A talk by Dr Arvind Gupta, Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, held at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies on Thursday marked an interesting development in the trajectory of local research activity in international relations. It was the first time such an event was organized jointly by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) and the LKIIRSS.

 

Introducing the speaker, Sunimal Fernando, Advisor to the President and member of the BCIS’s Board of Studies indicated that the two think tanks planned to work together and ‘provide complementarities’ to each other in the future. Both institutions were concerned with the study of international relations in the context of Sri Lanka’s national interest. His observation that Indo-Lanka relations were ‘structurally imbued with tensions’ which it was imperative to resolve, perhaps had relevance to other issues discussed by Dr Gupta in his talk on “Trends in Indian Foreign Policy.”

 

The foreign policy stance articulated by Gupta has been spelled out by previous visiting Indian diplomats as well. The gist of their message is that India seeks cooperation rather than competition, engagement rather than confrontation, and that the prosperity of its neighbours is in the interests of India’s own prosperity. Even as he spoke however, the ripples resulting from a statement made by India’s navy chief Admiral D.K. Joshi regarding readiness to deploy ships in the South China Sea – where India has interests in oil exploration – were being felt across the wider Indo Pacific region.

Joshi reportedly made the remarks at a press briefing in Delhi on Monday, days after China announced laws that allowed police in its island province of Hainan to board and search vessels which it considered to be ‘illegally’ entering the South China Sea. China asserts sovereignty over most of the South China Sea and its islands, but these claims are contested by Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan and Malaysia. The area’s rich resources in oil, gas and fish, as well as its shipping lanes, have made it a flashpoint in the region in recent times.

 

Last year India signed a pact with Vietnam for oil exploration in the disputed waters. “Where our country’s interests are involved, we will protect them and we will intervene,” NDTV reported Joshi as saying.
 

Referring to a subsidiary of India’s oil exploration company Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC), the Indian Express quoted Joshi as saying: “�. when the requirement is there, for example in situations where our country’s interests are involved, for example ONGC Videsh etc, we will be required�to go there and we are prepared for that. Are we preparing for it? Are we holding exercises of that nature? The short answer is yes.”

China’s announcement of the new laws came after a dispute between Chinese fishing boats and a Vietnamese ship in an area where both countries have overlapping claims. The two countries have different versions of the same incident. Vietnam accuses Chinese fishermen of cutting a seismic cable that was being towed behind a Vietnamese survey vessel, while China maintains that Vietnam chased away its fishermen engaged in legitimate fishing activity, the reports say.

More recently, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei, referring to Joshi’s remarks said that China “hopes relevant countries respect China’s sovereignty and national interests,” the Hindu reported. However India’s National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon on a visit to Beijing had downplayed Joshi’s comments, saying the issue did not figure in his talks with the Chinese leadership, the Hindu report added.
 

Needless to say, this kind of verbal sparring between the two rising powers is not reassuring for smaller states in the region that can nowhere match the military might of the nuclear armed Asian giants. Any Indian assertiveness in the South China Sea would also need to be seen in the context of the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ that will see 60 percent of US naval assets deployed in the Asia-Pacific by 2020 – a shift of focus widely seen by analysts as a move to counter the rise of China.

The thrust of these developments, if interpreted by China as provocations, could further undermine stability in the region, increasing the risk of war.

 

Responding to a question after the talk on the Indian navy chief’s remarks, Gupta said there was a need to see the issue in the context of the security of sea lanes, and that “confrontation was not the only way.”
 

In his talk he said India’s foreign policy had ‘changed beyond recognition’ since the end of the cold war, adapting to the new realities as it prepared to play a part in shaping the new world order. The US’s relative decline and the rise of new powers like China were among those changing realities. Opening up of the economy in 1991 and going nuclear in 1998 were developments that had far reaching consequences. With globalisation India was increasingly integrating with the outside world. But globalization also made India more vulnerable to external shocks. India was considering strategic partnerships that were unthinkable 10 years ago based on national interest, not ideology, he said.

Gupta also referred to the increasing importance of the maritime dimension of India’s foreign policy. The ‘rediscovery of the maritime dimension’ outlined by him needs to be considered against the backdrop of complex ground realities.

 

Noting that India could not afford to ignore the Indian Ocean, he referred to the Indian navy’s work in combating terrorism, in responding with assistance following the Indian Ocean tsunami, and in helping contain the LTTE’s activities at sea. While India sought to project its role as non-threatening and as a ‘net security provider’ in the region, he said the question was ‘would this be acceptable?’ The attempt to answer that question perhaps brings us back to Sunimal Fernando’s comments at the beginning of the event, on the inescapable tensions that beset India’s relationships with its neighbours.

 

 

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/121209/columns/indian-foreign-policy-ground-realities-and-mixed-messages-23979.html

A talk by Dr Arvind Gupta, Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, held at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies on Thursday marked an interesting development in the trajectory of local research activity in international relations. It was the first time such an event was organized jointly by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) and the LKIIRSS.

 

அரவிந்த் குப்தா- பாதுகாப்புச் செயலாளர் கோத்தபாய சந்திப்பு

http://www.yarl.com/forum3/index.php?showtopic=112537

 

Could New Delhi's growing naval force change the balance of power in the Pacific?

Is the Indian Navy about to start mixing it up with China on the high seas? For years, as the Chinese have modernised their naval fleet, Indian strategists have worried about what that might mean for India’s political and economic interests.

 

A recent book by C. Raja Mohan, one of India’s most influential strategic thinkers, explores the prospect of Sino-Indian competition spilling from the Himalayas to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, risking a struggle for maritime influence in the region among the United States, China, and India.

So it was all the more interesting, when, at a press conference Monday, India’s top admiral appeared to suggest that his navy would defend Indo-Vietnamese oil exploration efforts in the South China Sea against Chinese aggression. An Indian state-owned oil company, ONGC Videsh, has been involved in deepwater explorations with Vietnam in the South China Sea since 2006, despite Chinese claims of sovereignty over that area.

 

But the reality of Admiral D.K. Joshi’s statement was far less sensational. Rather than signalling a deployment, he merely reinforced the longstanding Indian position that China’s naval modernisation concerned India, and that like other maritime powers, India was preparing for worst-case scenarios. It wasn’t even a signal to clear the decks, let alone a shot across the bow.

Nonetheless, India is far more likely to become a regular naval presence in the Pacific than many previously imagined, due to its rapidly expanding economy, improving military technologies, and growing energy interests. The Indian Navy has historically been the smallest and most poorly-resourced of India’s three military services, in keeping with the country’s security preoccupations at home and its unresolved land border disputes with Pakistan and China.

 

It has just 60,000 active personnel and a $7 billion annual budget, roughly a quarter of the strength and resources of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. Its long-range capabilities come from a single aircraft carrier, a second-hand amphibious transport dock, 14 German- or Russian-designed diesel-powered submarines, and about 20 destroyers and frigates.

But power is relative, and this seemingly small flotilla today constitutes the largest naval presence in the Indian Ocean after the US Navy. Beyond the United States and China, only Japan, South Korea, and perhaps Taiwan boast even comparable capacities for the region, although their navies are more narrowly focused. But India’s navy dwarfs those of other countries embroiled in territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea. The two strongest rival claimants to China, Vietnam and the Philippines, boast just three active frigates between them. The temporary presence of even a small Indian squadron in the Pacific could make a meaningful difference to the region’s balance of power.

 

India’s growing interests, resources, and technological capabilities will likely lead it to increased naval activity east of the Strait of Malacca, the critical junction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans through which 40 percent of the world’s trade and most of East Asia’s oil imports flow. India is conducting sea trials of an indigenously-designed nuclear-powered submarine, which will significantly increase its navy’s operational range. In the next two years, India will induct a second aircraft carrier and modern French submarines into active service, to upgrade its aging fleet.

The navy’s share of the defence budget has steadily grown from less than 15 per cent of India’s annual military expenditure in 2000 to 19 per cent in 2012, outpacing India’s overall defence spending. And the 2009 agreement to purchase P-8 aircraft from the United States, capable of interdicting ships and tracking submarines, signals India’s technological ambitions in the high seas.

 

Perhaps more importantly, India is able to work with other regional navies. Beginning with basic exercises in the early 2000s, the Indian Navy’s collaboration with the US Pacific Command has evolved into complex war games. In 2004, India tested its ability to respond to regional crises in coordination with the United States, Japan, and Australia by performing humanitarian relief operations in Southeast Asia following the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami.

And the Malabar series of naval exercises between India and the United States, which have also involved Japan, Australia, and Singapore, has strengthened the Indian Navy’s ability to work closely with partners far from its shores. Contrast this to China: Beyond dustups with Southeast Asian countries, and with Japan over disputed islands — which only generate further suspicion of Chinese military intentions — Beijing is also quick to break off military ties, like it did after Washington sold weapons to Taiwan in 2010.
 

None of this means that India is looking to pick a fight with China in the South China Sea, particularly as India has no territorial stakes there.

 

Other facets of the Sino-Indian relationship — the fragile boundary talks over disputed Himalayan territory and bilateral trade of more than $70 billion and growing — are of far greater importance to New Delhi. At the same time, renouncing claims to its assets in Vietnam in response to perceived Chinese pressure could embarrass the Indian government, both domestically and internationally. When confronted with pressure from Beijing — as during the Dalai Lama’s 2009 visit to the disputed border town of Tawang or periods when China has refused to issue visas in some Indian passports — New Delhi’s response has generally been to stick to its guns.

India evidently needs to do a better job of managing its message. Its National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, who was in Beijing for border negotiations when Joshi made his statement, countered that the Indian media had “manufactured” the story.

 

For its part, China needs to appreciate that its aggressive pursuit of maritime territory compels India to cooperate more closely with Vietnam and the Philippines.

Beijing’s issuing of passports this November featuring a map showing the fullest extent of its territorial claims was a remarkably clumsy gesture, provoking simultaneous outrage in India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China may have only itself to blame if these states find greater common cause with one another, and with other regional maritime powers.

 

India’s steadily growing naval capabilities and its deepening commercial engagements in the Pacific Rim means that it now has the ability to provide security in the region to ensure open and secure sea lines of communication. For many countries invested in the region — not least the United States — that is welcome. For China too, this presents another opportunity for improving cooperation with New Delhi, but that would require it to accept India’s ability to play the role of a Pacific power.

Courtesy foreignpolicy.com

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/121209/sunday-times-2/indias-ocean-23779.html