finding refuge in the Toppigala jungles, much to the chagrin of LTTE area leader Nagesh, who, however, declined to send reinforcements, as the inevitable was about to happen.

The next big question is will the security forces go for the sprawling Toppigala forests? A 140 sq. km. area. where hundreds of Tigers have withdrawn to.

While there are small teams already infiltrating the area, it is likely that the military will not confront the Tigers head-on in a conventional battle to wrest control of the area.

The LTTE would prefer a head-on confrontation in its own terrain, rather than be isolated and deprived of food, medicine and ammunition, with the rest of the East under the security forces belt.

According to the military, which admits the loss of 98 security forces personnel in the fighting since July last year, the Tigers have lost 1,175 cadres. The military maintains that 138,000 people have been displaced since, while others say the displaced number is higher.

Not only politicians, even military men play games. In the first place, why did we have to wrest control of the East now, after former East Security Forces Commander, the late Maj. Gen. Lucky Algama successfully recaptured the East? The reality is that former Northern Commander, Maj. Gen. Daluwatte did not see eye-to-eye with Algama and hence, pulled out troops from the liberated East for the Riviresa operation to liberate Jaffna.

The East changed hands. Now, after 13 years, the forces have taken control of the region again, at a human and economic cost. It must be stressed that the liberation of the East is important, as the LTTE could lay claim over the two provinces in any solution, only if it controlled the East.

The forces should now somehow hold onto the areas recently captured, even as it turns its attention north. Already, there are operations north of Vavuniya in Paliyankulam and the chances are that the security forces will now go for the big targets but, over a period of time.

Prabhakaran’s bases are suspected to be in high security zones in Vavuniyakulam, Mullativu and Kilinochchi and bunker buster bombs have already been secured to hit underground targets. However, it is learnt that the LTTE leader shuttles between his bases and takes to bunker clusters 30-feet-deep, to avoid the impact. This action is taken with advance information provided to him. No sooner the Kfir jets and MiG 27s take off (they are easily distinguished from the rest of the aircraft), he is informed from this end (Katunayake-Negombo). These take just over 10-minutes to reach the north and cannot be airborne for too long. So, he needs to take cover in these deep bunkers underground for not more than an hour. Prabhakaran does not take chances and it is very likely that he has a second warning of flights overhead at that end, from a particular perimeter in the north.

In as much as he needs to protect himself, he also has another problem on his hands. After the string of reversals in the East, he needs to do something spectacular, lest his cadres begin to desert him. He certainly has his eyes set on re-taking Jaffna and presence around Trincomalee is of paramount importance. But, he knows that this is a tall order just now, as the security forces are well prepared and the morale among his cadres is low.

However, to raise their morale, Prabhakaran could launch an attack on Weli Oya, a predominantly Sinhala area. This seems to be the easiest way out, where his cadres could push their way through, up to the Thiriyaya jungles and gain access to the northern part of the port area. The southern part of the port area has been cleared of the Tigers in an operation that lasted more than 10 months.

The Defence establishment must ensure that Weli Oya is fortified and strengthened, with more troops sent to this likely target. If Weli Oya is overrun, there could be a political fallout in the South.

However, the first and deadly option of recapturing Jaffna cannot be ruled out, if the LTTE decides to use other strategies, instead of penetrating the Forward Defence Lines at the Muhamalai-Nagarkovil axis that is quite well entrenched.

With the East secured and Karuna gaining control, coupled with the Wanni Tigers fleeing the areas, there is the likelihood of informants fleeing. Some may decide to brave the threat and end up being singled out and eliminated in the next phase of targets. What Karuna would ideally want is the East purged of the Wanni cadres and their informants. The civilians will fall in line and accept Karuna as their new leader, as that is the practical option. However, businessmen will resist, as taxes would now be demanded by the new faction. More on regionalism will follow, with hearts and minds campaign by Karuna and his men to win people to his side. Already, there are reports (Daily Mirror) to the effect that the ‘Karuna’ faction had admitted its mistakes, including abduction of underaged children. The group had apologised and was ready to turn a new leaf. It was previously reported that Karuna was to submit his proposals for a political solution to the APRC.

While the military is having the upper hand, militarily, this week as well, barring the counter attack on the security forces at Paalamoddai, northwest of Vavuniya, when the forces launched an operation on Wednesday, the bodies of eight soldiers were handed over to the military.

The bigger threat of the air power of the Tigers still remains. Has the SLAF fixed this threat ? The five-man Commission of Inquiry into the Katunayake base attack, that began sittings promptly, will not only be probing the debacle but will also be making recommendations. Top officers have been summoned to give evidence and the inquiry is expected to be completed within a stipulated timeframe.

The five-member Commission was appointed by Air Force Commander Air Marshall Roshan Gunetilleke. Presiding Officer is Chief of Staff Air Vice Marshal P.B. Premachandra, while the other four includes Group Captain Sunil Karunaratne, who will look into the medical aspects of the nature of the injuries and failure, if any, to remove the injured to hospital on time, Group Captain Ranil Gurusinghe, Commanding Officer, SLAF Ratmalana, Group Captain Clyde Weerakoon, Staff Officer, Directorate of Training and Wing Commander Janaka Nanayakkara, Staff Officer, Directorate of Administration.

The fact that interception was possible and not attempted, will also be inquired into by the Commission.

The Government Analyst is learnt to have reported that there were six bombs dropped and that only one did not explode. The CID probe into the attack is also continuing, with the Analyst’s report and eyewitness interviews being made available to the sleuths. However, the million dollar question is whether we have taken the necessary precautions to prevent another disaster, should the LTTE decide to use its light aircraft on a defence installation?

However, the fallout from the use of its air power on April 26, had its repercussions in Europe and France in particular, as mentioned last week. We said that more countries were likely to crack down on LTTE activity overseas, taking the cue from France. Already, Singapore appears to be on the alert and Australia is mulling a domestic ban on the LTTE.

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http://www.nation.lk/2007/04/15/newsfe3.htm

நய்நா விசயம் தெரியதோ உங்களுக்கு.... ;)

உங்க கொஞ்சம் பாருங்கப்பா...

இல்ல இங்க...

கருத்துக்கள விதிமுறைகள்

இம்முறை என்றில்லாதவாறு கடுமையாக..... ;) துவங்கப்போகுது....போல...

வெயில்துவங்க.... துவங்கியுள்ளீர்கள் அல்லது துவங்கியுள்ளது.... ;) பள்ளிகூடத்துக்கு லீவு நீண்டநாள்கள்.... இல்ல மாதக்கணக்கில் கொடுத்துள்ளீர்கள்... போகபோக விளங்கும்...

தொப்பியையும்... கண்ணாடியையும் களட்டிவைத்துட்டு இனி அடக்கிவாசியுங்கோ... ;)

Edited April 14, 200718 yr by Netfriend

தொப்பியையும்... கண்ணாடியையும் களட்டிவைத்துட்டு இனி அடக்கிவாசியுங்கோ... ;)

ஹி.. ஹி..

வாசித்தோம்.. புரிந்தோம்..

மிகவிரைவில தொப்பிக்கலவைச் சுற்றி மல்ரி பரலை நிற்பாட்டி ஆட்லறிகளையும் நிற்பாட்டி பொழிஞ்சு தள்ளப் போறாங்க..! அப்புறம் மிக் கிபீர் எல்லாம் ஒன்றாச் சேர்ந்து கொட்டப் போகுது என்றது மட்டும் சம்பூரணமா தெரியுது வெளிச்சத்தில..! கருணா குழு சுற்றிவளைக்க.. ஆமி சுற்றி நிற்க இது நடக்கம் அதே நேரம் வடக்கிலும் ஆனையிறவு பூநகரி.. மன்னார்.. நெடுங்கேணி.. நோக்கி முழங்கும்..!

இது எல்லாம் சரத் பொன்சேகாவின் கணக்கு. கச்சிதமாக நடக்கப்போகின்றது என்ற கற்பனையில் இருக்கும்போது தலைவர் பிரபாகரனின் கணக்கு வேறு மாதிரி மாற்றும்... வரலாற்று திரும்பும்.. மேலதிக விளக்கங்களிற்கு.........

Buying time for war

Gajan Raj Tamil Guardian 11 April 2007

The international community is backing Rajapkse’s war against the LTTE while loudly endorsing the manifestly ineffectual APRC.

Despite its stated intent to the contrary, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) is proving an effective means by which the Sri Lankan government can avoid coming up with a political solution to the ethnic conflict.

And the international community is going along with this delaying strategy.

Soon after Mahinda Rajapakse won the 2005 Presidential elections vowing to defend the unitary nature of the state and defeat the LTTE, the international community put intense pressure on him to forge a southern consensus with the main opposition UNP on the ethnic question.

The objective was to come up with a position on which to negotiate an end to the conflict with the Tamil Tigers.

Rajapske neither wanted to negotiate with the LTTE nor, for that matter, with the UNP. Rather he wanted to weaken both – the LTTE by renewed military action and the UNP by political maneuver.

In a bid to escape international pressure, President Rajapakse setup the APRC in early 2006.

He rationalized the move through the logic of ‘inclusiveness’ – now a popular term amongst international actors in Sri Lanka.

The APRC included all the Sinhala parties including the centre-right UNP and the ultra-nationalist JVP as well as anti-LTTE Tamil party-cum-paramilitary groups. (The TNA, which swept the elections in the Northeast, wasn’t even invited.)

But Rajapakse knew full well that bringing together parties with such diverse and hard-line views would make the exercise of consensus building a futile one.

It would, however, buy him time to pursue a military onslaught against the Tigers.

Rajapakse knew that as long as the LTTE was being gradually weakened, international pressure to negotiate with it would decrease accordingly.

In fact, he correctly guessed, there would be increasing international support for his military project instead.

Prof. Tissa Vitarana of the LSSP, an ally of Rajapske’s ruling SLFP, was appointed chair of the APRC.A panel of constitutional experts, appropriatedly including Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, was also formed to support the APRC.

However, whilst the UNP put forward its proposals to the APRC for solving the Tamil question, the SLFP has pointedly desisted from providing its own.

As if to underline that the whole exercise is to buy time, the SLFP’s submission, whilst being repeatedly promised, has been postponed numerous times.

Meanwhile, as Sri Lanka has slid ever deeper into all out war, there have been a chorus of international calls for the government to come up with a political solution to form the basis of peace talks.

During his visit to India last year Rajapakse promised restless Indian leaders that his government’s proposals would be produced within two months.

Four months later, when Foreign minister Rohitha Bogollagama visited Washington he made a similar promise to the US leaders saying that the government’s proposals to resolve the conflict would be put forward “within a few weeks.”

Rajapakse made an identical promise to South Asian leaders at the SAARC summit last week.

One of the first tasks the APRC participants undertook was to visit India to study the governance model there. Not the power-sharing model between the Centre and the States but, rather, India’s third tier of governance – the Pachayat Raj. A village level governing body.

As he has repeatedly indicated, this is Rajapakse’s idea of a solution to the decades long ethnic conflict.

Meanwhile, after a year of deliberations, the APRC is nowhere near a consensus.

Even the seventeen member expert panel tasked with producing a set of proposals to form the basis of discussions for the APRC could not agree on the fundamentals of the Tamil question and ended up releasing four separate sets of recommendations last December.

One of the reports signed by the 11 members of the expert panel – and hence called the ‘Majority Report’ - called for asymmetrical devolution through legislative provincial council system.

A provincial level power sharing falls far short of the federal solution that the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE agreed to explore during the much celebrated peace talks in 2003.

But even this suggestion proved too much for the Sinhala nationalist parties. The JVP walked out of APRC and even the government quickly distanced itself from the reports- Rajapakse himself lambasted the experts for releasing their report to the press.

Meanwhile, the UNP, for its part, wants hold on to its position as the favourite of the West-led international community in Sri Lanka and has been lackadaisically attending APRC.

Even this month, the United States, once again, publicly put its hopes in the APRC producing a negotiating position to put before the LTTE.

It is in this context that the SLFP General Secretary, Mithripala Sirisena, announced last week that the ruling party’s proposal would be put forward on May 1.

But he warned that the proposals would be in keeping with President Rajapakse’s hardline election manifesto - ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ (Mahinda’s Thoughts).

That nationalist manifesto denies the existence of a traditional Tamil homeland in the island’s Northeast and espouses a strong unitary state.

Simply submitting ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ to the APRC is not a step towards negotiations with the Tigers. In fact the submission is neither a proposal for talks nor is it likely to unite the APRC into a consensus around one.

But in the past year, Rajapakse has been aggressively pursuing his main project: the renewed war against the LTTE.

The recent military offensives which led to the LTTE withdrawing from large swathes of the east has not only convinced many Sinhalese that a military solution is feasible, but many key international actors too.

There is a big difference between an end to a war and a just solution to one.

The international community is not interested in a just solution per se. It is primarily interested in stabilization of the region and the state prevailing over its non-state actor challenger. This is the basic logic of ‘fighting terrorism.’

So the international community is tacitly backing Rajapkse’s war against the LTTE while loudly calling for a negotiated solution - and, tellingly, endorsing the manifestly ineffectual APRC.

The Sri Lankan state’s engineering of mass displacement of the eastern Tamils through indiscriminate bombardments is an integral part of this internationally-backed strategy.

The Tamils are being forced to a point where any solution, no matter how unjust, is preferable to the deprivations of war.

Irrespective of the contents of the proposal that Colombo finally puts to the Tamils, whether it satisfies even the basic demands of the Tamils or not, the international community will in all likelihood express support for it and encourage the Tamils to accept it.

According to international community’s calculations, a weakened LTTE will either have to accept the proposals as a basis for talks or reject it and invite further deprivations on the hopefully war weary Tamils.

Knowing full well that the LTTE will not accept any proposals that do not satisfy core Tamil demands, Sri Lanka is expecting to receive continued assistance for its renewed war.

The recent comments attributed to Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse – the President’s brother - that the war will continue for another three years should be seen in this context.

Even if the LTTE agrees to discuss the proposals that the APRC may one day produce, the Tigers will undoubtedly demand the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) be fully implemented to ensure normalcy for the Tamils is first restored.

But President Rajapakse, who has been opposed to the CFA from the outset, has ensured the truce’s irrelevance since coming to power.

Yet he does not want to formally abrogate the pact and openly declare war. Not without an explanation the international community cannot dismiss.

This is why the idea of a referendum to nullify the CFA is being floated now.

Following a systematic campaign against the CFA and the government’s project of recent territorial gains in the east as major successes in crippling the LTTE, the Sinhala electorate will undoubtedly reject the CFA.

Indeed all these calculations by Sri Lankan government and its international allies are based on a growing confidence that the LTTE can be militarily weakened if not destroyed.

But this is not the first time this assumption has underpinned strategy in Colombo and other capitals.

And when lessons of the past are not learnt, history has a habit of repeating itself.

http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=1173