நித்திரை கொள்ளமுடியாமல் தவிக்கும் ராமனின் "அழல்" கருத்துக்கள்..

Paper no. 2182

26.03.2007

LTTE'S AIR STRIKE ON AIR FORCE BASE - INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 209

by B. Raman

(To be read in continuation of my article dated June 2, 2005, titled "The World's First Terrorist Air Force" available at http://www.saag.org/papers14/paper1398.html. It is annexed below)

The Tamil Eelam Air Force (TAF) of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has been in existence for at least nine years without the Sri Lankan intelligence having the least idea about its location and capability, went into action for the first time since its creation in the early morning of (12-45 AM) March 26,2007. It was a conventional air attack and not a suicide mission.

2. Two aircraft of the TAF flew over the Sri Lankan Air Force base at Katunayake near Colombo and dropped four bombs. At least three SLAF personnel were killed and about 20 injured. Two helicopters, reportedly given by Pakistan, were badly damaged. There was also some damage to the Israeli aircraft of the Sri Lankan Air Force.

3. The LTTE has claimed that both its planes returned safely to base and has released a photograph of Prabakaran with the officers of the TAF. It is reported that the approach of an unidentified aircraft towards the base was detected by the Sri Lankan Air Force radar, but the anti-aircraft units at the base failed to go into action. The SLAF pilots' capability for night operations is poor and the Air Tigers took advantage of this to fly over the base unintercepted and bomb it.

4. The Sri Lankan authorities immediately closed the nearby civilian airport and diverted all incoming flights to Indian airports.

5. The LTTE has projected its air strike as in retaliation for the repeated bombing of civilian areas by the Sri Lankan Air Force, which has killed a large number of innocent Tamil civilians. Many of these air strikes of the SLAF were carried out by mercenary Ukrainian pilots.

6. It was not only a reprisal air strike, but also a pre-emptive air strike to prevent an offensive operation, which the Sri Lankan Armed Forces are planning to launch in the Northern Province in order to liberate the areas under the control of the LTTE there. A fresh team of Pakistani counter-insurgency experts and Air Force officers has recently arrived in Colombo to assist the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in their planned operations in the Northern Province.

7. Apprehending this offensive, the LTTE has stepped up its arms procurement efforts. As reported earlier, it has already managed to replenish its stocks of explosives. It had undertaken a detailed study of the Hizbollah operations against Israel in July last in order to draw lessons from it. It was also trying to procure from the Hizbollah the surface-to-surface rockets, which it had used effectively against Israeli targets. It is not yet known whether it has succeeded in procuring them. If it has, it may bring them into action against military and economic targets in Colombo.

8. The war against the LTTE started by President Mahinda Rajapakse after assuming office in November, 2005, with the help of Pakistan, has entered a new phase.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:itschen36@gmail.com)

ANNEXURE

Paper no. 1398 dated 02.06.2005

THE WORLD'S FIRST TERRORIST AIR FORCE

by B. Raman

Speaking at a meeting of the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Sri Lanka at Colombo on May 26, 2005, Hagrup Haukland, the chief of the Norwegian-led military mission, which monitors the three-year-old ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), confirmed the allegation of the Sri Lankan Government that the LTTE had constructed an airstrip near Iranamadu in the Wanni area under its control in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka,

2. He said: "We have seen the airstrip while flying in a Sri Lankan military helicopter." However, he did not comment on the other allegation of the Government that the LTTE has acquired at least two aircraft which looked like the Czech-built Zlin Z-143.He said that his mission had been denied access by the LTTE to verify the Government charges that the LTTE possessed at least two light aircraft. From his statement, it would appear that while his mission was able to see the airstrip from the Sri Lankan helicopter, it could not notice the presence of any aircraft on the ground on or in the vicinity of the airstrip. He did not give any other details as to whether the mission noticed any hangar or any other construction in which the LTTE might have kept the aircraft concealed..

3. He warned that any move by the Government forces to bomb the airstrip could lead to a resumption of the war. Haukland said an air capability would "mean a hell of a lot" to the LTTE. "Those two aircraft, if they have any, represent a very serious threat," he said, and added that India had also expressed concern over the matter.

4. Asked what would happen if the Sri Lankan military were to bomb the airstrip, he said: "If the air force bombs the air strip, then it will be war. If bombs fall, we pull out... it is not a ceasefire anymore. If the Tigers fly, it will be a violation of Sri Lankan airspace and also of international law because the air space is a matter only for the Sri Lankan government."

5. The Sri Lankan authorities, who have been seriously concerned over the implications of the LTTE's success in clandestinely acquiring an air capability for terrorist operations, have for the present confined their reaction to bringing the matter to the notice of foreign governments, including reportedly those of India and Pakistan. President Chandrika Kumaratunga is expected to discuss this development with Indian leaders during her expected visit to New Delhi this week.

6. The LTTE's plans to acquire an air-mounted capability for suicide missions against Government personalities and ground infrastructure were known for nearly 15 years. The Western and Indian intelligence agencies had detected its instructions to its followers in countries such as the UK and Switzerland to join the local flying clubs and learn flying. They had also noticed that its cadres in West Europe and Canada were buying a large number of expensive technical books relating to flying and that they had been making enquiries in Europe about the availability of microlite aircraft and the price. They were closely monitoring its efforts in order to prevent it from acquiring any aircraft.

7. The fact that it had hoodwinked them and succeeded in acquiring some aircraft and having it smuggled to the areas under its control---possibly in a dismantled condition---became evident on November 27, 1998, when its Voice of Tigers clandestine radio station, in a broadcast on a function held in the Wanni area in memory of its cadres killed in terrorist operations, claimed that aircraft of the "Air Tigers" had sprinkled flowers from the air on the memorial. It did not specify the number and whether they were fixed-wing planes or helicopters.

8. Since then, there were periodic reports that the LTTE had managed to acquire abroad and smuggle to the Wanni area at least one light aircraft, but the Sri Lankan authorities kept denying these reports. What is new now is not that the LTTE has acquired aircraft for its air wing, which is at least seven years old, but that the Sri Lankan Government has, for the first time, officially admitted it and taken up the matter with the international community.

9. While the LTTE's acquisition of an air-mounted capability for suicide terrorism is thus old news, it needs to be added that it has not so far used the aircraft, in a conventional or unconventional manner, either for suicide missions or in its operations against the Sri Lankan security forces before the ceasefire came into force in 2002.

10. During its various rounds of fighting against the Sri Lankan security forces before 2002, it was totally relying on conventional anti-aircraft weapons and surface-to-air missiles for bringing down aircraft of the Sri Lankan Air Force. It had acquired some of them on its own in Thailand and other places and smuggled them into the areas under its control and received some others from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM---then known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar) of Pakistan in 1995 as a quid pro quo for clandestinely transporting in one of its shipe a consignment of arms and ammunition to the jihadi terrorist groups of southern Philippines, who were being assisted by the HUM.

11. By 2001, the LTTE had exhausted its holding of anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles and started facing difficulties in procuring replenishments. These difficulties increased after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, when the US intelligence started closely monitoring the movements of LTTE ships in order to prevent their being used for the clandestine transport of arms and ammunition or for the movement of men by the Al Qaeda and its associates in the International Islamic Front (IIF).

12. Despite these difficulties, the LTTE continued to clandestinely procure arms and ammunition from different sources and transport them in its ships to northern Sri Lanka, without anything being done to stop this either by the Norwegian-led monitoring mission or by the other members of the international community. Only the Indian agencies and Coast Guard continued to monitor the LTTE activities and share with the Government of Sri Lanka any information coming to their notice. There had been occasions before the ceasefire when Indian naval ships had by themselves intercepted LTTE ships and foiled their gun-running missions.

13. It needs to be mentioned here that ever since the LTTE acquired a shipping capability for clandestine gun-running, there had been innumerable occasions when its gun-running missions were foiled on the high seas or near Sri Lankan coastal waters. In all these instances, action was initiated by the Navies of India and/or Sri Lanka.

14. To my knowledge, there has not been a single instance in which other powers---either in Asia or Europe, including East Europe or the US---had thwarted a single gun-running mission of the LTTE---either by preventing it from clandestinely procuring arms and ammunition or smuggling them by sea to northern Sri Lanka.

15. From this, it would not be wrong to conclude that the silence and inaction of many external powers have contributed to the LTTE's emerging as the most ruthless non-jihadi terrorist organisation of the world with a capability for sea and air mounted suicide missions. While the US and other Western powers have not hesitated to act promptly and decisively against jihadi terrorist organisations posing a threat to the lives of their citizens and their interests, they have shown a worrisome reluctance to act against non-jihadi terrorist organisations.

16. One does not know clearly whether the LTTE procured the planes in its holding before or after 9/11. It is a serious development whenever they were procured. It would be even more serious if the procurement had been made after 9/11 when the international community, acting under UN Security Council Resolution No.1373 against terrorism, set in place an international anti-terrorist infrastructure and networking in order to prevent the flow of funds and equipment to terrorist organisations.

17. If the LTTE had hoodwinked the intelligence agencies of the world after 9/11, it should be equally easy for other terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaeda and the other members of the IIF to similarly hoodwink them for procuring and transporting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material to areas of intended use.

18. The reluctance and the failure of the international community to act against the LTTE have serious implications for the so-called war against terrorism. The Sri Lankan Government cannot escape a major share of responsibility for this state of affairs. Its failure to take up the matter with the monitoring mechanism set up by the Security Council after the passage of Resolution 1373 and complain not only against the LTTE, but also against the countries which have been turning a blind eyes to the LTTE's gun-running and the supine attitude of the Norwegian-led monitoring mission towards the LTTE have contributed to the emergence of the world's first terrorist Air Force.

http://www.saag.org/papers22/paper2182.html

LTTE Air attack: Air Defence and Related Issues

Guest Column by Commodore RS Vasan IN (Retd)

It is over a week since the first ever air attack by the air wing of LTTE was carried out on Monday 26th March 2007 at 0045 hrs. The most important dimension of this attack is the aspect of Air Defence or lack of it, which allowed the attack to go through. This article is an attempt to examine the air defence aspects of the attack, which are extremely important in the context of the success of the attack by the LTTE. The analysis would look at both the constituents of success as well as those of failure.

Constituents of Success. The listing and analysis of the ‘means and methods’ of by which the LTTE was able to sneak through and drop bombs at the Katyunayake Air Field would also hold the key to the subsequent analysis of what led to the failures on the part of the Sri Lankan Air force. These are covered in the succeeding paragraphs.

The Platform. From the photographs released by the Tamil net, it is clear that the aircraft used for the attack are the Czech made Zlin Z 143 variants. The capabilities and limitations of this aircraft are covered in an article carried by SAAG on 26th May 2005, available at http://saag.org/papers15/paper1401.html . The aerobatic aircraft were imported in a knocked down condition to be assembled at the place of choosing. Any one can buy such an aircraft including a second hand one today on the Internet and work out the arrangements for shipping. There are reports that this aircraft were brought in containers and moved inland to be assembled in Tiger held areas.

From the data provided by the manufacturer it is seen that the aircraft has enough radius of operation to hit any target in Sri Lanka. While the pictures shown are that of the Zlin 143, it is quite possible that there are other small aircraft in the inventory of the LTTE. Earlier reports had indicated the acquisition of lighter aircraft such as the PC7 or the PC 9 from the Pilatus Company. Releasing of only the photographs of Zlin and possibility of hiding another type, as part of the Psy Ops (Psychological operations) should not be ruled out.

Crew and Training aspects. The photographs released show highly motivated crew who are jubilant. It is not known as to when this crew were photographed along with their leader. There has been a clear effort to hide the identity of the crewmembers. It is not difficult to assume that the crew would have been trained abroad in one of the flying schools. Even with the eyes covered in the photos, it may still be possible to establish the identity of the crew as well as the place where the crew may have been trained by collaborating with the Interpol who could examine the relevant data of all the flying schools (in Europe, Canada, Australia or any South eastern country) and zero in on the suspects which would lead to more leads on the ways adopted by the LTTE.

As the daring mission was undertaken at night, it is clear that the crew had gained proficiency by going through the full flying training course at a flying training school. The currency in flying could be maintained by continuing to consolidate and fly at the chosen location in a flying school till called to undertake the mission in the Island. This would ensure that only bare essential flying is carried out in Tiger held territory close to Irainamedu. The details of the possible airstrips from which flying could be undertaken are covered in SAAG article 1414 carried on http://saag.org/papers15/paper1414.html. However, it is to be borne in mind that the aircraft can operate even from semi prepared surfaces and is not totally dependent on full-fledged facilities.

The innovative way in which the weapon carriage and release mechanisms have been integrated in to the Zlin aircraft are worthy of mention. It is clear that a lot of calculation has gone in to ensuring that the modification does not impair safe flying due to infringement of the aerodynamic characteristics. The end result is the ability of the aircraft to carry up to four small bombs that could be released. With the limitations of weight and balance aspects, the crew would have carried just enough fuel to reach the target and return thus optimising the payload.

As far the aeronautical training and technology levels displayed by the current lot of the air wing of the LTTE definitely owes its success to late Colonel Shanker alias Sornalingam who ensured that the seeds of sound aeronautical practices were imbibed by the team that he lead. The possibility of motivated Tamil youth who have acquired technical and flying skills joining the Air tigers explains the reasons for the success of the attack.

Accuracy of attack. The dropping of the bomb at the target would not have posed serious problems due to easy availability of hand held Global Positioning System (GPS) which would help in reaching the target in time. This would also provide ‘way point to way point’ navigation and ensure that no time is wasted in arriving in the target area. There would be no need for a sophisticated weapon aiming computer as the type of aircraft used are slower and could fly low to drop the bombs visually on the static targets chosen. However, flying at night is indeed challenging and the fact that the damages were not as high explains the aspect of inaccuracy creeping in. Also the limited payload that was carried by the aircraft can only prove highly dangerous if it hit incendiary/explosives or other such combustibles that could cause secondary fire and collateral damage.

Some questions have been raised on the aspects of flying by night and the accuracy of attacks at night. The skills of flying at night are something that are acquired by going through a laid down syllabus. As brought out earlier, the night endorsement for a Pilot on a particular aircraft is made by the Flying training school based on the training imparted to the trainee.

In the present day, simulator flying is quite handy in preparing the Pilots for the entire range of missions likely to be undertaken. With the help of google earth, it is even possible to replicate the entire flight over realistic reproduction of hybrid maps with elevation and important features marked. The entire flying up to the desired target area can be programmed on a personal computer and the mission flown on the computer to familiarise the air crew on the terrain and way points.

To enable visual detection and identification at night, it is possible for the co-pilot to carry night vision binoculars that would aid detection and identification of targets after reaching the target area with the help of GPS.

Evasion of Radars. A lot of debate has taken place on the efficacy of the Radar provided by India. Some in Sri Lanka were quick to blame the Indian Radar for the failure to detect the incoming raid by low flying aircraft. It may be recalled that India supplied the Indra series of Radar (produced by Bharat Electronics Limited), which is still in use both by its own Army and the Air Force.

The press in Sri Lanka have gone to the extent of suggesting that Indra was supplied to prevent the entry of Chinese who were ready to supply 3D Radar to Sri Lanka at a competitive cost. The hostile amongst them have even suggested that the only good thing that the Sri Lankans received was Budhism some 2500 years ago! The fact of the matter is that if the Sri Lankans wanted 3D radar it was also available from India. It is quite clear that the assessment was that 2D radar was sufficient to provide advance warning of the type of aircraft that was in LTTE possession at the time of threat evaluation. The 3D radars definitely have the advantage of providing height information, which the 2D radars are not designed for.

It has been reported that the Radar was switched off at the time of attack as well as for the previous two days for maintenance. It has also been suggested that there were perhaps moles who indicated that the Radar was switched off for a particular period either for maintenance or for operational reasons enabling the Air Tigers to mount the attack. Those knowledgeable in the Military will readily tell you that even a mole is not necessary to establish if the Radar is transmitting or not. Small electronic monitoring devices could indicate if there is transmission in a particular frequency band. And such devices could be carried either in the aircraft or by operatives close to the airfield. For example a radio set will also alert the observer about the transmissions due to what is termed as power seepage that provides a beep each time the transmission is received by a Radio. Apparently, the Air Traffic Control Radar at Bandarnayake International Airport (BIA) provided a last minute warning of the unidentified aircraft. Readers would recollect the debate over the efficacy /effectiveness of surveillance in our own air space when an unidentified aircraft had dropped arms at Purulia. The Indian Air Force was spurred along with the Civil Aviation department to look at integration of surveillance systems to ensure that detection capability was enhanced by both material and operational measures.

The detection by any Radar is a matter of physics and is dependent on design factors. As a rule the lower the aircraft, the shorter is the detection range due to the curvature of the earth. In addition to specially designed Radars for detection of low flying aircraft, Air Early Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) or an Air Early Warning (AEW) aircraft (minus the control architecture required for control of Fighter aircraft). By no means is it suggested that Sri Lankan Air Force should equip itself with such advanced expensive systems just to tackle a few small aircraft of the LTTE. However it needs to be borne in mind that it is to overcome this limitation that Air Forces with out the AWACS/AEW capability always resort to establishment of Mobile Observation Posts (MOPs) to enhance the reaction at the base. Tiers of MOPs would provide the direction and quantum of threat to the components of Air defence system.

The Indian Air Force is also no exception. The MOPS of the IAF have visual lookouts equipped with binoculars/Night Vision devices and communication links to provide advanced warning of approaching aircraft. In this present case, it has been reported that the crossing of the Northern border by the LTTE aircraft was indeed monitored by the SL Forces. Obviously the response of the Sri Lankan Air Force and the Ground forces despite receiving the report is indicative of a certain degree of casualness/improper analysis in preparing for the impending attack. Shoulder fired missiles or even conventional close range weapons would have been able to neutralise the threat and prevent the attack and the consequent embarrassment to the SL Government and its armed forces.

There have been reports in the media that the Indian Air Force has recommended to the Government that shoulder fired IGLA missiles and other essentials of an Air Defence system could be considered for supply to Sri Lanka. The stated position of the Indian Government in the past has been that it would provide the warning systems and not the weapons.

Element of Surprise. In a tactical engagement, the element of surprise is rated quite high by military analysts the world over. In this case a surprise attack at night by light aircraft, which hitherto had not at all been used in the past enabled the Air Tigers to accomplish their mission. There are no doubts that the International airport that lay on the opposite side of the Air force establishment could have been attacked with equal ease. However the possible adverse reaction by the international community obviously precluded the attack against BIA.

Having looked at the constituents of success, it would be now be relatively easier to identify the two prime causes of failure on part of the Sri Lankan forces. The same are listed below though not necessarily in the order of importance.

Being unprepared. It is clear that the SL Forces did not expect an aerial attack that too at night. The Air Defence measures were just not in place indicative of a level of complacency. There is definitely a need to revamp the entire system of surveillance, reporting and response mechanisms.

Intelligence. It is evident that there were gaps in the intelligence on the potential of the air wing. Some of the UAV missions undertaken in the past by the Sri Lankan Armed forces as well as visual reporting had clearly indicated the type of air activity undertaken by the Air wing of the LTTE. Failure to analyse the developments and its implications have resulted in loss of face for the SL Forces.

In conclusion, it is seen that the Air Tigers have won the first round in the new dimension of air wars. The two inquiry commissions ordered by the SL Government /Military would no doubt highlight the weaknesses and the possible causes. Some of would be remedied by both augmentation of material resources and review of the Operational procedures. The Air tigers would in the mean while would be examining the same factors that allowed them to succeed and would be refining their methodology for another attack as and when the situation is so warranted. The next attack doubtlessly would be against both commercial and military sea targets of the Sri Lankan Navy, which has enjoyed success at sea. Attacks on Sri Lankan Ports likewise cannot be ruled out.

On the part of India, the setting up of over eight mobile radars in the Seniappa Dargah Casurina jungle area appears to be an over kill. It is highly unlikely that the LTTE would carry out attacks on Indian soil with out grave provocation. One cannot rule out the use of these aircraft for clandestine activity.

http://www.saag.org/papers22/paper2193.html