Columns - Situation Report

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Army holds jaya pirith, Tigers warn of bloodbath

Both sides accuse each other of intensifying hostilities

Foreign Ministry issues tough guidelines for visits by diplomats to North, East

How the German envoy took Italian Ambassador to hospital

By Iqbal Athas

The LTTE mortar attack on diplomats, United Nations and Government officials twelve days ago has had its sequel.

Colombo-based foreign diplomats have now been banned from undertaking visits to operational areas in the North and East without the express permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such permission, the Ministry has said in a note to Colombo-based diplomatic missions, should be obtained three weeks ahead of a planned visit. The note sent out last week calls upon them to adhere to this procedure which had also been laid out in previous notes.

This in effect means that no other Minister will be able to sponsor visits for diplomats to the operational areas without the express approval of the Foreign Ministry. A high ranking Government official, who did not wish to be named, said yesterday such Foreign Ministry approval would only be granted in consultation with the Ministry of Defence. "That is to ensure security conditions in the areas the diplomats planned to visit were normal and the visits did not hinder any ongoing operational activity by the Security Forces," the official said.

The ruling came as senior Government officials took stock of the events that unfolded after the February 27 mortar attack on the Weber Stadium in Batticaloa. This began when an Air Force Mi-17 helicopter touched down with diplomats, UN and government officials at the Weber Stadium in Batticaloa.

It has come to light that there were no contingency plans and even the diplomats were forced to fend for themselves in the ensuing melee. Some of the events, which Government officials have come to know, have led to concerns at the highest levels.

One such instance was the experience of German Ambassador Juergen Weerth. He was upset to find his Italian colleague, Pio Mariani lying on the ground bleeding with a head injury. There was so much of panic and confusion that those in the Stadium were rushing for cover from the mortar attacks. There had been no one to help the diplomats and UN officials who were not familiar with the area or with what was going on. Mr. Weerth helped the Italian envoy stand up. He had his right hand across Mr. Mariani's shoulder and walked him out of the stadium. There had been more signs of panic on the road outside. People were running. Motorists were tooting their horns to make a hurried get away.

Ignoring the confusion, Mr. Weerth had walked towards two armed soldiers who were on duty along the roadside. He had asked one of them for directions to the hospital. He pointed the area, some distance away. It took another soldier, a good Samaritan who was driving in that direction in an empty Army vehicle, to offer the two envoys a lift to the hospital. He dropped them there and drove away.

The two envoys were first directed to an Out Patients Department (OPD). Evidently, some hospital staff did not recognize them. Perhaps they thought the duo were tourists or foreign journalists. One of staffers was to remark that senior hospital officials were busy since the Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights, Mahinda Samarasinghe and some diplomats had arrived in Batticaloa.

Ambassador Weerth had walked towards a person clad in a shirt and tie. He had assumed the person was someone in authority at the hospital. He was right. It was a doctor who was in the management staff. Upon being introduced, the doctor took the two envoys into a larger room which was a hive of activity. More doctors there were busy with various chores. Some attending to the wounds of Security Forces personnel just brought in, others tending to patients and the nursing staff cleaning fresh wounds of those hit by the mortars.

Ambassador Mariani was promptly put on a wheeled stretcher. His head injury, the result of a small piece of shrapnel hitting the back of his head, was cleaned and surgically dressed. A Government official in Colombo said that at this stage, there was a comical diversion. A hospital staffer walked up to Ambassador Weerth to tell him he had visited Germany thrice. He asked whether the German envoy could arrange a Schengen Visa for him. This visa entitles a traveller to visit any European Union country instead of Germany alone. Mr. Weerth was diplomatic enough to tell the staffer that the matter could be discussed later and to kindly pay attention to Mr. Mariani. By then, Minister Samarasinghe had realized that the two envoys were missing from the group that arrived at the Weber Stadium. He had sent a vehicle to get them transported from the hospital to the office of the Deputy Inspector General (DIG).

Last week's report on this page made reference to the Ambassador for France in Sri Lanka who was one of those who arrived at the Weber Stadium. Inadvertently his name was given as Jean-Bernard de Vaivre. He was the former Ambassador. The name, as pointed out in a note to the The Sunday Times by the Press Service of the Embassy of France in Sri Lanka should be Michel Lummaux. Yet, ironic enough that the Embassy's Press Service does not seem to be aware that their own Colombo website (http://www. ambafrance-lk.org) gives the name of the former Ambassador Mr.de Vaivre. Perhaps Mr. Lummaux should get his own Press Service to correct this to include his name. That will help more Sri Lankans to know that Mr. de Vaivre has long been replaced.

The days that followed the mortar attack on Weber Stadium have seen enhanced military activity in the East. Security Forces have begun assaults on several Tiger guerrilla positions both in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. In Trincomalee the focus is to prevent the guerrillas from using the contiguous land route north of the strategic port city and to prevent them from expanding their bases in the area. One such base is said to be in Kumburupiddy where measures are under way to expand. Military officials say supplies to this base were being moved by sea through the eastern coastal village of Kuchchaveli (north of Trincomalee). Some areas dominated by the guerrillas have now been brought under Security Forces control.

In the Batticaloa district, the main focus of the Security Forces, as previously announced, has been Toppigala. This week has seen a rapid exodus of civilians from the area. One time residents, who were eye witnesses, say small groups of Security Forces were moving in stealthily to search and destroy guerrilla hideouts. This has raised fears among civilians that they may be caught up in escalated hostilities in the weeks to come. This has triggered off the civilian exodus. Contrary to reports that an all out land based offensive (backed by air cover) had begun, Army sources confirmed yesterday "small group" attacks by Special Forces and Commandos were continuing in and around Toppigala and other areas. They said the measures adopted were forcing the guerrillas to flee from place to place.

The Army and commandos of the Police Special Task Force (STF) are also undertaking joint operations against Tiger guerrillas. On Friday eight STF commandos were killed in a guerrilla ambush at Periyapullumalai in the Batticaloa district. Four of the commando bodies, taken away by the guerrillas, were handed over yesterday to the members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to be handed over to the STF.

On the other hand, guerrilla pistol groups are also reported to have infiltrated Batticaloa town and its environs with plans to attack targets said to include top Security Forces, Police and Government officials. The Army captured Vakarai and its environs in a two stage operation that began on October 30 and officially ended on January 15, this year. Enhancing the military activity in and around Toppigala is other military action, the result of the guerrilla mortar attacks on the Air Force Base and the Weber Stadium on February 27. Security Forces have begun shelling guerrilla positions in areas near Batticaloa including Eravur, Kiran, Vellaweli, Vavunativu and Paddipallai. This has also led to an exodus of civilians in the villages for fear they may get caught up in the battles that would follow.

These developments come as the Army concluded week-long religious ceremonies countrywide to invoke blessings for them to conduct all its activities successfully. A signal sent out early this month by Colonel K.R.P. Rowel, (on behalf of the President of the Buddhist Bala Mandalaya of the Army) to Security Forces Commanders, Divisional Commanders, Sector Commanders and Deputy Sector Commanders said:

"Chanting of the Jaya Piritha and conducting of Bodi Pooja"

"The Army Commander has advised that steps should be taken by headquarters, units and sub units to chant the Jaya Piritha and conduct Bodhi Pooja for a week long period continuously from March 2, 2007 enabling the Army to conduct all its activities successfully and that lives of all soldiers including the Army Commander are protected.

"Accordingly steps should be taken to organize to hold the Bodhi Pooja and chant the Jaya piritha at the temples close to the army camps or within the camps at Headquarters, unit or sub unit level without endangering the lives of those taking part in such events. You are advised that all information about the events organized at headquarters, unit or sub unit level should be conveyed before 10.00 a.m. March 2, 2007 so that the details could be forwarded to the Commander of the Army.

"Only for sectors and sub sectors - Make arrangements to chant the Jaya Piritha and hold Bodhi Pooja in the main temples in your area as advised above and send the details of such programmes." The religious ceremonies came at a time when there are clearly signs of an escalation of military activity not only in the East but also in the North. This is in addition to the western seaboard and the guerrilla dominated Wanni.

Last Monday, LTTE Political Wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan warned Norway's Ambassador Hans Brattskar that "the present soft approach of the international community towards the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) is not going to change its plans and will only contribute to worsening situation leading to bloodbath in the island." According to the LTTE Peace Secretariat website Mr. Thamilselvan had briefed Ambassador Brattskar "about the serious human rights and humanitarian situation." He had also pointed out that the "GOSL is showing no sign of letting up on its military intent and is continuing with its daily attacks on the people in the east." The website added, "Thamilselvan also pointed out that LTTE intelligence gathering has revealed large scale military personnel and equipment being moved into Manalaru (Weli Oya) near Mullaitivu."

Interesting enough, even before Mr. Thamilselvan had complained of a build up by the Security Forces at Weli Oya, the guerrillas have adopted a number of counter measures fearing an advance. Additional cadres, including specific groups tasked to carry out mortar attacks, have been positioned. New trenches were being dug to further fortify their defence lines. Guerrilla intelligence cadres have been tasked to observe the frontlines of Army positions.

The security establishment in Colombo, however, holds a different view. They say there is evidence that the LTTE was making hectic preparations in several key areas. They include plans to attack Government-held Jaffna peninsula. Groups of guerrilla cadres have infiltrated the peninsula to carry out attacks on troops. The guerrillas have warned that civilians leaving the peninsula by sea would be targets. Guerrilla positions in the line that divides Security Forces held areas were being fortified with additional cadres and weaponry including mortar and artillery.

Other areas where there have been guerrilla build up, they say, are Mannar and Vavuniya. In Mannar north the LTTE had poured in large number of additional cadres. This is to provide depth to their defended localities in the event of a Security Forces advance. The LTTE had believed such an attack was possible along the coastal stretch north of Mannar - a move that would have the Sea Tiger base at Viduthaltivu, a nerve centre of Sea Tiger activity, vulnerable.

In Vavuniya, fears of confrontations between the Security Forces and the guerrillas have led to a departure of civilians. LTTE pistol groups and other infiltrated cadres have stepped up attacks on troops and police. The number of incidents in the town area in the past weeks has increased. The move has prompted Security Forces to step up search operations. It has led to arrests of guerrilla suspects from whom troops have learnt of plans to step up violence.

The Army has just raised its 57 Division. Named as officiating General Officer Commanding (GOC) is Brigadier S.R. Manawaduge. He was earlier Director (Plans) at Army Headquarters. There will be three Brigades under this Division each under the charge of a Lieutenant Colonel.

The two sides, the Security Forces and the Tiger guerrillas, have again accused each other of preparing for enhanced hostilities. Mr. Thamilselvam warns the worsening situation would lead to "bloodbath in the island." The Army, on the other hand, has held Jaya Pirithas and Bodhi Poojas countrywide to "conduct all its activities successfully and that lives of all soldiers including the Army Commander are protected."

Amidst the increased fighting in the east, threats in the North and other areas, the coming weeks will, no doubt, show how the undeclared Eelam War IV is headed. War has clearly taken precedence over peace and portends to continue.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070311/Columns/sitreport.html

Edited March 24, 200718 yr by kirubans

Columns - Situation Report

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Eelam war IV erupts in the Wanni

Scores of Tigers and troops killed or wounded in Madhu battle

Closure of Omanthai Exit-Entry point brings more hardships to civilians

Fears of war increase and peace hopes fade for New Year

By Iqbal Athas

The Sea Tiger boat mounted with a 14.5mm gun detected on February 22 at Kalpitiya by the Navy.

Reports of a group of Tiger guerrillas, said to be around 50, hovering in an area south of the Madhu Church and just ahead of their defended localities astride Mannar caused serious concerns for the security establishment. Were they on a mission to attack troop positions? Air raids on the group set a poser. There were civilian settlements in the area where the group was moving around. On Friday, the Army's newly established 57 Division decided to take on the group in what they believed was a pre-emptive strike. During such a move, they also planned to neutralize guerrilla artillery and mortar positions. The latter task was also being undertaken simultaneouly by small groups operating ahead of the defence lines.

Troops broke out of their defence lines to advance towards the guerrilla positions. They had penetrated some four kilometers when bitter gun battles erupted with the Tiger guerrillas in the general area east of the Giant's Tank. By Friday night, nine soldiers were killed. Six others were described as P1 or in a serious condition. A further four were described as P 2. That would leave them out of battle for sometime. Yet another five officers and 48 soldiers were classed as P3 or walking wounded. Eight of the dead were from the 8th battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI) whilst one was from the 6th battalion of the Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR), both now components of the new 57 Division. The injured were moved to the Anuradhapura base hospital in batches on Friday night.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had a different story to tell about the incident. Their Peace Secretariat web site accused the Army of launching heavy artillery and Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher attacks on Periya Pandivirichchan located two kilometers east of Madhu Church. It said heavy artillery and MBRL rocket fire was stepped up on civilian settlements. It charged that that the firing came from the Army camp in Piramanalankulam Junction on the Mannar-Vavuniya Road and the one at Madhu Road junction on Mannar - Medawachchiya Road.

The LTTE quoted NGO officials as claiming that 2000 families were displaced from villages east of Madhu towards Iluippaikkaikadavai, Vellankulam, Jeyanthinagar and Kilinochchi. State intelligence agencies have alerted security authorities to take steps to prevent an exodus of refugees to South India. They have warned that the LTTE may encourage the move in a strong bid to win sympathy in Tamil Nadu.

Notwithstanding each other's accusations or suspicions, it is clear both the Security Forces and Tiger guerrillas have been prepared. As expected, Friday's confrontation marks the return and escalation of the undeclared Eelam War IV in the Wanni. This is in the backdrop of reports in the past weeks of military preparations for which the two sides have been publicly accusing each other.

Friday night's fighting prompted the troops to make a tactical withdrawal to their original positions. Offensive action was temporarily halted. This was after battles had raged for over 12 hours. Some 51 Sinhala civilians who were forced to flee the fighting have ended up in the Vavuniya town. In a move that made clear the LTTE is poised to step up attacks, the Entry-Exit point at Omanthai, now the lifeline for civilians in the Wanni, also came under attack. It prompted the Army to promptly shut down the facility. It was re-opened yesterday.

On the same day, in the Government-controlled Jaffna peninsula the Army seized a variety of items from a lorry parked near a house. They included a large haul of explosives, claymore charges, remote-controlled devices and satellite phones. Yesterday, a guerrilla suicide bomber exploded himself outside an Army position in the Jaffna town killing one soldier and wounding three others.

Even last week the guerrillas directed 81 mm mortar fire at positions of the 10th battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI), part of the new 57 Division. Five Army personnel were killed and 23 others were wounded. The incident occurred near a location from which troops broke out for Friday's intrusion and attack.

The intensified action by the LTTE in the Wanni and the Jaffna peninsula is in addition to its efforts to step up attacks in the East. Last Wednesday, in a bid to demonstrate that they have not altogether given up the Batticaloa district, Tiger guerrillas planned an attack on the Army detachment in Sittandy just past 2 am. However, it failed. Two heavily-explosive-laden trucks had exploded prematurely at Red Bridge near the detachment. Four soldiers and two civilians employed by the Army were killed and 17 others were wounded. Also killed was a civilian passerby. Thirty two other civilians were injured. The Army said they found the bodies of eight guerrillas and added that according to radio intercepts 18 guerrillas had been killed. Independent verification of these figures is not possible. In other confrontations in the Batticaloa district for the period February 24 to March 7, Army sources say, nine soldiers were killed, three missing and 55 wounded. They say 67 guerrillas were killed and 83 wounded.

Among the items recovered by the Army from the scene of the incident were six T-56 assault rifles, a Light Machine Gun, a Rocket Propelled Grenade and 2,000 rounds of (T-56) ammunition. This week both the Army and the Police Special Task Force (STF) continued their joint operations in the Batticaloa district. President Mahinda Rajapaksa was briefed last Wednesday on these joint operations.

This was both by the Commander of the Army Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and the Commandant of the STF, Nimal Lewke DIG. The two were to commend each other's role in their new tasks. He also heard details about the Navy's reported destroying of two LTTE weapons ships in the deeper seas off the eastern coastal town of Arugam Bay. However, powerful sections in the security establishment held a different but well recorded version of how the incident occurred. But this was not detailed out.

Quite apart from this, from January 2006 to February 2007, the Navy has either rounded up or destroyed LTTE cargo vessels or trawlers in 13 separate incidents. Ten of these incidents took place last year whilst the rest in February this year. On both February 16 and 22, they made two important finds. The first was an LTTE boat carrying more than a million steel balls of varying sizes used for the manufacture of claymore mines and suicide jackets. The other was when they apprehended a Sea Tiger boat mounted with a 14.5 mm gun. Both discoveries were made in Kalpitiya, an official at Navy Headquarters said yesterday.

Intensified anti-guerrilla operations in the Batticaloa district came as intelligence agencies reported that the LTTE had moved two 152 mm artillery guns into the general area of Toppigala or Baron's Cap. Whilst small groups were engaging guerrilla targets there, intelligence sources reiterated yesterday that large groups of guerrillas were shifting from the east to the northern theatre. This was whilst retaining a limited presence in the east to engage the Security Forces and thus drive home the point that they have not ceded the entire east.

A hitherto lesser known feature of the ongoing undeclared Eelam War IV is the great sacrifice being made by personel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police and Home Guards. Since, December 2005 January 1, 2007, according to the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS), a total of 945 were killed. Here is a break down: Army (599), Navy (226), Air Force (7), Police (72) and Home Guards (41). There were hardly any incidents in November 2005 when Presidential Elections were held. Hence, the casualty figures are for the period that began after the Presidential polls.

These figures include some of the major incidents since the outbreak of hostilities after the LTTE blockaded the Mavil Aru anicut. The move deprived water to over 25,000 acres of paddy land in the Batticaloa district and prompted a military offensive that began on July 28 last year. On August 8 of the same year, the sluice gates were re-opened. Two officers and 15 soldiers were killed in the fighting. A further eight officers and 113 soldiers were wounded. Army officials say 35 guerrillas were killed and 75 cadres were wounded.

Here are details of some of the other military action that followed:

When Security Forces attacks got under way in Mavil Aru, Tiger guerrillas mounted an offensive in Mutur and villages south of it. The three-day offensive began on August 3 and led to the deaths of 12 soldiers. Seven officers and 94 soldiers were wounded. Army officials say 99 guerrillas were killed and 124 wounded.

On August 11, last year, in a bid to place a siege on the Jaffna peninsula, Tiger guerrillas carried out attacks on several Security Forces positions in the Jaffna peninsula. This included attacks on the Entry-Exit point at Muhamalai (now closed), an attack on the Naval Sub Unit and the seizure of Kayts island, a fact hitherto unknown. The Army deployed a team of commandos to recapture Kayts island after it was in guerrilla hands for two days. Later, during a two day offensive, troops hit back at LTTE positions and returned to the original positions at Muhamalai. According to sources at the Security Forces Headquarters Jaffna (SFHQ-J), 17 officers and 180 soldiers died in the fighting. A further 47 officers and 778 soldiers were wounded. These sources said over 350 guerrills were killed and more than 400 wounded.

Later on August 27 the Army launched a week-long operation to recapture Sampur. This was the location from which the guerrillas directed artillery fire at the Dockyard, home for the Navy's Eastern Naval Area Headquarters and the Sri Lanka Air Force base in China Bay. In fact, the recapture of this strategic location, as revealed in The Sunday Times, was recommended by a team from the United States Army's Pacific Command. In this encounter, Army officials say, 20 soldiers were killed. Eleven officers and 156 soldiers were wounded. They said nearly 200 guerrillas were killed and over 60 wounded.

On September 5 last year, the Army launched an offensive to capture the LTTE's frontlines facing the Muhamalai Entry-Exit point. This forced the LTTE to fall back to their next line. The near three day offensive led to two officers and 36 soldiers being killed. A further ten officers and 201 soldiers were wounded. Army officials said more than 225 guerrillas were killed and over 250 wounded.

This was followed by the infamous debacle at Muhamalai on October 11 after an Army advance was foiled. According to figures revealed by sources at SFHQ Jaffna 12 officers and 124 soldiers were killed during this day long encounter. A further 24 officers and 490 soldiers were wounded whilst three soldiers were declared missing in action. They said 175 guerrillas were killed and more than 220 wounded.

With the guerrillas now poised for attacks both in the Northern and Eastern theatre, fears of the current fighting reaching a new high are gaining momentum. It comes at a time when the Government is busying itself to expedite the formulation of political proposals to end the ethnic conflict. Quite clearly, a heightened war seems closer than a hopeful peace as another national New Year closes in.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070325/Columns/sitreport.html

Air Tiger thunderbolt jolts nation

Explosive inside stories of midnight attack on the SLAF main base

Not so modern Indian radars were repaired by Sunday but not switched on

Vavuniya STF gave the alert, but SLAF thought it was a Silk Air flight

By Iqbal Athas

It was close upon midnight last Sunday when commandos on duty at the Police Special Task Force (STF) detachment in Ganeshapuram, between Vavuniya and Mannar, heard the roar of engines overhead. Though visibility was restricted, they figured out that the noise came from two low flying aircraft with no lights. This aroused suspicion.

Chief Inspector Channa Sirimanne, Officer-in-Charge, promptly telephoned the Sri Lanka Air Force base in Vavuniya to give them the news. His telephone call was connected to the Operations Room of SLAF headquarters in Colombo. CI Sirimanne repeated the details. He also alerted the STF Headquarters in Colombo. He was to later record the encounter in the Information Book at the detachment. So did his colleague Chief Inspector Upul Jayawardena, who was also a witness.

SLAF bases in Anuradhapura and Vavuniya went into action. They switched off all lights. So did the Army installations and the Police in Vavuniya. The only exceptions were lights inside the buildings. Additional sentries were moved into guard the outer perimeter and vital points. In Colombo, checks were being made whether any international flights were operating at that time over Wanni skies. It turned out there was one. It was a flight from Silk Air, a subsidiary of Singapore Airlines. This lulled them into believing there were no threats. They were thus unaware that Tiger guerrillas were only minutes away from a deadly mission.

Some 45 minutes ticked by. At 12.45 am, after Monday had dawned, three loud explosions rocked the SLAF's main base at Katunayake. This base is separated from the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) only by the runway, used both by military and civilian aircraft. The blasts were heard several kilometers away. In Nugegoda and Mirihana, south of the City, police officers said they heard the explosion. So did residents in Katana, Dankotuwa, Kimbulapitiya and other outlying areas of the BIA. Telephones began to ring and news spread that the air base was under Tiger guerrilla attack. Yet, no one knew how exactly it came about. Some wondered whether a mortar attack was under way. Others thought Tiger guerrillas had infiltrated the air base for a second time. The first was in July 2001.

At the Operations Room of the SLAF headquarters in Colombo, they were trying to piece together a correct picture of what had gone wrong. Air Traffic controllers at the BIA were told to divert all inbound aircraft to other airports in the region. Some were told to proceed to Trivandrum, others to Chennai, and yet others to Male in the Maldives. Colombo flights that had not taken off from foreign capitals were told to stay on ground. At the BIA, passengers were checking in for outbound flights. In fact some of them had boarded Singapore Airlines flight SQ 469, a Boeing 777 due to depart for Singapore 1.10 a.m.. They were told to hurriedly disembark. Passengers were only aware the airbase was under attack but did not know how.

There was panic inside a Cathay Pacific aircraft due to depart to Hong Kong. Crew had seen the sporadic illumination of the night sky. They heard rapid bursts of gunfire. Commandos, Air Force officials said, moved in to evacuate them and assure that the airport was not under attack. Security Forces and Police sealed off the airport preventing those inside from leaving. Similarly, no one was allowed entry until a thorough search was carried out. That took over two hours.

At the SLAF airbase in Katunayake, it became clear there was no guerrilla intrusion through the ground. Some airmen at the Air Defence facility had heard the noise of an aircraft just overhead. Much later, they heard reports of another light aircraft hovering around some three kilometres away. A Corporal began pouring anti aircraft gunfire into the sky. They were unable to see the aircraft overhead due to darkness. There was no night target acquisition capability either. The gunfire was to give rise to rumours, spread through the telephone that gun battles had begun at the BIA. Before long, the noise of the aircraft engine faded away.

The destruction left behind became clear. Three bombs had exploded at the zinc sheet covered building that housed the Aeronautical Engineering Wing. The roof and the walls had crumbled. Nearby, airmen, all members of the Air and Sea Rescue team, were sleeping. They were on call any time of the day or night when there is an emergency rescue mission. Three died and 16 were injured. Air Force officials said helicopters in the adjoining Four Squadron suffered slight damage. The shattering effect of the bombs had led to glass windows breaking. At least five such helicopters were later repaired. They insist there was no damage to any fixed wing aircraft.

The Air Tiger bombs were clearly meant for the Kfir and MiG 27 squadrons that lay not far away from where the bombs fell. Through bombing raids, the guerrillas had wanted to retaliate for the string of air raids conducted by the Air Force both in the North and the East. If guerrilla efforts to procure state-of-the-art Surface to Air Missiles from the United States ended up in a fiasco due to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sting, the LTTE had now demonstrated their air strike capability as some measure to counter the threat. However, the aircraft failed to drop the bombs in the hangars where the fighter jets lay parked.

If it were to fall there, it could have caused unimaginable mayhem and destruction. Some of the fighter jets remained armed with 250 kilogramme bombs and the attack could have triggered off massive secondary explosions. Some Air Force officials believe the pilot of the guerrilla aircraft may have been disoriented after he was unable to locate the hangars. As a standard operational procedure, lights in the fighter bomber hangars are switched off at night.

The intrusion of the Tiger Air Wing light aircraft was made possible because the Indian built air defence radar was not operational. Technicians had sought and obtained permission from the SLAF Directorate of Operations for it to be shut down from March 19 to 23 for servicing and repairs. Thereafter they had sought an extension of two days that was to end on Sunday March 25. Ironically, The Sunday Times learnt that the servicing had been completed by last Sunday evening. It was operational. However, for some unknown reason it had not been switched on. Did information of such a shutdown reach the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)? Did that pave the way for the surprise attack?

Answers to these and a number of other questions are being sought by an investigation that is being conducted by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Among other aspects being probed by a team led by Mahes Perera, Senior Superintendent of Police, is whether there was any lapses by any party that led to Monday's attack. On Friday detectives recorded the statements of Chief Inspectors Channa Sirimanne and Upul Jayawardena of the STF.

Confirmation that the two light aircraft of the Air Tiger Wing were used in the attack came from Air Traffic Controllers at Bandaranaike International Airport. They had spotted on their radar two unidentified aircraft. By then, they were heading in a northwesterly direction towards Wanni. Air Force officials believe the two light aircraft took off from an unknown location in the Wanni and veered westwards past Ganeshapuram. Thereafter, they flew southwards along the coast astride the Wilpattu National Park to veer left towards the SLAF airbase. They had taken the same route to return though not over Ganeshapuram.

SLAF headquarters and its air base in Vavuniya began tracking the fleeing Air Tiger aircraft. The SLAF scoured into the sky a Chinese built K-8 jet trainer, which has night flying capability, to intercept them. But it was more than 20 minutes later. Both SLAF headquarters and its base in Vavuniya found much to their chagrin that the two aircraft had gone off the radar screens somewhere in the skies above Mannar. The K-8 had to be ordered to return to base. The use of Kfirs or the recently acquired MiG 27s to intercept the two light aircraft was not possible due to a number of important reasons. Despite the very heavy investment of public funds, they lacked some features. For obvious reasons they cannot be spelt out.

Later, after sunrise on Monday morning, Kfir jets pounded several areas near Mannar and north of it. This is on the basis of suspicion that the light aircraft landed somewhere in that general area. Air Force officials estimate that the two way journey for the Zlin Z-143 aircraft would have taken not more than 90 minutes. That is with each journey lasting only 45 minutes.

Though the LTTE had constructed a 1.2 kilometre runway in Iranamadu, capable of even landing a C-130 Hercules transport plane, senior Air Force officials are doubtful whether the two light aircraft took off from there. Iranamadu is located in the Kilinochchi district west of the A-9 Jaffna-Kandy highway. One source said, "the use of a large stretch of road both for take off and landing cannot be ruled out." Photographs released by the LTTE showed the Zlin Z-143 aircraft with a metal frame in the under belly to hold the bombs.

The aircraft used for the bombing has been conclusively identified by the Air Force as a Czech built Zlin Z-143 four-seater light aircraft. This was after the LTTE released photographs of the aircraft as well as a group of light blue uniformed guerrillas of the Air Wing, some sporting flying brevets, posing for photographs with their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Further confirmation of this was obtained by The Sunday Times from foreign aviation experts and intelligence sources.

The Sunday Times made a string of exclusive exposures on the LTTE constructing an airstrip east of the Iranamadu irrigation tank in the Kilinochchi district and acquiring aircraft. On March 6, 2005 this newspaper revealed exclusively how the United States has helped the Government identify an aircraft photographed by a UAV to be the Czech built Zlin Z-143. On March 27, 2005 this newspaper exclusively revealed a top secret report by the Air Force on the air capability developed by the LTTE. There were several other reports during 2005 and 2006.

The Zlin Z-143 is said to have a maximum range of 630 nautical miles (1,170 kilometres). The cost in 2005 is said to be around US $ 259,350 for a basic model. This aircraft, used for training and acrobatic purposes, is capable of carrying an ordinance load of 240 kilogrammes. Experts say such a load could be doubled or made more if only one pilot flies the aircraft as a "flying bomb." Though there were fears earlier that suicide missions could be carried out with the aircraft, by hindsight it is clear the LTTE will not risk such a move unless they become desperate. This is both in view of the costs of the aircraft as well as the time and money invested to train the pilots abroad. Intelligence sources say the pilots for the guerrilla air wing were trained both in France and in the United Kingdom.

Of the four bombs that fell at the Katunayake SLAF base, one did not explode. The firing mechanism did not trigger. It was broken into large pieces. That gave Air Force the detailed characteristics of the bomb. It contained C-4 explosives and had been mixed with large quantities of steel razor balls. The Sunday Times (Situation Report) revealed last week how over a million such steel balls were seized by the Navy in Kalpitiya on February 16. The new discovery confirms that more stocks of steel balls had been smuggled in earlier.

As confirmed from pictures released by the LTTE, the improvised fin stabilized gravity bombs had been attached to the under belly of the aircraft by a metal frame. According to a senior Air Force official who did not wish to be named, each bomb weighed 25 kilogrammes. He said there was an electrical cable linked from the fuselage to the frame of each bomb that hung at two points. The bombs, he said, had been held electromagnetically until they were dropped.

The Commander of the Sri Lanka Air Force, Air Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke, has appointed a three member Court of Inquiry to probe Monday's attack. This is to identify lapses, if any in the Air Force, and the corrective measures to be taken. The Court is headed by Air Vice Marshal P.B. Premachandra, Chief of Staff and comprises Group Captain Ranil Gurusinghe, Commanding Officer, SLAF base, Ratmalana and Group Captain Clyde Weerakoon, Staff Officer in the Directorate of Training. Wing Commander Janaka Nanayakkara, Staff Officer in the Directorate of Administration has been named as the Secretary to the Court.

In 2005, when the SLAF received confirmation of the construction of the LTTE airstrip, they were able to discern that the guerrillas had only two aircraft. Thereafter, confirmation that they possessed five came in a briefing note a high level Sri Lanka Air Force team received from their Indian counterparts. The 14 page note, seen by The Sunday Times, revealed that the LTTE had "Up to five light aircraft having 600 nm (nautical miles) range with maximum speed/height of 200 kts (knots) / 15000', capable to carry 250 kg of explosives." The briefing note came as India gifted Air Defence radars to Sri Lanka and invited a high level SLAF team to visit their air base in Bangalore to discuss matters relating to it.

The Indian offer prompted the former Government to cancel an order placed with China for 4 Dimensional radars. India was to first install two Dimensional radars and later integrate 4 Ds. Whilst the 2 D radars indicate direction and distance of a target, the 4 D provides the height in addition to the other two factors.

The Indian note observed: "Though an MoU for ceasefire has been signed by the GoSL (Government of Sri Lanka) with insurgent groups, there are confirmed reports of the LTTE developing infrastructure for operating in third dimension. The conflict has been restricted to ground level activity till recently. Acquisition of light twin/four seater aircraft, development of airstrip at Iranamadu and ongoing training of pilots by LTTE has opened the third dimension of war from air. GoSL is exceedingly concerned with this development. GoSL has expressed a desire that GoI (Government of India) help them in assessing their AD (air defence) requirements to enforce her sovereignty in airspace over its territories."

The note listed the following threats perceived by the Government of Sri Lanka:

• Colombo and economic targets in and around Colombo.
  
• National leadership.
  
• Use of aerial route by the LTTE to bring in critical military hardware.
  
• Suicide attacks on centres of gravity.
  
• Parallel attacks on number of VAs (Vulnerable Areas) and VPs (Vulnerable Points) to undermine the morale of the people.
  
• Use the air assets to get their demands accepted and threaten the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.
  

Based on inputs given by the Government, the Indian Air Force made some deductions. Among them:

• The aircraft has adequate range to do a tactical routing from the sea to attack targets in Colombo, Southern Sri Lanka and East Sri Lanka coast. However, the COG (centre of gravity) being located in Colombo, the attack if any to achieve the desired result would be in and around Colombo.
  
• The attack on VA/VPs in Colombo emanating from West (sea) is the most challenging to Air Defence set up of Colombo area.
  
• Runway at Iranamadu can take on operation of C-130 type of aircraft which can carry 10 to 15 ton load.
  
• Jungle around the Iranamadu runway provides good concealment of airborne assets of the LTTE.
  

This is the second time that the SLAF airbase has come under attack from Tiger guerrillas. The first was on July 24, 2001, when guerrillas infiltrated the area and mounted attacks both on the international airport and the adjoining SLAF base. Civilian and military aircraft were destroyed.

Following top level inquiries into the incident, the Ministry of Defence then decided to shift the Kfir and MiG-27 squadrons to a location near the SLAF base in Sigiriya. The idea was to make sure the international airport was secure. The move drew fierce protests from environmental groups who said this could cause damage to the Sigiriya frescoes and other historical sites. Hence, the moves were suspended.

Most Sri Lankans woke up last Monday morning to realize that the face of the near-two decade long separatist war has changed. During the undeclared Eelam War IV Tiger guerrillas have for the first time demonstrated their air strike capability. It came at a time when the people were made to believe that the LTTE has been badly weakened and 95 per cent of the battles have been won. Until last Monday, wars were fought only on the ground and at sea. Now, the defence and security establishment are forced to cope with a new threat from the air, one that has many ramifications.

Whilst the Ministry of Defence pondered over a long term response, searchlights and communications sets were issued to troops in the front lines of the north. They were told to alert their bases if they sighted any suspicious aircraft. In what seemed a move that bordered on hilarity, Sri Lankans were asked to telephone 116 if they sighted any suspicious aircraft.

Monday's LTTE demonstration of their air strike capability, even if it sounds primitive to some, means the defence establishment will have to evolve counter measures to secure military installations, naval assets at sea and on land, troop transport ships, VIP residences and a host of others who are now targets. To a nation that is reeling under an economic crisis, such measures would be a costly burden.

Already, foreign suppliers are girding themselves to offer air defence mechanisms and a host of other related hardware to the Government to overcome the threat. Like what has happened in the past, such procurements would lead again to the birth of some more millionaires or billionaires, both in and out of uniform. That is at a time when those who disclose such blatant rip offs and rackets in the media have become the second, (or is it the first), enemy.

Through high-pitched official propaganda they have already been warned of the dubious titles they will qualify for through those exposures - being branded as acolytes of the enemy and even named traitors. They are destined to remain in the graveyard of silence or suffer the consequences for saying the truth. That is Sri Lanka today.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070401/Columns/sitreport.html