Whither Karuna, three years on?

Tamil Guardian 07 March 2007

Amid changing political and military dynamics, the former LTTE commander contends with his backers´dislliusionment.

When Karuna (Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan), then one of the Tamil Tigers’ top commanders, broke away from the LTTE, exactly three years ago, his rebel yell was ‘freeing the east from the domination of the north.’

At the time, the expectation amongst many - not just his fellow rebels - was that Karuna, as leader of a new Tamil outfit in the east, was going to play a role comparable to LTTE leader Veluppillai Pirapaharan.

Karuna attempted to gain recognition as another party, alongside the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state, to the protracted conflict. He asked Colombo, foreign governments, including peace-broker Norway, and other international actors to treat his breakaway faction accordingly.

Meanwhile, Karuna’s fellow rebels and supporters addressed him as 'thalaivar' (leader). A new oath of allegiance was drawn up for them. Their new goal was to liberate the Tamil people of the east from the oppressive Sinhala state and northern Tamil domination.

Karuna named his new movement ‘Tamil Eela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal’ (TMVP) - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam People.

But Karuna’s fiefdom collapsed after just six weeks. However, even after fleeing the east with a handful of loyalists and going underground, he did not abandon efforts to (re)establish a bastion in the east.

Karuna knew only solid control over a piece of territory, no matter how small, could ensure him a respectable position in any future bargaining for his ambitions.

Vowing to ‘liberate the eastern Tamils from Vanni domination’ Karuna and his cadres began launching raids against the LTTE.

The TMVP projected these attacks in which a few Tiger cadres were killed from time to time as significant military achievements.

He projected his group as a parallel to the LTTE, asserting that it was essentially a liberating force of the eastern Tamils.

Copying Pirapaharan, Karuna even issued a policy statement on Nov 27, ‘Heroes Day’ – the day on which the Tigers remember fellow fighters killed in three decades of struggle and the LTTE leader makes his much-anticipated annual speech.

With a measure of territorial control his primary goal, Karuna based his strategy on his own military experience and his group’s armed capability.

Aware of the TMVP's limitations, he exchanged his inside knowledge about the LTTE and the services of his menfor the protection, weapons and other assistance that Sri Lankan Military Intelligence (MI) was eager to provide him with.

Since then the Karuna Group, as the TMVP has come to be known, has engaged in a murderous dirty war against the LTTE with the increasing support of MI.

But last year the Sri Lankan government launched direct military offensives against the Tigers.

And with the fall of Vahari in January, Karuna’s position regarding his political goals and bargaining power has changed drastically.

This was starkly apparent when Karuna appeared on Derana TV, a Colombo based private channel in early February. In an interview, Karuna was now advocating ‘peace.’ His agenda for the east was, notably, ‘development and education.’

Amid the very difficult socio-economic conditions of the east, such pledges have long been the mainstay of political campaigns there.

What was curious in this instance was a liberation war veteran promising to court the state's largess.

His ‘liberation force’ would, he said, solicit governmental assistance to ‘satisfy’ the people of the east.

The Tamils of the east, he argued, would quit their freedom struggle once the government commenced social development and educational programmes. They would not even ask for federalism or devolution, he asserted.

Meanwhile, his group’s name had became ‘Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal’ with ‘Eelam’ notably being dropped.

Karuna went on to praise President Mahinda Rajapakse and his policies as outlined in the hardline Sinhala-nationalist election manifesto, ‘Mahinda Chinthana.’

Karuna even denounced former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe for bretraying ‘Mother Lanka’ during the Norwegian-brokered peace talks.

Questioning Ranil’s loyalty to the nation, the born-again Sri Lankan patriot also cast aspersions on the credibility of the Norwegian facilitators.

Karuna then thanked the Sri Lankan Army for ‘liberating’ the Tamils of Vaharai from the LTTE and said the Sinhalese should be assured of his determination to engage in peaceful politics.

Last weekend Karuna came out in public and visited some of his camps in the east. Wearing a pistol belt and accompanied by heavily armed guards, he addressed hundreds of unarmed conscripts.

“We believe today in the rule of law, democracy and pluralism,” he declared.

“Sri Lanka is our Motherland. We consider that it is our duty to respect the country’s Constitution and also the President and the Government of Sri Lanka,” the liberation fighter said.

“The liberation of the Tamils of the east was possible because of the correct political leadership of President Mahinda Rajapakse and his Army commander Lt-Gen, Sarath Fonseka.”

“The Tamils should remember the few hundred soldiers who sacrificed their lives to liberate Vaharai from the ruthless Vanni Tigers.”

This drastic about turn in Karuna’s policies can be illuminated by an examination of the recent and drastic changes in his circumstances.

Unfulfilled military promise

When Karuna decided to split from the LTTE, he invited the media to his stronghold in Batticaloa. Protected by grim-faced guards, he gave interviews with hundreds of well-trained fighters and 120mm heavy mortars lined up in the background.

The message was clear: whoever (the government, the LTTE or the Norwegian facilitators) considering negotiations should bear in mind his military assets and 6000 strong military force.

To his then numerous admirers' dismay, the only negotiation Karuna was to have turn out to be with the Jeyanthan Regiment - and that was not conducted around a table.

Prior to his rebellion, Karuna had been the Commanding Officer of the Jeyanthan Regiment. At the time of the split, this elite force was deployed at Nagerkovil in northern Vanni.

Six weeks later a sizeable contingent of the Jeyanthan Regiment advanced past Karuna's defence lines in Verugal and bore down on his main camp, Meenakam, warning strong action against those who opposed its intent to bring the east under the control of the LTTE’s central command.

Ahead of the offensive, the LTTE had appealed through the media for eastern community leaders to encourage Karuna’s cadres to desert.

Shortly after the collapse of Karuna's frontlines at Verugal, a large crowd of local people forced their way into Meenakam, where for many weeks newspapers had been barred and radios confiscated.

Upon hearing of the LTTE offensive from the civilians, the fighters vacated the Meenakam camp, leaving their weaponry behind. (According to Karuna, he disbanded and released them to avoid a battle).

Karuna, with a handful his loyalists, fled to Colombo. He was now without any independent military capacity.

Nevertheless, he continued to believe that he could rebuild this capability and eventually claim equal status to the LTTE.

Sri Lankan military intelligence, believing Karuna could pose a challenge to the LTTE whilst being kept under their control, began to assist him.

Camps were established for Karuna’s cadres in the jungle on the border between Batticaloa and Pollannaruwa districts. MI assisted Karuna overtly (for example to forcibly recruit Tamil youths – including minors) and covertly assisted him to attack LTTE border positions.

Though Karuna was able to kill a number of LTTE officials and fighters, it was at a heavy price to the TMVP. He lost most of his key loyalists including his brother, Reggie (Vinayagamoorthi Sivanesathurai) in a series of clashes.

Meanwhile LTTE intelligence infiltrated into Karuna's hideouts, as deep as Koddawa in Colombo and Vannathurai in Welikkanda, and inflicted severe losses.

These developments alarmed MI’s commanders. Concerned the TMVP could be a conduit for LTTE penetration of their own structures, they limited contact with the Karuna Group to specific operatives and started to keep it at arm’s length.

Rather than allow Karuna free rein against the LTTE, when MI thought his recruits were sufficiently trained, they took them along on attacks and ambushes against the LTTE.

In late 2006, as the Sri Lankan military stepped up direct offensives against the LTTE in different parts of the east, Karuna Group cadres were incorporated into the attacks.

On Sep 6, 2006, Karuna Group sub-commanders Jeyam and Pillaiyan jointly lead Karuna men in an operation to capture an LTTE base in Kanchikudicharu area. (Before the split, Jeyam was an LTTE company leader and Pillaiyan was in the finance section.)

They were given a temporary operational base in the Kanchirankuda Special Task Force (STF) camp. From there, they gave orders to their 150-strong unit.

But the Tigers had mined their own base and set up an ambush with mortars and snipers. As Karuna’s men began torching the unprotected huts, claymores went off followed by a barrage of 60mm mortars.

In their hasty retreat, the Karuna Group team ran straight through an STF unit functioning as a rear guard and forward control post for artillery in Kanchirankuda and Thandiyadi STF bases.

Caught in LTTE heavy weapons fire being directed at the Karuna Group, the STF took heavy casualties.

Subsequently, when the STF launched a final push to capture the LTTE bases as Kanchikudicharu and Vinayagapuram LTTE bases, they avoided using Karuna Group cadres.

In neighbouring Batticaloa, an infantry unit of Sri Lankan Army (SLA) had a similar experience.

Though a Karuna Group team and a rearguard unit of SLA soldiers managed to infiltrate as far as Aliyavodai in Thoppikkal jungle, they triggered an LTTE response and staged a chaotic retreat.

They barely escaped a cordon and search operation reportedly led by Colonel Jeyam, the LTTE's special commander for Battiacaloa in the Vadamunai bush. Supporting SLA artillery killed four LTTE cadres, but yet a Karuna Group cadre was captured and the body of another left behind.

In the early phases of the Vaharai offensive, SLA units operating under the instructions of Major General Pannipttiya, Commanding Officer, Security Force (East), deployed Karuna Group men differently.

They were given specific tasks such as neutralizing an LTTE position or establishing one of their own at a location within LTTE-controlled area.

Karuna Group cadres, given their knowledge of the territory and the Tamil language, scored a success in an initial mission on Oct 6, 2006. Masquerading as LTTE fighters, Karuna Group cadres approached an unsuspecting group of Tigers and shot them all at point-blank range. The Tigers lost eleven fighters in that incident.

But the element of surprise was now lost.

In the subsequent phases, in a series of fire-fights with LTTE cadres, the Karuna Group sustained heavy losses. Over forty cadres were killed, seriously wounded or captured in different attempts to infiltrate Vaharai.

The losses lead to friction with the SLA amid the Karuna Group’s complaints that the extent of artillery and air support being extended to them was much less than that received by SLA units.

Just as the STF had in Amparai, in the final stages of the Vaharai battle, the SLA removed Karuna Group cadres from the area of operations.

Limited options

However, despite the dismal performance of his fighting cadres, Karuna maintained a high profile in the media. The TMVP’s media reports about operations jointly carried out with the SLA against the LTTE, often contradicted the military’s versions.

Each claimed the anti-LTTE operations were carried out without the other's assistance. The contradictions came to a head when four Tiger dead bodies were recovered along with some weapons near Miyankulam on the A11 highway on December 13, 2006.

The Karuna Group's claims were creating disquiet in the south and undisguised irritation within the military. The issue went up the chain of command to President Rajapakse himself.

The instructions from the top were clear and final. In contrast to the early days of the ‘shadow war’, Karuna was instructed not to make any claims on recent successes against the Tigers. Further publicity for the Karuna Group in the south would be unhelpful, he was told.

Indeed, in his interview in early February on Derana TV, Karuna disclaimed his fighters' involvement in the Vaharai battles.

“The SLA is now capable of handling these matters,” he said. “They did not ask. … We did not go.”

On Oct. 8, 2006, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) collected the bodies of eleven SLA soldiers from the LTTE in Vaharai. However, they were not permitted to collect another six bodies of Karuna Group cadres killed alongside the soldiers.

Meanwhile, amid increasing complaints of criminal activity, Karuna was asked to discipline his cadres, whose conduct was embarrassing the security forces in the Muslim area of Kattankudi.

In general, the TMVP was told, it should concentrate on its political agenda for the time being.

Karuna is thus in a bind. Unlike Douglas Devananda, who heads the paramilitary EPDP or the militant turned politicians in the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), he is not used to parliamentary politics.

Without no credible and sustainable military capability, Karuna desperately needs a political support base for his survival. But that produces another problem: what political slogan can woo the eastern Tamil constituency?

The Tamils in the east have too many stakeholders for a newcomer, especially one with a track record of cooperation with the Sri Lankan military which has a particularly brutal history in the eastern province.

Even in last year’s local government elections in Ampara and Trincomalee, the Tamils demonstrated they were not prepared to vote for the parties backed by military. Instead, the LTTE-backed TNA did well.

As the results show, the majority of the Tamil community are likely continue to take this stance. The remaining votes will be equally contested by anti LTTE groups - PLOT, EPRLF (Varathar) and EPDP – other than the Karuna Group.

Even if, as has been unsuccessfully tried before, Karuna unites the ant-LTTE Tamil groups in the east behind him and with the help of the military gets a sizeable electoral backing, this alone cannot give him control of the east.

Over the years the demography of the Eastern Province has been deliberately and (often) violently manipulated to create equal representation of all three communities: Muslim, Tamil and Sinhalese.

Karuna therefore cannot afford to make political statements that could undermine his possible future alliance with other communities’ representatives. Such an alliance would be unavoidable to secure even a provincial portfolio for the TMVP.

Which is why, addressing his recruits this weekend, Karuna asserted: “We want to live equally with the majority Sinhalese and minority Muslims.”

There is one other, time proven, way for Karuna to establish himself in the east: to strike a bargain with Sri Lanka’s most powerful office, the executive presidency.

Which is why Karuna is unabashedly singing hosannas for Mahinda Rajapakse. The oddity of the former Tamil liberation fighter praising ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ is not entirely inexplicable.

His overt praise of his former foes, the Sri Lanka Army and its commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, is a strategy of exaggerated subservience to defuse rising Sinhala doubts that one day this Tamil terrorist will ‘revert to type’ – or perhaps, by his actions, invite unwanted external interventions.

As he told his cadres last weekend in comments reported in the south: "When we left the LTTE on 03 March 2004 we decided to enter into the main stream politics of Sri Lanka.

“When we left the LTTE, we also gave up the policy of Separate state or Tamil Eelam. We do not believe in such a utopian politics any more.”

Three years after launching his rebellion against the LTTE, Karuna is very far from where he was on March 2, 2004.

For Rajapakse, he is a fortuitous dual-purpose (military and political) tool. Though Wickremesinghe’s party claimed credit for creating the split in the LTTE, Karuna belongs exclusively to the President.

For the TMVP’s sub-commanders, his personal political ambitions are the only means by which financial security and legal immunity (an increasing necessity amid rising accusations of murder and gang-rape) are possible.

For the Sri Lankan military he is an initially welcome but now problematic counterinsurgency asset that needs to be handled with care: on a tight leash, but at arm’s length.

For the Sinhala polity, he is another element to undermine the Tamils’ unity against the discrimination of the Sri Lankan state.

For the other anti-LTTE Tamil groups, he is an unwelcome – and dangerous - player in their limited political pool.

For the Tamils of the east, he is the latest in a long line of Army-backed militants whose extortion, conscription and unrestrained violence they must endure.

For the LTTE he is one more informant to eliminate.

http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=1138

Armed forces on the offensive

Taking the fight to the Tigers by land, sea and air

Karuna, Prabhakaran’s enfant terrible

The difference between the present phase of the war and the previous ones is that unlike earlier, the security forces are not restricted to a single operation like, say Riviresa. They are working to a plan and simultaneously directing their firepower in Batticaloa, Toppigala, Vavunativu, Kokokodicholai, Amparai, Vavuniya and Muhamalai in Jaffna.

Firing on all fronts, the military believes, unsettles the Tigers, who were accustomed to facing one operation at a time and therefore, were free to tactically withdraw, to fight another day. In Eelam War IV, the military is calling the shots, deciding when and where to take on the Tigers, often with an element of surprise.

While the work of the valiant security forces in the East, in recent times, must not be undermined, it must also be added that the LTTE’s tactical withdrawal was not for nothing. It was in preparation for a major battle up North.

According to intelligence reports, the Charles Anthony Brigade and the Imranpandyan Brigade, which were training in Kilinochchi, suddenly shifted to Mullaitivu under thick forest cover, owing to air-strikes by the Air Force. The tri-forces are working in unison, with the SLAF using the Kfirs and the first four Mig 27s, are awaiting delivery of a another four Migs already ordered.

The SLAF special squadron and the SLAF Intelligence have been deployed in the Katunayake area, with further restrictions on visits to the hangars of the Kfirs and Migs being imposed. Other than pilots and technicians, even other SLAF personnel cannot visit these areas, while special identification for those allowed entry, are being issued by the SLAF police.

That the North is hotting up, is quite evident, with preparations by both sides. Warnings by LTTE political wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan, that there will be a bloodbath in the rest of the country, if Mullaitivu is targeted, has been taken seriously by the Defence establishment. Maximum alert has been ordered in Colombo and other parts of the island.

That the LTTE plans to target Colombo was evident from intelligence reports that suicide bombers were roaming in the capital.

Military intelligence disclosed that the LTTE had sent five suicide cadres to Chavakachcheri in Jaffna, to attack a military convoy, while a group of 12 cadres were to plan claymore mine attacks.

The army has given civilians fresh instructions to be beyond a certain point on the road, when convoys pass, to avoid being caught in explosions, as the LTTE is bent on targeting the army. Very often, civilians have also died or sustained injuries in these claymore explosions.

The military claims that an alert sentry on Friday shot dead a Tiger suicide bomber at a roadblock at Savalkattu in Jaffna, when he was trying to detonate the explosives.

Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka visited Jaffna yesterday and met Security Forces Commander Major General C.A. Chandrasiri, Divisional Commanders and Field Commanders. General Chandrasiri briefed the army chief on the security situation and discussed plans which cannot be disclosed for security reasons.

General Chandasiri who received a delegation of Catholic Bishops said that the civilians were cooperating with the military, informing it of any attempts by the LTTE to create chaos.

On Friday night, the military claims that the LTTE launched artillery and mortar attacks on the Northern FDL at Muhamalai, which the security forces had retaliated with heavy artillery fire, bringing the situation under control. A soldier was killed and another injured in the attack.

The military is ready to repulse any LTTE attack on the Muhamalai and Nagarkovil areas, employing the recently operational Mack Infantry Brigade. The Brigade’s Commanding Officer, Colonel Ralph Nugera, seriously injured when an LTTE artillery shell exploded at a conference he was attending in Jaffna, was replaced by Col. Shantha Dissanayake. The 533 Brigade is under regular training and ready to take on the Tigers.

However, the real military action was in Vavuniya.

There are claims and counter claims of attacks west of Omanthai, Vavuniya. The military claims that for the third successive day, the LTTE fired 120 mm mortars and the army responded with stiff retaliation. The LTTE says the army commenced an operation northwest of Vavuniya in LTTE-controlled Palamoddai and west of this area at Mullikkulam, along the Vavuniya-Mannar border.

Both parties agree on the casualty figures of the army in the Omanathai area while the military says there were seven LTTE bodies in “no man’s land”. The LTTE says the troops hurriedly withdrew from the area, leaving behind military hardware, as the Tigers put up stiff resistance between 12:00 nn and 3:00 pm. yesterday.

A captain, two second lieutenants and two soldiers were killed, while 23 security force personnel were wounded, including four in critical condition. Six of the injured were able to return to the battlefield, while the rest were airlifted to Anuradhapura General Hospital. The Security Forces retaliated with heavy artillery and mortar fire.

The military admitted a soldier was injured on Thursday by an LTTE mortar attack west of Omanthai from the Pandiwirichchan area. This version tallies with the military’s assertion that the Tigers have been directing mortar fire for the past three days. In the first attack on the Muhamalai FDL, the LTTE tried to make out that the army had begun an operation, which proved to be otherwise. In the October 11 Muhamalai attack, the military denied it began an operation, which was, in fact, a military offensive.

Besides the North hotting up, as the week drew to a close, it began with heavy fighting in the East. The military is pushing the Tigers into a situation where it would be deprived of food, medicine and ammunition. The Navy is patrolling the Eastern seas, to prevent supplies, while the army attempts to surround the Tiger strongholds by infiltrating in small numbers, as it did previously.

Infantry and elite troops, including commandos and special forces, are infiltrating the Thoppigala jungles in small groups. Their purpose is to seek and eliminate the Tigers in small numbers. The same is happening in Taravikulam, Kokodicholai and Vavunativu, the last Tiger bastions in the East.

During clearing operations in Unnichchai, 12 kilometres south-west of Karadiyanaru in Batticaloa, the Security forces on Sunday confronted an LTTE movement, killing 14 Tigers, while a soldier died and 10 others were injured in heavy fighting between 7:00 am. and 4:pm. The injured were admitted to Ampara Base Hospital.

A large haul of weapons, including two RPG launchers, one sniper weapon, 10 T-56 assault riffles and five mobile phones were recovered.

Commandos on Tuesday handed over bodies of seven Tiger cadres killed in Unnachchi, to the ICRC at Kohombagasthalawa. These cadres were killed on Sunday, in confrontations with troops on a search and clear operation in Unnachchi, along the Maha Oya-Chenkalady road, about 40 kilometers from Batticaloa. The military claims that 28 Tiger cadres were killed in this confrontation. Mopping up operations are on. However, clearing the East 100%, will not be practical, with Tiger infiltration among the civilian population. The plan is to go in for elections in the East, once the security forces are in control. The Eastern MPs, with added security, will be approached to join the government. Karuna’s contribution to the military victories in the East can neither be downplayed nor overlooked.

For a considerable period of time, the LTTE made a serious effort to play down the ‘Karuna’ factor. However, in a recent article, the pro Tiger Tamil Guardian in London, has dwelt on the implications of Karuna’s defection, at length.

Marking the third anniversary of the defection, the Guardian article has logically argued that Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Col. Karuna, LTTE’s Eastern province leader, has lost influence in all quarters, including the very Eastern Tamils he had wanted to represent.

Observers feel that the purpose of the article was to bring down Karuna’s image on the eve of a possible election in the East, which the Wanni Tigers are paranoid about.

The fact that the LTTE organ has devoted so much time and space on this defection, is proof to the military that the Wanni Tigers were adversely affected by Karuna’s breakaway on March 2, 2004.

Karuna’s biggest contribution to the military was sharing secrets of the Tigers’ military strength, thinking, plans and terrain. He plays the role of a devil’s advocate, in exchange for protection and security.

To the LTTE, Karuna is one more informant to be eliminated, according to the concluding lines of the March 7, Guardian article.

To dismiss Karuna as a mere informant is wishful thinking. However, that is to be expected, given the efforts by the Tigers to dismiss his role as being insignificant.

In fact, of all Prabhakaran’s enemies, Karuna ranks No. 1, and the Wanni faction has spent millions of rupees to track him down here and overseas or, just eliminate him but, to no avail. It is reported that Ramesh, who succeeded Karuna in the East, offered a gratification of Rs. 15 million to a senior military official, to track down Karuna. The official had, however, declined the offer.

The Wanni leadership has also looked at killing the renegade, turned traitor, according to their belief, by poisoning him through unsuspecting Tamils returning from overseas. Karuna is alive to the ways sought to eliminate him.

However, he wou;ld also entertain fears of Southern leaders using him and later, allowing him to be eliminated at a convenient time. Hence, he has decided to fall in line with the thinking of the current political/military leadership.

After President Chandrika Kumarartunga’s United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) came to power in the April 2004 General elections, the LTTE obtained free access for its armed cadres to cross through Government-controlled territory to track down Karuna. The LTTE tried to overpower him on April 9, by sending a number of cadres with heavy weapons, across the Verugal River to Karuna’s main camp at Meenakam. The Jeyanathan Regiment, which Karuna commanded at the time of his breakaway, was sent to take him on at Meenakam. But, Karuna disbanded his troops and fled to the South with the support of UNP MP Alizahir Maulana.

Prabhakaran vowed to take revenge on the UNP, by depriving it from coming to power at the Presidential polls. Through intermediaries, he tried to seek Mahinda Rajapaksa’s support to turn over Karuna, once he gets elected President. This fits well with the allegation that there was a deal involving millions of rupees to prevent Tamils from LTTE areas, from voting at the Presidential polls.

Ranil Wickremesinghe paid the price by losing the Presidency. Naturally, he is annoyed with his opponent Rajapaksa and is seeking clarification about this alleged deal that deprived him of the Presidency. Like he extracted weapons from President Ranasinghe Premadasa, Prabhakaran wanted hard cash this time around, if he was to prevent the Tamils under his jackboot, from voting for Wickremesinghe.

Prabhakaran had enough of Wickremesinghe, who was referred to by the LTTE leadership as the fox, given the way the international community was used to trap the LTTE. So, through intermediaries, Wickremesinghe sent before the Presidential polls, Prabhakaran asked for the impossible- a written assurance that the much-maligned Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) would be granted.

Having already dealt with Wickremesinghe and Kumaratunga, in fact, Prabhakaran preferred a new leader on the throne. His demand to the unsuspecting Rajapaksa to make him President, was to have Karuna turned over, in exchange for peace talks.

Prabhakaran, in his annual Heroes Week speech, described the new President as a practical person, as he knew the most practical thing to do, if he wanted peace, was to hand over Karuna, the thorn in Prabhakaran’s flesh.

As, the request to turn over Karuna was not complied with, the LTTE responded with claymore mines. The LTTE changed its strategy and got an undertaking at the Geneva I talks, that the Government would disband paramilitaries. This was in the hope that Karuna’s group would then pale into insignificance. That too did not happen. Through the February 22, 2002 Cease-Fire Agreement, the LTTE made certain of a clause to make the disarming of paramilitaries mandatory. The now unarmed former militants were sought and eliminated one by one, during the peace process.

However, this time, nothing of the sort happened, and the new government was not willing to live up to the Geneva undertaking, given what happened to the EPDP, EPRLF and PLOTE previously. And some add that Karuna’s support was, in fact, required, as war was on the cards, after the LTTE targeted Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka.

In some of the recent battles, it was evident that Karuna’s faction made a major contribution. In the three years, Karuna was successful on four occasions, after initially disbanding. In August 2004, the ‘Karuna’ group attacked Pundalchenai in Batticaloa and killed 20 Wanni cadres and recovered T-56 weapons and AK-47s. Two ‘Karuna’ cadres died in this battle and six were injured. In December 2004, at Pullamullai, on the Trinco- Batticaloa road, 15 Wanni Tigers were killed, while Karuna’s group lost three. On March 3, 2005, Karuna’s group overran Stanley Base in Amparai, as well as the 73 base and the Pu base, killing 12 Wanni Tigers, while losing six of their men. Small arms and heavy weapons, including RPGs and mortars, were recovered. The Wanni group moved back into Stanley Base, which was again overrun by the STF recently.

The biggest attack by Karuna’s group to date, was staged in October 2006, when it stormed Karadiyanaru, killing 32 Wanni cadres at the expense of seven of its men. RPGs, mortars, T-56 and AK-47 rifles were recovered. In January 2007, the ‘Karuna’ faction attacked Panchumaraththandu in Toppigala, killing 35 Wanni Tigers.

Vowing to ‘liberate the Eastern Tamils from Vanni domination’ Karuna’s cadres began launching raids against the LTTE. The TMVP projected these attacks as significant military achievements, in which a few Tiger cadres were killed from time to time,” said the Guardian article.

Karuna sprang an element of surprise in October, 2006, killing 11 Wanni Tigers. In these major operations, 125 Wanni Tigers were killed by the ‘Karuna’ faction, which lost 18 cadres and another 40 plus, during infiltration of Vakarai, according to the LTTE.

The Guardian article admits that Karuna was able to kill a number of LTTE officials and fighters, even though at a price. It is also common knowledge that the Wanni faction has been systematically decimating the ‘Karuna’ group in a series of attacks, during the past three years. The biggest blow to Karuna was the killing of his brother, Vinayagamoorthi Sivanesathurai alias ‘Reggie’. That there was infiltration, Karuna was well aware; the Kottawa killings and infiltration at Vannathurai in Welikkanda, are good examples.

Colonel Cheindan Master, responsible for assassinating several ‘Karuna’ faction members at a house in Kottawa in 2005, was killed in a military confrontation last week, that also saw other senior LTTE cadres, including Colonels Shivaram, Ilannkiyan, Shivakumaran and Major Ravi killed, according to the military. Cheindan Master had also killed EPRLF leader Vardhan at Kanthankudi in Batticaloa, and several others. Thjere was a court warrant for his arrest.

During the past three years, 87 Wanni cadres surrendered to the ‘Karuna’ group, while in the past two weeks alone, there were 38 surrendees. Because of the fear of infiltration, they are not absorbed immediately into the group but, are under surveillance by Karuna’s intelligence team, which is expected to file a report. Those not absorbed will find their way abroad, lest they be targeted by the LTTE, which is in the same predicament as regards infiltration by Karuna’s group. A series of claymore explosions in LTTE-controlled areas has necessitated the issue of identity cards for its cadres in the Wanni.

There are reports of moves to reunite the ‘Karuna’ faction with the Wanni group. But, Karuna knows better. No Tiger who undermined Prabhakaran, sided with his enemies or, betrayed him, was spared. He is aware of the fate of former deputy leader Mahattaya and a host of others.

Karuna is lucky to be alive after three years, in as much as Minister Douglas Devananda has survived many an attack by the LTTE.

The Tigers, which dominated the internecine war between the LTTE and the former militant groups in the eighties, and throughout, are facing a hurdle this time, as Karuna broke away citing discrimination by the Wanni faction, towards Eastern Tamils, who, he claimed, were deprived of top positions and were simply used as cannon fodder in the war.

When Karuna broke away from the LTTE, the Guardian article says, “his rebel yell was ‘freeing the East from the domination of the north,’”

He asked Colombo, foreign governments, including peace-broker Norway, and other international actors to treat his breakaway faction accordingly, the article states. But that was not to be, even the military under President Chandrika Kumaratunga did not want to support Karuna and antagonise the Wanni faction.

After the initial setback, and a tactical withdrawal, he returned when the climate was right.

“Karuna knew that only solid control over a piece of territory, no matter how small, could ensure him a respectable position in any future bargaining for his ambitions,” the Guardian article observed, adding that he based his strategy on his own military experience and his group’s armed capability.

After the fall of Vakarai, the Tamils in the East, Karuna argued, would quit their freedom struggle, once the Government commenced social development and educational programmes. The Guardian article goes on to paint Karuna as yet another deserter of the freedom struggle of Tamils.

However, what the article does not state is that Karuna, and before him, many former Tamil militants such as Douglas Devananda and a host of others have come to realise that separation is not a practical alternative and this separatist war cannot be won.

In fact, it not only cannot be won by the LTTE and all the Tamil militant groups but, it cannot be won by the state either. Neither side can control all the territory in the north and east at the same time. We know what happened after Operation Riviresa. All the gains by the UNP administration in the East were lost in the efforts to capture Jaffna and have an alternative supply route to the peninsula. But, this phase of war is different from the previous ones in that the tri services are working in tandem and to a plan, taking many targets together. But again whether the man power is sufficient to hold on to vast areas of land at once is left to be seen.

http://www.nation.lk/2007/03/18/newsfe1.htm